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Abstract 
 
Of all the Tsar’s former subjects, the Kazakh nomad made perhaps the most 
unlikely communist. Following the Russian Civil War and the consolidation of Soviet 
power, a majority of Kazakhs still practised some form of nomadic custom, including 
seasonal migration and animal husbandry. For the Communist Party, this population 
posed both conceptual and administrative challenges. Taking guidance from an 
ideology more commonly associated with the industrial landscapes of Western Europe 
than the expanse of the Kazakh Steppe, the new Soviet state sought nevertheless to 
understand and administer its nomadic citizens. How was nomadism conceptualised by 
the state? What objectives did the state set itself with regards to nomads, and how 
successfully were these objectives achieved? What confounded the state’s efforts?  
Using a range of archival documentation produced by Party and state, scholarly 
publications, newspapers and memoir, this thesis assesses the Soviet state’s 
relationship with Kazakh nomads from the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the 
collectivisation drive. It argues that any consensus about the proper government of 
nomadic regions emerged slowly, and analyses the effect on nomads of disparate 
policies concerning land-ownership, border-control, taxation, and social policies 
including sanitation and education. The thesis asserts that the political factor which 
most often complicated the state’s treatment of nomads was the various concessions 
made by the Bolsheviks to non-Russian national identity. Meanwhile the state also 
made some concerted efforts to adapt itself to the nomadic lifestyle of the Kazakh 
population. 
The thesis concludes with a summary of the sedentarisation campaign 1928-
1934, in which nomadic communities were collectivised and brutally forced to settle. 
But the thesis’ central focus is on the years preceding sedentarisation, which have 
received comparably less attention in the historiography and, the thesis argues, 
represent a distinctive period for the state’s treatment of Kazakh nomads. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter One: 
Introduction 
 
Within the history of the Soviet Union, the treatment of Kazakh nomads by Party 
and state covers a substantial portion of the polity’s early years, as by the mid-1930s 
the tale has largely reached its denouement. But situated in the history of Central Asian 
nomadism, this same story occupies a comparably smaller area at the concluding end 
of the timeline. Though the events which took place on the Kazakh Steppe in the 1920s 
are in many ways distinctly Soviet, therefore, we glean some perspective from the 
broader context of Central Asia’s nomadic past and its earlier dominance of Russia. 
Nomadism was once the foremost social and economic form on the Kazakh 
Steppe. The impact of Mongol invasion, perpetrated by great nomadic armies led by the 
descendants of Ghengis Khan, was so sudden and profound, Svat Soucek argues, that 
the histories of Russia, China and Central Asia can each be divided into periods before 
and after Mongol rule.1 Many of the Mongolian Empire’s territories, including large 
swathes of Eurasia, had already been nomadic in character, but in some places 
sedentary cultures had existed and were altogether extinguished.2 Russia or Rus′, then 
a collection of city states led principally by Kiev, had long been challenged by Eurasian 
nomads but was in the thirteenth century comprehensively overrun and made 
subservient to the Golden Horde.3 
Emerging out of the Mongolian Empire, the Golden Horde was, from the 
thirteenth to the fifteenth century, a vast, powerful and resilient polity.4 Its rulers 
eventually adopted a sedentary way of life but David Morgan argues that the nomadic 
lifestyle practiced by much of its population enabled it to continue exploiting the 
sedentary cultures of Russia, leading to the prosperity and longevity of the Horde.5 
Charles J. Halperin suggests that the Golden Horde represented a ‘delicately balanced 
symbiosis’ of sedentary and nomadic elements.6 Rule by nomads had a notable impact 
                                                          
1 Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 103. 
2 Ibid., pp. 114-115. Thomas T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 51-52. 
3 Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 
pp. 10-20. The Golden Horde is sometimes referred to as the Kipchak Khanate. 
4 Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, p. 162.  
5 David Morgan, The Mongols, Second ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 151. 
6 Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, p. 26. 
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on the Russian psyche and, some have argued, on Russia’s later governing institutions.7 
Such was the gravity and humiliation of the defeat, Russia’s intellectuals lacked the 
linguistic and theological tools necessary to properly understand and communicate 
conquest by a non-Christian force of such might.8 Yet Russia inherited some of the old 
nomadic empire’s structures for taxation and administration, and Muscovy emerged as 
the centre of Russian military and political power by competing with other cities for 
their nomadic rulers’ favour.9 Moscow would remain the Russian capital until it was 
replaced by Saint Petersburg in 1713, and again served as capital after the Russian 
Revolution, demonstrating Moscow’s continuing significance and, by implication, the 
Mongols’ continuing legacy. 
The eventual rise of Russian authority based in Muscovy was concurrent with 
and connected to the disintegration of the Horde. 1502 is typically taken as the final 
year of the Golden Horde’s existence, after which it disintegrated into various khanates 
and conglomerations of nomadic clans which would eventually be annexed by the 
expanding Russian Empire.10 At this time Moscow was the dominant military power in 
the region, and within a relatively short period the balance of power had been tipped 
entirely in European Russia’s favour, that is, in the favour of a sedentary culture.11 
The word ‘Kazakh’ has been granted various origins. Some make reference to a 
Central Asian myth about a white goose.12 Some suggest the word comes from two 
others: ‘true nomad’.13 Martha Brill Olcott states that qaz is a Turkic word meaning ‘to 
wander’, and some have associated this with the Kazakh title and their nomadic 
heritage.14 Michael Khodarkovsky offers another translation of Kazakh, as ‘fugitive, 
freebooter’, in his description of the origins of the people themselves, who emerged out 
of one of the khanates which formed the old Mongol Empire and by the late 1500s had 
come to control ‘enormous pasturelands from the Yaik in the west to the Irtysh in the 
                                                          
7 Karl A. Wittfogel, 'Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast,' Slavic Review 22, no. 4 
(1963), pp. 627-643. 
8 Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, pp. 61-64. 
9 Ibid., pp. 44-60. 
10 Morgan, The Mongols, p. 128. 
11 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 20. 
12 Shirin Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State, Former Soviet 
South Project (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 11. 
13 Didar Kassymova, Zhanat Kundakbaeva, and Ustina Markus, eds., Historical Dictionary of 
Kazakhstan (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2012), p. 142. 
14 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, First ed., Studies of Nationalities in the USSR (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 4. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
east.’15 There is a consensus among historians that by this time Kazakh society had a 
tripartite structure, with clans divided into one of three Juz (meaning ‘hundred’): a 
younger, middle and elder Juz, each occupying different parts of the Kazakh Steppe.16 
The Kazakhs were a nomadic people who spoke a Turkic language.17 
Russian colonial occupation of the Kazakhs, which came before the conquest of 
the other four Central Asian populations to eventually be granted their own Soviet 
Republic (Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbeks and Tajiks), was facilitated by technology, 
particularly gunpowder. The geographical proximity of Russia to the Kazakhs’ land, and 
concerted Tsarist administrative efforts, caused the area now known as northern 
Kazakhstan to be occupied by sedentary Russian farmers in ever larger numbers.18 A 
steady rate of encroachment became in the late nineteenth century a heady race 
southwards for Russian officers, motivated in Alexander Morrison’s formulation by a 
search for a ‘natural frontier’.19 
Russian colonial occupation had the effect of causing some nomads to settle, but 
the Tsar’s administration in Central Asia was sparse and its effect on the everyday life 
of Kazakhs, in comparison to the tidal wave of interference which was to follow the 
collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, was less immense, hurried, and unilateral.20 
Clan loyalties were attacked and Orthodox Christianity was endorsed by wandering 
missionaries.21 Seismic changes did begin to gather pace in the early twentieth century, 
when an appalling famine in 1916 combined with an attempt to conscript Kazakhs into 
military service to create widespread unrest and the rise of the Basmachi.22 In 1917, 
when the Winter Palace was stormed, Russian rule on the steppe was predominant but 
sedentary culture was not quite the norm. Nomadic features of life, most importantly 
migration, remained substantially in evidence in the Tsar’s governor-generalships. 
* * * 
                                                          
15 Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, pp. 12, 13. 
16 Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, pp. 195-196. Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, pp. 12-13. 
Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire; A Guide, First ed. 
(London: C. Hurst & Company, 1985), p. 69.  
17 Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, p. 29. 
18 Bhavna Davé, Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 38. 
19 Alexander Morrison, 'Russia, Khoqand, and the Search for a "Natural" Frontier, 1893-1865,' 
Ab Imperio 2 (2014), pp. 1-27. 
20 Wayne Dowler, Classroom and Empire: The Politics of Schooling Russia's Eastern Nationalities, 
1860-1917 (London: Ithica, 2001), p. 140. Davé, Kazakhstan, p. 36. 
21 Soucek, A History of Inner Asia, p. 197.  
22 The Basmachi engaged in violent resistance and banditry in Central Asia as the Tsarist Empire 
began to collapse. Martha B. Olcott, 'The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 1918-24,' 
Soviet Studies 33, no. 3 (1981), pp. 352-369. Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 
1865-1923 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), pp. 183, 197. 
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The present thesis is the product of doctoral research which was initially 
concerned principally with issues of identity and nationality in early Soviet Central Asia. 
Study was guided by research questions relating to religion, language and tribal 
loyalties and their relationship with communism and nationalism in the 1920s. Due to 
the relatively diverse range of political voices to be heard before the rise of Stalin was 
complete, the 1920s appeared the most fruitful period for the study of the panoply of 
peoples and communities of Central Asia, how they were categorised in a post-
revolutionary context, and how they thought of themselves. In comparison to the more 
censorial decades which constitute the rest of Soviet history, in the 1920s every people 
seemed to have their spokesperson. 
The chronological focus has remained much the same, but amid the gamut of 
events and processes under consideration an unexpectedly clear and yet understudied 
story made itself apparent; one which, counter-intuitively, has proven to be less about 
identity and categorisation than about the lack of those things. Nomadism, often 
mentioned in analyses of Soviet Central Asia but seldom discussed in depth, was a 
significant feature of life on the Kazakh Steppe but any role it may have played as a 
unifying or mobilizing banner in the 1920s was often omitted from the secondary 
literature. In other words, nomads were presented as a people without a spokesperson. 
Why? How did the Communist Party relate to and understand nomads? How did 
nomads traverse the novel ideological terrain laid out by the revolution? How did they 
deal with the state, and the state with them? Did anyone speak for them? 
The decision to focus specifically on Kazakh nomads began largely as a pragmatic 
one. In the 1920s, that group which became the titular nationality of the Kazakh 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR) contained the largest single cohort of 
nomads within the Soviet Union.23  They therefore represent the largest single case 
study in the relationship between nomad and state in the early Soviet period. For the 
purposes of a doctoral thesis, focusing on the nomads of a single national group lends 
the project a realisable scale and a degree of clarity and specificity. Accurate 
generalisations can be made about the Party and state’s approach because these 
generalisations are restricted to a single republic with a single Party branch, a single 
Central Committee and Council of People’s Commissars, and a single territorial ambit. 
Archival holdings in Moscow and Almaty provide ample foundational material for the 
                                                          
23 Sarah Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe: Soviet Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Famine, 1921-1934', 
PhD thesis (Yale University, 2011), p. 5. See also: Ernest Gellner, 'Foreword,' in Nomads and the 
Outside World, ed. A. M. Khazanov (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. xii. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
thesis, while holdings in Bishkek, for example, can be logically omitted on this occasion. 
In spite of this, additionally, some of these general observations can be sensibly applied 
to other groups of nomads by way of informed speculation. 
These simplifications do come with their own further complications. In various 
ways the category of Kazakh was contested after the revolution, and the republic which 
became independent Kazakhstan saw its borders expand and contract very 
considerably, most notably in 1925. Thus the present thesis uses the Kazakh 
appellation when discussing any year in the period of study in spite of the fact that 
Kazakh meant different or many different things at different times, and further 
notwithstanding the earliest uses not of Kazakh or even Kazak but Kirgiz in the Russian 
language, a problem discussed later in this chapter.  Yet this imprecision is justified by 
the legibility and feasibility it affords the project in a broader sense.  
To the very same research questions outlined above, therefore, should be added 
the word ‘Kazakh’. How did the Communist Party relate to and understand Kazakh 
nomads? How did Kazakh nomads traverse the novel ideological terrain laid out by the 
revolution? How did they deal with the state, and the state with them? Who, if anyone, 
spoke for them? 
In an effort to answer these questions, this thesis provides a broad analysis of the 
relationship between Kazakh nomads and the state from the end of the Civil War to the 
conclusion of the sedentarisation drive, that is, from 1919 to 1934. Detail is present but 
each chapter represents a wide-ranging assessment of a particular policy area, 
allowing the thesis to give a sense of the general situation on the steppe over a period 
of fifteen years, but particularly from 1920 to 1928, and including a clear explanation 
of how things changed.  
How did things change? The thesis comes to some conclusions which can be 
summarised as follows. First, the relationship between state and nomad was never 
likely to be a simple one, but it does seem to have become a little closer and a little 
more formalised or systematic as time passed.  Due to the disorganisation of the early 
Soviet state, the erratic application of early Soviet power, the transient nature of 
nomadic life and widespread ignorance about that life and its habits, nomads first 
experienced Soviet authority only intermittently and with unpredictable results. Yet 
there is evidence that, as time passed, Soviet authority was experienced more regularly 
and consistently by nomads. Some nomads came to negotiate with state 
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representatives, and these representatives had an appreciable effect on everyday life in 
the nomadic community, or aul, before sedentarisation. 
Second, as in most other regards, the management of nomads underwent steady 
bureaucratic centralisation. This is tightly connected with the more methodological 
approach taken by the state towards nomads. Legislation, dictating terms to regional 
administrators but also guarding against localised corruption, became more formulaic 
and prescriptive. Importantly, this centralisation took place within the Kazakh 
Republic itself, but less than may be expected in the broader context of rule from 
Moscow. The KASSR has been described as one of the Soviet republics which most 
jealously defended its competencies in the early years, but more importantly 
nomadism was not perceived as a Union-wide concern.24 Consequentially Moscow 
remained a significant but distant and irregular influence for most of the period under 
investigation. There is evidence of Kazakh regional institutions negotiating with their 
republic-level counterparts, and increasingly taking direction from the Kazakh capital, 
and this appears to have been how much policy was generated, rather than from the 
instructions sent regularly from the Kremlin. 
Third, foremost among the factors which intensified as the decade progressed 
was the new elite’s self-confidence in the face of insurmountable environmental 
obstacles. A potent mix of post-revolutionary ardour and triumphalism combined with 
an unshakeable faith in technological and social progress to create a political 
atmosphere in which extravagant agricultural ambitions were pursued in spite of their 
impracticality. Further, this was not the kind of impracticality obvious only in 
retrospect to the reproving historian. The forbidding climactic conditions of the steppe 
and the infertility of much Kazakh soil became tropes for a diminishing number of 
dogged sceptics within the Kazakh branch of the Communist Party. Their interventions 
litter the archival materials bequeathed to us from those tumultuous days.    
These arguments are made to a varying extent in each chapter, and as indicated 
these chapters are chiefly built around policy areas. After a review of the relevant 
secondary literature in Chapter Two, Chapter Three describes the most typical ways in 
which nomads were understood by Party members and Soviet-era scholars. Chapters 
Four to Seven constitute the main body of the thesis, expound its central arguments, 
and make most use of archival materials. In turn, they address the politics of nomadic 
                                                          
24 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 
1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 140. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
land use; the role of nomadism in the creation of national borders; taxation policies; 
and social policies towards nomads. Chapter Eight addresses the sedentarisation drive 
and Chapter Nine concludes the thesis. To give a further foretaste of the issues and 
arguments at the heart of the thesis, Chapters Three to Eight are summarised below. 
Chapter Three describes how Kazakh nomads were perceived by the Communist 
Party, state administrators and scholars. This is essential context for following chapters, 
in that it explains the mindset of those who devised and implemented policy. The 
chapter argues that the overall attitude of the Soviet administration was characterised 
simultaneously by some consensus and much uncertainty. By 1922 no powerful 
member of the Kazakh branch of the Communist Party publicly argued that nomadism 
was a positive feature of steppe life. All agreed that nomadism was squalid, wretched 
and impoverished. Beyond this relatively simple stance, however, there was no 
agreement on how nomadism should be managed, and this was a product not of 
intense disagreement but of disengagement. Policy towards nomads for much of the 
period was not bolstered with the same acute intellectual struggles which informed 
policy on class or nationhood, for example. This had profound consequences. 
Chapter Four considers the policy area most obviously complicated by the 
presence of a nomadic population; land ownership and land use. The chapter assesses 
some of the ways the state sought to regulate land use and resolve the competing 
interests of nomadic and sedentary peoples, a difficult process made more complex by 
the presence of inter-ethnic hostilities. The prevailing post-colonial zeitgeist of the 
early years allowed nomads to benefit modestly from this process, but as the Party’s 
political priorities in the region gave way to macroeconomic aims nomads found their 
practices more frequently and successfully contested. 
Chapter Five analyses four case studies in the delineation and enforcement of the 
Kazakh Republic’s external borders. In three cases, these are borders shared with other 
Soviet republics. The fourth case concerns the KASSR’s only land border with a non-
Soviet polity, the Xinjiang province of China. Each example has its own implications for 
the relationship between nomad and state, but common to all of them are the 
unsurprising difficulties involved in imposing clear national borders on a highly mobile 
population. Chapter Five most plainly evidences the problems caused for nomads by 
the Communist Party’s preoccupation with the National Question in non-Russian 
regions.  
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Chapter Six considers efforts made to tax nomads. The nature of nomadic life 
made this process much harder, but beyond this the chapter makes some less 
predictable arguments. Building on its belief in the inherent poverty of the nomadic 
lifestyle, the Soviet administration initially made some minor efforts to recognise 
nomadism in the tax system. Due however to the poverty of the state’s understanding 
of nomads and the problems raised by non-Kazakh nationalities, who made accusations 
of unfairness, this principle proved unsustainable. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of confiscation and the persecution of the bais, the wealthier stratum of 
Kazakh society, in the latter half of the 1920s. 
Chapter Seven analyses cultural campaigns conducted among nomads in the 
1920s, broadly defined and connected with the concept of kultur′nost. Nomads were 
subject to similar targets on literacy and sanitation, for example, as other members of 
Soviet society. Indeed, the Party’s view that nomads were inherently backward led 
some to conclude that cultural development might facilitate settlement. It is in the 
sphere of cultural policy that another trend in the relationship between nomad and 
state is at its most conspicuous; the Soviet administration’s readiness to go mobile, in 
that it created institutions which physically roamed around the steppe in an effort to 
engage nomads. The thesis argues that this phenomenon conflicts with our most 
common notions of the Soviet state. 
Chapter Eight draws principally from the relevant historiography to describe and 
analyse the sedentarisation drive, beginning in 1928 and ending in 1934. The chapter 
contends that sedentarisation, precisely defined, was the state-sponsored settlement of 
nomads by violent force, but that the attendant demise of the nomadic lifestyle was 
also the product of concurrent, mutually-reinforcing processes: famine, repression, 
collectivisation and population movement.  
Importantly, five of the six chapters described above concentrate primarily on 
the period 1920 to 1928. Primary sources from 1919 are very occasionally cited too. 
Only Chapter Eight, shortest of the six, engages specifically with the years from 1928 to 
1934 and the policies of collectivisation and sedentarisation which define them.25 This 
was done with intent. As explained in Chapter Two, academic works devoted to the 
question of nomad and state typically focus almost entirely on the early 1930s, 
                                                          
25 This then explains the period of study suggested by the thesis’ title. Though the years 1920-
1928 are most comprehensively analysed, some of the earliest references come from 1919, and 
a brief survey of the years 1928-1934, based primarily but not entirely on historiographical 
research, comes towards the end of the thesis. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
collectivisation, and sedentarisation. Perhaps because talk of sedentarisation was 
censored in the later Soviet period, because the campaign was uncovered dramatically 
under Glasnost, and because of the moral outrage the period may provoke, there has 
been an understandable move towards explaining the shape and origins of 
sedentarisation in any work concerning Soviet Communism and Kazakh nomadism.26 
The response of the present thesis to this trend is twofold. First, it recognises the 
decade prior to the onset of sedentarisation as a neglected part of the story described 
in the very beginning of this chapter, and seeks to give the years between the Civil War 
and the first Five Year Plan its full attention. Second and on a deeper level, it builds on 
the conviction that sedentarisation, though vitally significant, can have the effect of 
prejudicing accounts of the Soviet 1920s by appearing to be the natural conclusion of 
all that took place in those years. The period 1919-1928, by most accounts, thus 
becomes a preamble to the barbarity of the collectivisation era. This thesis, then, 
cognisant of the importance of sedentarisation, deliberately prioritises events before 
1928. It looks for the origins of sedentarisation in these events, but it also finds in them 
alternative expository power, as examples of a new Communist state acting in a 
nomadic region in a post-revolutionary context and confronting problems both 
ideological and practical. It is this field of analysis in particular which distinguishes the 
thesis from all related historiographical studies. 
Therefore the explanations for how and why things changed through the 1920s, 
outlined earlier in this chapter, are at most of equal importance to other observations 
about the general nature of nomadic life after the revolution but before collectivisation. 
What can be derived from these observations, made in Chapters Three to Seven? To 
characterise the whole period very briefly; almost no Communist Party members of 
any consequence hoped or believed that nomadism would endure, and the state wished 
to incentivise settlement wherever possible. As will be shown, a surprising number of 
policy positions were conceived as incentives to settlement. Low tax rates for newly-
settled nomads are an easily recognisable form of encouragement, but the Party also 
thought that wealth redistribution (in the form of changing cattle ownership), 
                                                          
26 For a fuller explanation of this trend, see Chapter Two.  Some of the pieces most 
representative of this academic drive are: M. K. Kozybaev, Zh. B. Abylkhozhin, and K. S. 
Aldazhumanov, Kollektivizatsiia v Kazakhstane: tragediia krest'ianstva (Alma-Ata: Ministerstvo 
narodnogo obrazovaniia Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1992). Talas Omarbekov, Golomodor v 
Kazakhstane: prichiny, masshtaby i itogi (1930-1931 g.g.) (Almaty: Kazakhskii Natsional'nyi 
Universitet im. Al'-Farabi, 2009). Zere Maindanali, Zemledel'cheskie raiony Kazakhstana v gody 
nasil'stvennoi kollektivizatsii (Almaty: KazNU im. al'-Farabi, 2003). Zh. B. Abylkhozhin, 
Traditsionnaia struktura Kazakhstana: Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie aspekty funktsionirovaniia i 
transformatsii (1920-1930-e g.g.) (Alma-Ata: Gylym, 1991). 
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education, and fostering heavy industry would diminish nomadic numbers. Such 
measures were sometimes part of larger political and economic state agendas, and 
their effect on nomads, notional or otherwise, was often an afterthought. Most 
initiatives intended to change nomadic life were implemented in an ad hoc or 
haphazard manner, at least until 1928. 
Frustrations emerged among administrators because nomads were hard to find, 
their herds hard to count, and their practices were more resilient than expected. To 
overcome these challenges the state sought to earn the loyalty of nomads and to 
improve the frequency and consistency of its interactions with them, and these dual 
aims were in fact one and the same. To increase the state’s presence in the most remote 
rural areas of Kazakhstan was to impress the state’s worldview upon those occupying 
these areas, earning new Party representatives among nomads who would then 
collaborate with the authorities to at least a small degree. Building a state apparatus 
which could effectively govern nomads meant including nomads in state and Party 
structures through elections, committee appointments and judicial hearings. Where 
new Soviet institutions were made in the image of sedentary Russian administrative 
organs, or where the Soviet system adopted old Tsarist sedentary Russian 
administrative organs and allowed them to remain as such, their chances of affecting 
nomadic life in any nuanced way were slimmer than if they adapted to the migratory 
habits of their charges. 
In summary, the present thesis is a broad survey of the relationship between 
Kazakh nomad and Soviet state from 1919 to 1934. It seeks to explain events beginning 
in 1928 and associated with the collectivisation drive, but places special emphasis on 
the years 1919 to 1928 and aims to analyse the treatment of nomads by Party and state 
in these years without the context of collectivisation. It does so by considering Soviet 
perceptions of nomads and Soviet policies on land, national borders, taxation and 
culture.  It identifies some of the central difficulties experienced by the state, such as 
lack of knowledge about nomadic custom and the problems of administering a mobile 
population. It credits the state with some limited successes, associated mostly with 
those institutions which adapted to the nomadic lifestyle of the population. It assesses 
the importance of Communist ideology, but also the significance of the Tsarist Empire’s 
cultural and institutional legacies and a more general faith in progress and 
technological development after 1917. Before moving on to where all this places the 
thesis in relation to other historiographical contributions, the topic of Chapter Two, 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
there are essential questions regarding the thesis’ stylistic choices and source base 
which must be addressed. 
* * * 
In this thesis, translations, transliterations and the spelling of certain proper 
nouns are complicated by the use of Russian-language sources and by the frequent 
appearance in these sources of words of Kazakh origin written in Cyrillic, often in a 
variety of renderings. For the purposes of clarity and consistency one method of 
communicating each foreign word or phrase has been chosen and repeatedly used. 
Where Kazakh words have been encountered in the source material transliterated into 
Cyrillic, a second transliteration has been made directly from the Cyrillic into the Latin 
alphabet. 
The most complex linguistic decision involved use of the word Kazakh. That 
historical group now referred to as Kazakhs was generally described in Russian as 
Kirgiz until 1925, with those now called Kyrgyz being distinguished from Kazakhs and 
most commonly called Kara-Kirgiz. In 1925, the year of the national delimitation of 
Central Asia, those associated with contemporary Kyrgyzstan became Kirgiz and 
Kazakh was written Kazak.27 This was later adapted to Kazakh to distinguish Kazakhs 
from Cossacks, whose name was also written Kazak in Russian. While some English-
language publications now choose to write the nationality as Kazak, the present thesis 
has opted for the more commonly used and recognisable Kazakh.28 To avoid confusion, 
Kazakh is also used as the translation of Kirgiz when the latter was applied before 1925 
to the people and institutions of the republic which would eventually become 
Kazakhstan. For example the pre-1925 Kirgizskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respublik 
(KSSR) will be translated as the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.29 
Within the category of Kazakh there is the more important but no less ambiguous 
category of nomad. As noted by Niccolò Pianciola, Soviet state and Party sources are 
frustratingly vague about their definition of nomadism. The use of the word kochevnik 
may sometimes be used in archival materials to describe the rural population, 
sometimes transhumant animal herders, and sometimes nomads defined more strictly 
                                                          
27 Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe,' PhD thesis, p. v. 
28 Michael R. Rouland, 'Music and the Making of the Kazak Nation', PhD thesis (Georgetown 
University, 2005). Niccolò Pianciola and Susan Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe. The 
Collectivization of Agriculture and the Kazak Herdsmen, 1928-1934,' Cahiers du Monde Russe 45, 
no. 1/2 (2004), pp. 137-191. 
29 There are a small number of exceptions to this rule where the specific ethnonational 
categories in use are particularly important. 
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as pastoralists who migrated all year. The phrase chisto kochevnik, implying the latter 
type, is intermittently encountered, as is otkochevnik, which Pianciola translates as ‘ex-
nomad’ or in certain contexts ‘refugee’ but Matthew J. Payne translates as ‘displaced 
nomad’.30 Transhumance and nomadism differ in vitally important ways, of course, as 
does the distinction between a merely rural Kazakh and a non-sedentary one. Yet, in 
common to some extent with Pianciola and the work of other academics such as Payne 
and Sarah Cameron, the present thesis has opted to use the words ‘nomadic’ and 
‘nomad’ to describe all the individuals and social phenomena under discussion.31 This 
is for a number of reasons. 
As will be argued, the story of Kazakh nomadism in the 1920s is often one about 
the lack of clear categorisations and identities. Soviet authorities, who provided most 
accessible sources on the period, appear able only occasionally to have specified 
accurately what level or kind of nomadism was under question when a particular 
source was produced. Such was the deficit of reliable, coherent data on nomads that 
many statistics found in Soviet reports and appraisals are plainly little more than 
conjecture. Thus it would be an arduous and possibly fruitless task for a historian to 
make such distinctions, relying on speculative interpretations of speculative assertions. 
Furthermore, even when Soviet authorities were in a position to distinguish between 
nomads, transhumant cattle herders and temporary migrants, they may have chosen 
not to because generally in the state and Party’s view what mattered was a Kazakh’s 
behaviour and the effects of that behaviour. Where forthcoming, sources can be 
misleading. Where informed, sources appear reticent. 
More significantly, the distinctions between habitual and temporary migrations 
of varying distances and frequencies are not vitally important in this thesis’ analysis. 
Whether a Kazakh migrated only under pressure, habitually but only twice a year, or 
habitually but year round, conflict emerged over their transience in that instance that 
they interacted with Soviet power. To that effect the thesis would omit relevant 
historical episodes from its survey if it only studied the state’s relationship with chisto 
kochevniki, because the same dynamic was at play in the case of formerly or partially 
                                                          
30 Pianciola and Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' p. 141. Niccolò Pianciola, 'The Collectivization 
Famine in Kazakhstan, 1931-1933,' Harvard Ukrainian Studies 25, no. 3/4 (2001), p. 242. 
Matthew J. Payne, 'Seeing Like a Soviet State: Settlement of Nomadic Kazakhs, 1928-1934,' in 
Writing the Stalin Era: Sheila Fitzpatrick and Soviet Historiography, ed. Golfo Alexopoulos, Julie 
Hessler, and Kiril Tomoff (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2011), p. 59. 
31 Note also that Pianciola in his piece uses the word ‘herdsmen’, which is appropriate in some 
circumstances but, for the purposes of this thesis, does not adequately convey the vital concept 
of migration. Pianciola and Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' p. 141. See also: Payne, "Seeing Like a 
Soviet State," pp. 59-87. Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe,' PhD thesis.  
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nomadic groups. It is this dynamic which is of interest, and it is the product of Kazakh 
nomadism in any of its manifestations. As the materials show, even ‘ex-nomads’ still 
displayed legacies of the lifestyle in their behaviour, which in its effects was also a 
problem for the regime and therefore of interest. It is perhaps for the same reasons 
that other historians have made a similar judgement. Though only ‘approximately 25% 
of the Kazak population … was fully nomadic on the eve of the revolution [emphasis 
added]’, it is often claimed simply that ‘nomads’ constituted the majority of the Kazakh 
population under early Soviet stewardship.32 Whereas Pianciola prefers to assert that 
only 23 percent of the Kazakh population was ‘entirely sedentary’, Jeremy Smith 
chooses to suggest that ‘77 percent of Kazakhs were classified as nomadic or semi-
nomadic.’33 The effect for the thesis is the same; over three quarters of Kazakhs are of 
substantial relevance to the project and others are not necessarily excluded.  
In short, this thesis addresses all aspects of the nomadic lifestyle as it interacted 
with the Soviet administration. These aspects were manifested in the lives of that 
relatively small number of Kazakhs who still migrated all year in the 1920s, but they 
were also present in the lives of other Kazakhs who migrated only twice a year, who 
pursued transhumance, and who at times were in practice sedentary but who returned 
to migration whether out of choice or under duress. Aspects of the nomadic lifestyle 
were also visible in the lives of those Kazakhs who were sedentary for much of the 
1920s but who exhibited the legacies of their community’s nomadic past. The lives of 
all these Kazakhs shared certain agricultural habits, predilections and unfamiliarities. 
They were more likely to move, short or far distances, in response to threat. They were 
also perceived by Soviet authorities in a certain manner in accordance with their 
nomadic associations, and treated accordingly. In this sense they were all nomads for 
the purposes of this thesis’ research questions. 
Given this, the inaccuracy and reticence of Soviet state sources on the precise 
nature of a Kazakh’s behaviour is less of an obstacle for the thesis than may otherwise 
have been assumed. But the source base certainly does have its weaknesses. With the 
exception of some journalistic and academic texts and one memoir, this thesis relies on 
archival documentation produced by the Communist Party or the Soviet state. In a few 
cases this includes petitions and letters submitted by nomads, but due to the 
                                                          
32 Pianciola and Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' p. 141. Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe,' PhD thesis, 
p. 3.  
33 Pianciola and Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' p. 140. Jeremy Smith, Red Nations: The 
Nationalities Experience in and after the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 
105. 
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widespread illiteracy of the nomadic population and its lack of fluent Russian speakers, 
these petitions and letters are likely to have been translated and transcribed by at least 
one official. The tendency of the Soviet state to operate in the Russian language in the 
1920s places a blockade between nomad and historian, as does illiteracy and of course 
the selective bias of Soviet petition-takers and archivists. Remaining sources discuss 
nomads from the perspective of the regional committee, People’s Commissariat or 
Politburo, and therefore exude the assumptions, prejudices, misunderstandings and 
wilful falsehoods of bureaucrats and Party members who were either sedentary 
Central Asians or from elsewhere, usually European Russia.34 
As the central focus of this thesis is the relationship between nomad and state in 
the 1920s, these features of the source base are not an obstruction. Indeed, to learn 
about the generation, implementation and results of the state’s policies towards 
nomads, the state’s own documentation is the best source of information. But the 
relative weakness of a nomadic voice amid the cacophony of administrative and Party 
claims must be acknowledged. How did a nomad interpret the propaganda of the 
Communist Party or the health inspections of Russian doctors? How were taxes and 
renewed border controls experienced on a personal level? These questions must 
remain unanswered. The optimistic projections and euphemistic descriptions of the 
Soviet materials, which do not properly communicate the brutality of actions 
sometimes taken against nomads, must also be treated with the usual scepticism. 
Countervailing narratives from the nomads themselves are scarce. 
A final stylistic decision to be addressed relates to the distinction between Party 
and state. The title of this thesis refers only to the new Soviet state, but the attitudes, 
policies, members, actions and documentation of the Communist Party are also 
repeatedly analysed throughout the following chapters. This thesis does not contend 
that there was no significant difference between Party and state. Rather, it asserts that 
specifically in their treatment of nomads the Party and state did not differ in a way 
which is significant for the arguments and conclusions of the thesis. While the Party 
might be more readily associated with policy formation and the state with policy 
implementation, for example, the end result is a small group of elites of both Party and 
state exercising administrative, judicial and ideological power over a larger group 
defined by their agricultural customs, and it is this dynamic which is here scrutinised.  
                                                          
34 Elsewhere in the thesis some examples of clearly inaccurate claims made by state officials are 
discussed. For another incidence, Niccolò Pianciola describes Soviet state figures relating to 
grain quotas in the early 1930s as ‘imaginary’: Pianciola and Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' p. 
181. 
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In the interests of precision, it might be more accurate to say that this thesis 
investigates the relationship between Kazakh nomads and Soviet power, as manifested 
in the distinct but (in the context of the case study) similar twin institutions of Party 
and state. But in the interests of clarity and accessibility, as in its title, this thesis will 
sometimes refer only to the Soviet state when in fact the Communist Party is also 
relevant and implied. 
* * * 
Nomadism was once the foremost social and economic form on the Kazakh 
Steppe. It is useful to keep this in mind when reviewing the plight of Kazakh nomadism 
in the 1920s. Though the superiority of nomadic culture over sedentary culture had by 
then been comprehensively overturned, the same factors which made nomadism so 
successful may also account for its longevity before Stalinism. To many Communist 
Party members in the 1920s, nomadism looked like a backward and anachronistic 
practice which would never withstand the prosperity and progress unleashed in 1917. 
This is not how nomadism appeared in the early thirteenth century when the concerted 
conquest of Rus′ began. Yet like the Mongol invasion of Rus′, the Russian Revolution is 
an event which can be used to separate two distinct historical periods, so profound 
were its consequences for all Tsarist subjects, including nomads.  
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In the main body of this thesis, Chapters Three to Seven, much material for 
discussion has been drawn from archival holdings found in Moscow, Russia and Almaty, 
Kazakhstan. But analysis of these materials has of course been heavily informed by the 
works of other historians, who have also provided a good deal of additional detail and 
insight in their contributions to the secondary literature. The purpose of this relatively 
brief chapter is to review some of the most pertinent secondary literature for this 
thesis, evaluating its importance and explaining its various influences. The secondary 
literature has been grouped into categories for ease of explication. These categories, 
which will be discussed in order, are: soviet historiography, non-Soviet historiography 
before 1991, non-Soviet historiography after 1991, Glasnost-era work on 
sedentarisation (and the period 1928-1934 more broadly), histories of the Kazakh 
nation, histories of Kazakh nomadism, and histories of Tsarist Central Asia. These 
categories are not strictly defined, but rather are designed to make clearer their effect 
on the present thesis. In describing and assessing them, this chapter also reveals the 
place of the thesis in its broader historiographical context, comparing its approach, 
aims and conclusions to those of other scholars. 
Soviet Historiography 
The Soviet Union produced a considerable body of historiographical and 
anthropological works on the nomads of Central Asia. Given that the political 
atmosphere and academic output of the USSR varied very considerable over that 
polity’s history, it would be a misleading generalisation to say that these works are all 
equally astute or deficient in the same ways. Yet, broadly speaking, there are 
limitations typically associated with Soviet scholarship which can be found among 
these works as much as among others. Their historical accounts are incomplete due to 
intense state censorship, meaning the worst abuses of the Communist Party, including 
sedentarisation, pass without mention. Those events which are discussed are 
sometimes misrepresented to emphasise the Soviet administration’s general 
benevolence and ideological continuity across time. Anthropological and historical 
studies are rigidly ideological in their analyses, featuring lengthy passages on the 
validity and universal applicability of the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism which 
was de rigueur at the time of writing. Certain interpretations of certain factors are 
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therefore repeatedly used to explain historical and social phenomena, whilst 
alternative explanations are ignored altogether. The Soviet academic view of the topic 
under consideration here was therefore partial and subjected to the political 
motivations of the state. 
Nevertheless, Soviet historiography has been considered extensively in 
preparation for this thesis, and this is for two principal reasons. The first is its influence 
on other texts. In the Cold War context, access to Soviet archives for foreign scholars 
was severely curtailed, and academic publications were one of the few available 
conduits for commentary and data. The bibliographies of English-language studies 
published before the collapse of the USSR are therefore replete with Soviet scholarship, 
which must be read and understood in order to understand its influence on non-Soviet 
historians. The same is true of historians of the post-Soviet space, trained before the 
collapse but working and writing since. Though now researching in a less censorious 
political atmosphere, their methodologies bear the hallmarks of the earlier era and 
studying works from this era makes its legacies clearer. Second, for all its limitations, 
Soviet historiography contains much original and insightful commentary, as well as a 
useful corrective against some of the assumptions and axioms of the present age. This 
case is most clearly made by British historian Ernest Gellner in his foreword to Nomads 
and the Outside World, an anthropological and historical survey by Soviet-trained 
Anatoly Khazanov. Gellner suggests that a relentless focus on material inequality and 
social change granted Soviet scholarship a singular insight into nomadic life.1 
A foundational text in the development of Soviet scholarly attitudes towards 
Kazakh nomads and their history in the 1920s was provided by Boris Ia. Vladimirtsov. 
His The Social System of the Mongols: Mongol Nomadic Feudalism, published 
posthumously in 1934, was a materialist account of Mongolian society and an 
explication of nomadic feudalism, a concept Vladimirtsov attributed to the Mongol 
Empire but which, as will be shown in later chapters, was in use throughout the 1920s 
among policy-makers.2 In explaining the rise of Ghengis Khan, nomadic feudalism 
allowed Soviet scholars to dismiss alternative factors such as geography or the 
character of the Mongolian people, the latter of which was deemed part of a racist 
                                                          
1 Ernest Gellner, 'Foreword,' in Nomads and the Outside World, ed. A. M. Khazanov (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. x, xiii. 
2 B. Ia. Vladimirtsov, Obshchestvennyi stroi Mongolov: Mongol′skoi kochevoi feodalizm (Leningrad: 
1934). Gellner, 'Foreword,’ pp. xiv-xvi. 
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interpretation. 3  But nomadic feudalism was nevertheless a deeply pejorative 
attribution. Soviet scholarship held that this social form ‘had a regressive effect on the 
socio-economic development of all sedentary peoples incorporated within the Mongol 
Empire.’4  In the Stalinist era the settled view in Soviet historiography was that Mongol 
rule in Russia had been profoundly injurious, and this perception survived into the late 
Soviet period.5  
Later Soviet works engaged to a lesser or greater extent with Vladimirtsov’s 
argument. In his 1957 The Victory of the Collectivised Farming System in Kazakhstan, A. 
Tursunbaev concedes that agrarian development in the 1920s had been far more 
complicated among Kazakhs because their rural population was more backwards than 
that of European Russia.6 As an example of both the difficulties and the value of Soviet 
scholarship, Tursunbaev implies that the ultimate settlement of nomads was achieved 
largely through a system of incentives and land redistribution, but the writer also 
includes useful statistics on the growth of sedentary agriculture in the Kazakh 
Republic.7 
Nomadic feudalism again became the focal point of a debate between Soviet 
historians in the 1960s and 1970s. S. Tolybekov produced two monographs, the first of 
which was published in 1959, the latter in 1971.8 Both passionately refuted the concept 
                                                          
3 Charles J. Halperin, 'Soviet Historiography on Russia and the Mongols,' Russian Review 41, no. 3 
(1982), pp. 310-311. 
4 Ibid., p. 311. In this Soviet scholarship reversed an earlier rehabilitation of Ghengis Khan and 
the Mongol Empire overseen by Vasilii Bartol′d, a Tsarist Orientalist scholar and colleague of 
Baron Viktor Rozen, founder of the Saint Petersburg School of Oriental Studies. Bartol′d argued 
that the Mongol Empire had in fact left a positive legacy of stability and cultural interchange in 
spite, that is, of the Mongols’ ‘elemental savagery’. Craig Brandist, The Dimensions of Hegemony: 
Language, Culture and Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Boston: Brill, 2015), pp. 53-54. 
5 Halperin, 'Soviet Historiography on Russia and the Mongols,' pp. 308-309. Later in the century 
geopolitics intervened in this debate. In 1962 academics of the Mongolian People’s Republic 
attempted to rehabilitate Ghengis Khan, complaining that schoolchildren learned about 
Alexander the Great and Napoleon but not their Mongolian counterpart, a historical figure of at 
least comparable stature. Reaction in Soviet scholarly circles was highly and immediately 
critical. The proposed rehabilitation came towards the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and 
this heated debate emerged from the fact that China had begun courting Mongolian opinion by 
citing first the racial solidarity of Mongolian and Chinese peoples and, second, the racial 
superiority of these peoples over Europeans (Russians), a superiority evidenced by Ghengis 
Khan’s domination of Russians and others. See: Paul Hyer, 'The Re-Evaluation of Chinggis Khan: 
Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute,' Asian Survey 6, no. 12 (1966), pp. 699-700.  Robert A. Rupen, 
'Mongolia in the Sino-Soviet Dispute,' The China Quarterly, no. 16 (1963), pp. 77-79. Hyer, 'The 
Re-Evaluation of Chinggis Khan,' p. 703. 
6  A. Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia v Kazakhstane (Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1957), p. 25. 
7 Ibid., pp. 25-27, 51. 
8 S. E. Tolybekov, Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskii stroi kazakhov v XVII-XIX vekakh (Alma-Ata: 
Kazakhskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel′stvo, 1959). S. E. Tolybekov, Kochevoe obshchestvo 
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of nomadic feudalism. In his 1971 The Nomadic Society of the Kazakhs Tolybekov 
criticises earlier scholars for underestimating the immense diversity of Kazakh 
nomadic life.9 The implication of his rebuttal of nomadic feudalism was not that pre-
revolutionary nomadic life was harmonious or without need of reform, however. 
Rather, Kazakh nomadism had both patriarchal-feudal and capitalist features, and had 
been penetrated by an embryonic market economy which was stratifying economic 
classes.10 In terms of Soviet ideology these were significant distinctions, but Tolybekov 
nevertheless reinforced the same image of a nomadic society in crisis and a benevolent 
state and Party, whilst simultaneously offering useful information on the nature of 
Kazakh life and the rate at which it changed. Other Soviet authors did the same; S. B. 
Baishev’s comprehensive Notes on the Economic History of the Kazakh SSR, published in 
1974, follows a similar pattern.11 
G. Dakhshleiger was another prolific historian of the Kazakh Republic, producing 
monographs, articles and document collections particularly in the 1960s.12 Again his 
narrative is of an isolated and fragile nomadic existence, strengthened by the New 
Economic Policy and liberated willingly, if with difficulty, from exploitative elements by 
collectivisation.13 All these Soviet scholars demonise the bais, wealthy members of 
Kazakh society often treated as analogous with the kulak. They do so as much as any 
source material produced during the collectivisation period itself.14 The most critical 
note struck by Soviet scholars reviewing the collectivisation drive in Kazakhstan is to 
say that for the nomadic elements of the population the process was slower and more 
complicated than in sedentary regions.15 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Kazakhov v XVII - nachale XX veka: politiko-ekonomicheskii analiz (Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo Nauka 
Kazakhskoi SSR, 1971). Gellner, 'Foreword,’ pp. xv, xviii. 
9 Tolybekov, Kochevoe Obshchestvo Kazakhov, p. 495. 
10 Ibid., pp. 4, 505-510. 
11 S. B. Baishev, Ocherki ekonomicheskoi istorii Kazakhskoi SSR (1860-1970 gg.) (Alma-Ata: 
Izdatel'stvo Kazakhstan 1974), pp. 88, 118, 121-123. 
12  Grigorii Fedorovich Dakhshleiger and M. Abilova, Sotsial'isticheskoe stroitel'stvo v 
Kazakhstane v vosstanovitelnyi period, 1921-1925 gg : sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Alma-
Ata: Arkheologiia Zhane Etnografiia Instituty, 1962). G. F. Dakhshleiger, Sotsial'no-
ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniia v aule i derevne Kazakhstana 1921-1929 gg. (Alma-Ata: 
Izdatel'stvo 'Nauka' Kazakhskoi SSR, 1965). G. F. Dakhshleiger, 'Kazakhstan nakanune NEPa,' 
Voprosy Istorii, no. 8 (1966), pp. 20-34. G. F. Dakhshleiger, V I Lenin i problemy Kazakhstanskoi 
istoriografii (Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo 'Nauka' Kazakhskoi SSR, 1973). 
13 Dakhshleiger, 'Kazakhstan,' p. 26. Dakhshleiger, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniia, p. 
311. 
14  Baishev, Ocherki ekonomicheskoi istorii Kazakhskoi SSR, pp. 121-122. Dakhshleiger, 
'Kazakhstan,' pp. 23-24. 
15 For more of this, see: M. B. Balakaev, Kolkhoznoe krest'ianstvo Kazakhstana v gody velikoi 
otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 (Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo 'Nauka' Kazakhskoi SSR, 1971), p. 29. 
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Ultimately, Soviet historiography of the 1920s should be judged as too restricted 
in its expression and too dogmatic in its theory to provide any definitive explanation of 
the relationship between nomad and state in the 1920s and beyond. Yet for its detail 
about Kazakh nomadic culture, its clear and accurate references to Soviet legislation 
and its anthropological insights, this body of literature continues to be of use. These 
latter characteristics are most clearly in evidence in Anatoly Khazanov’s Nomads and 
the Outside World, published in English in 1984.16 Though written in the highly 
restrictive political atmosphere of the USSR and preoccupied with economic 
inequalities and development, Khazanov’s work includes information on Kazakh 
nomadic culture in a comparative context with other nomadic groups. 
Non-Soviet Historiography before 1991 
Long before Khazanov began his research, non-Soviet scholars had taken an 
interest in Kazakh nomads. Their work was also often produced under the pressurised 
political circumstances of the Cold War, and initially they glimpsed the Kazakhs 
through only a very specific prism. Some of the earliest English-language work to 
engage with Kazakh history, and which suffered most obviously from lack of data, was 
concerned with the population of Central Asia and its decline during collectivisation. As 
previously mentioned, non-Soviet studies of the Kazakhs and their early-Soviet history 
built their analyses on a limited source base prior to 1991, when access to the relevant 
archives was greatly relaxed.  
Frank Lorimer, writing in 1946, noted that the Soviet Kazakh population declined 
dramatically by 1.5 million individuals between 1926 and 1939. To achieve this figure 
he interpreted available census materials. He took into consideration both average 
population increase and the possibility of Kazakh emigration, given the high mobility of 
the population’s nomadic cohort, and qualified his estimate by emphasising the 
ambiguity of national identity, as it was perceived, in the early USSR.17 In his Europe on 
the Move published in 1948, Eugene M. Kulischer describes the collectivisation drive as 
a massive effort to increase cultivated agricultural land and noted that this took place 
‘at the expense of the natives’, and especially nomads, in the Kazakh Republic.18 
Without citing Lorimer directly but by following the same logic, Kulischer too estimates 
                                                          
16 Anatoly M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984). 
17 Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1946), p. 140. 
18 Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-1947 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 99. 
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a drop in the Kazakh population of one and a half million people in the early 1930s.19 
Another mention of Kazakh nomads came in Population Change in Russia and the USSR 
in 1966. Here, often quoting Kulischer, the authors again use precisely the same census 
data from 1926 and 1933, but without further analysis they indicate simply that the 
settling of nomads caused the Kazakh population to drop by just under a million 
people.20 
Later pieces naturally built their conclusions on previous findings, incorporating 
together estimates of varying accuracy. Naum Jasny uses the Lorimer quote in his 1949 
The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR, for example.21 As discussed in Chapter Eight, the 
question of how many nomads perished in the early 1930s remains difficult to assess.22 
Beyond the narrow question of population change, valuable contributions were 
made to the study of Kazakh history and identity.23 These still tended towards analyses 
of quantitative trends, as this was the nature of the information available. Romeo A. 
Cherot produced an early, useful study of the demographic constitution of Kazakh 
‘government and Party structure’ in 1955, referring to ‘nativization’ or korenizatsiia, 
discussed in this thesis primarily in Chapter Seven.24 David Lane shared a similar focus 
in his article on ‘ethnic and class stratification’ in 1975.25 In arguing that class and the 
‘urban-rural’ dichotomy were more important factors in determining a citizen’s status 
than ethnicity in Soviet Kazakhstan, Lane’s analysis concurs surprisingly closely with 
some claims made later in this thesis.26 An excellent early monograph by George J. 
Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916, also offered extensive 
quantitative analysis, here on the arrival of Europeans to the Kazakh Steppe under the 
                                                          
19 Ibid., p. 101. 
20  J. William Leasure and Robert A. Lewis, Population Change in Russia and the USSR: a Set of 
Comparable Territorial Units (San Diego: San Diego State College Press, 1966), pp. 99-103. 
21 Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1949), p. 323. 
22 More recent evidence of the same reliance on census material can be found here: K. S. 
Aldazhumanov et al., eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, vol. 4 
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25 David Lane, 'Ethnic and Class Stratification in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1917 - 39,' Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 17, no. 2 (1975), pp. 165-189. 
26 Ibid., pp. 187. 
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Tsar.27 Though, in contrast to Cherot and Lane, Demko studied pre-Soviet history, he 
too grants lucid and comprehensive context for the present thesis. 
Authoritative qualitative commentary on Kazakh history came later in the period, 
most notably from Martha Brill Olcott. Her 1981 article ‘The Collectivization Drive in 
Kazakhstan’ exhibited an appreciation for the significance of the collectivization period 
in the Kazakh Republic.28 As she claims: ‘One of the greatest challenges for the 
sovietologist is to attempt to understand and interpret the events of the 1930s.’29 
Olcott accurately contextualises the collectivisation drive in Kazakhstan and identifies 
some of its main features, such as the chaotic character of the campaign, the difficulty 
of collectivising nomadic peoples and the establishment of a special Committee on 
Settlement.30  Yet the Soviet state’s actions in Kazakhstan appear less severe and 
premeditated in this article than in later accounts, evidence of the reliance of English-
language scholars on Soviet academic output and its aforementioned reticence on the 
subject of sedentarisation.31 The Kazakhs, also by Olcott and published in 1987, suffers 
too from this reliance on Soviet sources, but remains a seminal English-language text 
on Kazakh history nonetheless.32 Beginning prior to Tsarist colonisation and ending in 
the late Soviet era (a second edition covers independence), this account brings together 
a host of relevant insights into Kazakh cultural, economic, political and social trends, 
navigating the lacunae in the book’s source materials deftly.33 
Further notable English-language works produced before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union are those which also focused on Soviet Central Asia but through the prism 
of religion or ethnicity. Perhaps due to a Cold War tendency to overlook the national 
differences of the region (a tendency which, as will be shown, was very much reversed 
in later years), Kazakhs were often associated together with other Central Asian groups 
under the rubric of the USSR’s Muslim or Turkic peoples. Prominent examples of this 
trend include Michael Rywkin, Alexandre Bennigsen, S. Enders Wimbush and Hélène 
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fulfil the task.’ Ibid., p. 133.  
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Carrère D’Encausse, among others.34 Such pieces often provide useful introductory 
information on the Kazakhs and other Central Asian peoples, and give some valuable 
interpretations of the effect of new Soviet power on Islamic communities after the 
revolution, but typically omit the question of nomadism.35 
Non-Soviet Historiography after 1991 
After the collapse of the USSR and the ‘archival revolution’, historiography on the 
Soviet period was transformed by the considerable increase in available source 
material and the new analytical models this material allowed.36 Of all the new 
categories of historiography to emerge from outside the post-Soviet space in the post-
Soviet period, the history of Kazakhs and Kazakhstan has been most often discussed in 
literature addressing the National Question. 
In the introduction to A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of 
Lenin and Stalin, published in 2001, Terry Martin and Ronald Grigor Suny associate 
themselves with an ongoing effort to repudiate some widespread assumptions about 
the early history of the USSR, assumptions they respectfully attribute to the work of 
Richard Pipes.  For Suny and Martin, Pipes’ account – of the Bolsheviks sweeping away 
the rights of national groups – pays insufficient attention to the Communist Party’s 
attempts not to obliterate non-Russian nationalism, but to endorse and nurture it.37 
Suny and Martin should therefore be associated with a group of other historians, 
among them Yuri Slezkine and Francine Hirsch, who argue that the Communist Party 
expended much intellectual and administrative energy in the early Soviet period 
supporting national identities and creating governing structures to represent them.38 
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As a prominent non-Russian group which became an official nationality with its 
own republic, Kazakhs and their treatment by the Soviet administration warrant 
frequent mention in this body of literature. We learn from Jeremy Smith’s 1999 The 
Bolsheviks and the National Question, for example, that settling Kazakh nomads were 
formally granted the best land in the early 1920s to encourage them to relocate and 
create a majority of Kazakhs within their republic.39 In his later work Red Nations, 
Smith dedicates considerable attention to nomads and the sedentarisation drive.40 
Michael Rouland has considered the role of Kazakh folk music in the development of a 
Kazakh national identity, whilst also engaging extensively with the settlement of 
nomads, arguing that ‘Without understanding the economic and social upheaval in 
Kazakhstan with the onset of Stalin’s drive towards collectivisation, it is difficult to 
comprehend the momentous cultural changes of the 1930s.’41 
The nation-making paradigm and its advocates have influenced the present 
thesis more than any other discrete group within the historiography. To take an 
obvious example, Francine Hirsch’s work on the Soviet census of 1926 inspired much 
of Chapter Three.42 Chapter Five, on the effect on nomads of the Kazakh Republic’s 
external borders, has been made possible by extensive work on the delimitation of 
Central Asia into distinct national territories.43 Furthermore, in general terms, the 
manner in which these authors characterise the motives and priorities of the 
Communist Party is reflected in the analysis and conclusions of this thesis. The idea 
that Bolshevik power was not simply relentlessly destructive and homogenising, but 
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could also be productive and responsive to non-Russian social realities, is a foundation 
stone upon which this thesis’ conclusions lie. 
Yet the utility of the nation-making paradigm is, in an instructive way, restricted, 
and the 1926 census mentioned above is a useful case in point. As argued in Chapter 
Three, the Soviet census is an example of the Communist Party’s preoccupation with 
national identities and the efforts it made to study and govern those identities. The 
intellectual and administrative efforts it made when studying and governing nomads, 
however, were tiny in comparison. In an important way, this thesis will argue, the 
Communist Party overlooked the significance of the nomadic lifestyle because it had 
fixed its gaze on national identity in Central Asia. It was, in a sense, distracted by the 
National Question. For understandable reasons the historiography on the National 
Question has repeated this mistake. Kazakhs and nomadism, though addressed in much 
recent historiography of the Soviet era, are often discussed only in the context of 
Communist efforts to formalise Kazakh national identity. This has affected the 
presentation of the topic. In spite of being a non-national category (in that little of it 
was unique to the Kazakh nation and nor was it considered so), nomadism has most 
often been analysed as an interesting but peripheral variable in the nation-making 
process. This thesis hopes to place nomadism at the centre of attention, with nation-
making, important as it is, made a variable in the governance of nomads. 
Beyond the nation-making paradigm, there are scholars based outside of the 
post-Soviet space whose research is more closely in keeping with work being produced 
in independent Kazakhstan. As will be discussed, this makes their research part of an 
effort to create a national history for the country beginning long before 1917. Bhavna 
Davé and Shirin Akiner may be cited in this context.44 Davé for example explicitly 
questions the view that Kazakh national identity was forged in the 1920s by the 
policies of the Communist Party, pointing instead to ‘culturalist narratives of Central 
Asian history’.45 Alternatively Shoshana Keller, Douglas Northrop and Marianne Kamp 
are scholars whose work continues in the tradition of research into the religious factor 
in early Soviet Central Asia, including Kazakhstan or focusing particularly on gender.46 
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Glasnost-era work on sedentarisation 
As will be argued, post-Soviet historiography produced in Kazakhstan has also 
developed a preoccupation with the origins and characteristics of the Kazakh nation. 
But initially the collapse of the USSR had a very different impact in Kazakhstan. It was 
nomadism which was thrown into stark relief in the Glasnost and immediate post-
Soviet periods by a new body of literature. Sedentarisation appears to have become 
one of the many political secrets which were publicised in revelatory terms under 
Mikhail Gorbachev, provoking greater interest in the Kazakhs’ nomadic heritage. 
Works which uncovered sedentarisation, written by Soviet-trained scholars 
experiencing new levels of academic freedom, are sometimes characterised by a jolting 
mixture of formulaic Marxist-Leninist theory and moral indignation. They are 
nevertheless among the most informative works referenced in the present thesis. 
Most distinctively Soviet in its content is The Traditional Structure of Kazakhstan 
by Zhulduzbek Abylkhozhin, published in 1991.47 This monograph begins by reminding 
its readers that Kazakh society of the 1920s had been studied by Soviet scholars before, 
but only under strict ideological control.48 Yet it then goes on to make the kind of 
lengthy affirmations of Leninist thought typical of those same earlier scholars.49 It then 
describes in nuanced detail the structures of Kazakh life, including nomadic 
communities, from 1920 to 1930. It pays particular attention to the familiar notion of 
class stratification in the aul and the influence of Soviet power.50 Abylkhozhin makes 
his separation from pre-Glasnost authors most clearly towards the end of the piece, 
where he describes collectivisation and sedentarisation as premeditated actions of the 
state which were responsible for a dramatic decrease in the numbers of livestock and, 
eventually, a demographic catastrophe in the Kazakh Republic.51 His conclusions are 
profoundly critical of the regime. 
Yet more coruscating in its criticism is Collectivisation in Kazakhstan: Tragedy of 
the Peasantry, published in 1992 and jointly written by Abylkhozhin and two other 
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scholars, M. K. Kozybaev and K. S. Aldazhumanov.52 This shorter pamphlet-style text 
moves from the 1920s to the early 1930s and focuses specifically on the collectivisation 
drive, emphasising the particularly ruinous effects of the campaign on Kazakhs and 
Kazakh nomads.53 It also seeks to rehabilitate the nomadic economic system from 
Soviet-era contempt, arguing for example that in certain circumstances ‘nomadic 
livestock-herding retained its ecological rationale.’54  
Independent Kazakhstan has produced a series of texts written in a similar style 
and on similar topics to those which emerged immediately after the Soviet Union’s 
collapse. Genocide in Kazakhstan by L. D. Kuderina, for example, considers the 
maltreatment of Kazakh Communist Party members.55 Talas Omarbekov is highly 
critical of the Soviet regime, also using the concept of genocide in his historical 
accounts of collectivisation and sedentarisation.56 Many of these Kazakh publications 
are redolent of the body of literature which presents the Ukrainian famine of the early 
1930s as an act of genocide perpetrated by the Soviet state; Omarbekov refers directly 
to the Holomodor in the title of his 2009 document collection.57 Zere Maidanali’s 
exceptional monograph Agricultural Regions of Kazakhstan in the Years of Forced 
Collectivisation was published in 2003 and combines statistical analysis of 
collectivisation with more measured qualitative assessments, often considering the 
nomadic variable in the outcome of collectivisation policies.58 Her conclusions about 
the scale of suffering experienced in the Kazakh Republic are nonetheless damning.  
Histories of the Kazakh Nation 
A harshly critical assessment of the collectivisation campaign and 
sedentarisation can now be discovered in some general reference works on Kazakh 
history published in Kazakhstan since 1991. For example The History of Kazakhstan: 
Peoples and Cultures refers to the 1930s as a war on private property and economic 
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endeavour.59 The Historical Dictionary of Kazakhstan, published in 2012, has this to say 
about the subject: ‘In the early 1930s, Goloshchekin’s collectivization campaign led to 
the massive loss of cattle that ultimately caused the decimation of the Kazakh 
population through famine and starvation along with a massive migration out of the 
country. Some 31 percent of [sic] rural population, or 1.5 million to 2 million Kazakhs, 
died of hunger and epidemics during the collectivization, and hundreds of thousands 
fled to China.’60 Goloshchekin, first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan 
from 1924-1933, has been commonly denigrated in the post-Soviet era, and his actions 
and views will be addressed again later in the thesis.  
The Historical Dictionary of Kazakhstan and The History of Kazakhstan: Peoples 
and Cultures are both features of a relatively new phenomenon: reference works and 
textbooks on the national history of Kazakhstan produced in Kazakhstan. Other 
examples include The History of Kazakhstan: From Ancient Time to Our Days and The 
History of Kazakhstan in Russian Sources, both multi-volume series, and The History of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan.61 Further works may place Kazakh history in a Central 
Asian context but while retaining the emphasis on nationhood and the continuity of a 
national culture.62 
As reflected in its content, this body of literature is part of a growing endeavour 
to create a national history for the post-Soviet, independent Kazakhstan. This is how 
many recent Kazakh publications might be characterised, and it has implications for 
the aims of this thesis. The nomadic aspect of events in the 1920s, before 
collectivisation, may be noted extensively in books and articles of this sort, but the 
trend is often to place far heavier emphasis on the lessons of Glasnost-era revelations 
about sedentarisation in the early 1930s. Both are subsidiary to the pieces’ primary 
purpose of creating a national history but sedentarisation has been granted an iconic 
role in the Kazakh national story in a similar way that its counterpart, the Holomodor, 
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takes an iconic role in the Ukrainian national story.63 Certainly the sedentarisation 
drive was a transformative and defining event in Kazakh history, but this comes at the 
expense of the years preceding sedentarisation, which are treated as a prelude to the 
barbarity of the collectivisation period. 
In other words, literature on the sedentarisation drive exerts a gravitational pull 
on all studies of early Soviet Kazakhstan or of nomads in modern Central Asia. Such is 
the significance understandably accredited to it by historians, other pertinent topics of 
research are drawn into the story of sedentarisation. They may be used to explain 
sedentarisation, or sedentarisation might be used to understand and explain them. 
Assessments of the 1920s, when given, are made in this context.  
Histories of Kazakh Nomadism 
This partially applies also to the growing body of English-language scholarship 
which focuses more specifically on Kazakh nomadism. Matthew J. Payne’s penetrating 
work on early-Soviet Kazakhstan and its nomadic citizens looks to the years following 
the introduction of the first Five Year Plan for material, thereby overlooking the period 
prior to 1928.64 In his piece ‘Seeing Like a Soviet State: Settlement of Nomadic Kazakhs, 
1928-1934’, Payne summarises the treatment of Kazakhs before 1928, but gives his 
primary aim as stating how and why things changed at the end of the decade.65 A 
comprehensive PhD thesis by Sarah Cameron does engage with the decade 1920-1930, 
but principally as introductory context for the following four years.66  
A foremost European scholar specialising in the collectivisation period is Niccolò 
Pianicola, who brings very welcome quantitative and comparative analyses to the 
topic.67 His two English-language articles ‘The Collectivization Famine in Kazakhstan, 
1931-1933’ and ‘Famine in the Steppe: The Collectivization of Agriculture and the 
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Kazak Herdsmen, 1928-1934’ represent some of the most rigorous and informative 
work done on this most pivotal of subjects, but as is clear from the titles of these two 
pieces, Pianciola’s ambit is largely comparable to other historians mentioned above.68 
He is however one of a small number of scholars who also assess, with depth and 
sensitivity, the consequences of the collectivisation drive in the years that followed it.69 
Remaining English-language publications which do consider the 1920s in detail 
but without the distraction of the National Question come from Paula A. Michaels and 
Edward Schatz.70 Both authors are interested in the cultural norms of the Kazakhs and 
their transformation under Soviet influence. Whereas Schatz takes a broad approach to 
Kazakh culture and its concepts of kinship and lineage (he describes identity as a useful 
but limited post-modern preoccupation), Michaels’ particular focus in gender and 
medical norms and the specific case of the Red Yurts, a feature of Soviet rule to be 
discussed in Chapter Seven.71 Both works are referenced repeatedly in this thesis. 
Lastly, a prominent Soviet-trained historian whose work deserves special 
recognition is Nurbulat Masanov. Masanov’s highly-esteemed work on pre-Soviet 
Kazakh cultural norms; the origins, specificities and functions of Kazakh nomadism; 
and the Kazakhs’ nomadic economy, has provided a bedrock of knowledge for all those 
scholars who have followed him, in spite of certain methodological assumptions which 
evidence his academic training under the Soviet regime.72 
History of Tsarist Central Asia 
There is a final body of literature which has also been indispensable for the 
present thesis. This is work on late Tsarist Central Asia and the nature and effects of 
Russian imperialism there, both conceptual and physical. Demko’s pre-1991 
contribution has already been noted, but some of the best work in this field has 
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emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union.73 As reasserted throughout the 
chapters which follow, many of the phenomena witnessed on the Kazakh Steppe in the 
1920s are less the product of the Russian Revolution and more the results of Tsarist-
era events or ideas, making the following works indispensable. 
For the socio-economic and political impact of Russian power, the works of 
Alexander Morrison and Michael Khodarkovsky, though rather different from one 
another in their style and points of emphasis, have both been helpful.74 Both describe 
the difficulties experienced by the Russian Empire when seeking to extend, define and 
consolidate its rule over a nomadic region with distinctive topographical features. Like 
Demko they also describe the effects of Slavic colonisation before the revolution.75 
These authors provide detailed analysis of Central Asia’s governing structures and 
prevailing socio-economic trends before 1917, but they also offer more generalizable 
insights into the nature of power, administration and bureaucracy in Central Asia. 
Some of these insights have proven directly applicable to Soviet Kazakhstan, some act 
as a useful point of contrast. Further scholars who might be associated with Morrison 
and Khodarkovsky are Virginia Martin and Adeeb Khalid.76 Other works of varying 
value have considered the religious factor in the colonisation of Kazakh nomads. These 
include publications by Robert P. Geraci, Robert D. Crews and, for some of the most 
insightful and comprehensive work on this topic, Allen J. Frank.77 
In his article ‘Russian Rule in Turkestan and the Example of British India, c. 1860-
1917’, Morrison makes reference to the argument that the ideology of Russian 
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imperialism differed in a meaningful way from the ideology of Western European, 
particularly British, imperialism. He cites a common belief that Russian imperialist 
expansion was not justified by a racist worldview, for example.78 Morrison is sceptical 
of this model, asserting that in its implementation in Central Asia Russian rule did not 
vary substantively from British rule in India. He does acknowledge, however, that the 
case for a unique Russian imperialist mentality may withstand closer scrutiny when 
looking not at the actions of ‘military men’ but at the published output of journalists 
and scholars working under the Tsar in European Russia.79 A case of this nature has 
been made Vera Tolz, and with further important implications for this thesis. 
Tolz assesses the late Russian Empire’s Orientalist scholarship and its effect on 
early Bolshevik thinking and actions.80 She engages with the assumption, commonly 
associated with Edward Said, that Orientalism as a form of scholarship facilitated 
imperialist expansion.81 Tolz argues that certain important members of Russia’s 
Orientalist school differed from their Western European counterparts, and so Said’s 
model is inapplicable in the Russian case. Furthermore, Tolz points to the influence of 
these scholars in the early Soviet period.82 As with the nation-making paradigm, Tolz’s 
conclusions provide useful contextual detail for the thesis, particularly in Chapter 
Three, but they also inform the analytical approach of the thesis. Like Tolz, this thesis 
holds that the actions of the Soviet state in Central Asia in the 1920s cannot be easily 
categorised as imperialistic, at least in the sense used by Said and others. This 
conviction is most plainly expressed where the thesis diverges from the work of Paula 
A. Michaels in Chapter Seven. Tolz’s work also demonstrates the connections, 
important for the conclusions of this thesis, between late Tsarist and early Soviet rule 
and between recent historiography on the National Question and recent historiography 
on the last years of the Russian Empire. All are relevant to the treatment of nomads 
after the Russian Civil War. 
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Historical Journal 48, no. 1 (2005), pp. 127-150. Vera Tolz, Russia's Own Orient: The Politics of 
Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). A similar case is made by Francine Hirsch: Hirsch, Empire of Nations, pp. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is not to produce a national history of modern 
Kazakhstan, one which reflects the insights of the nation-making paradigm and 
perhaps chooses the fate of Kazakh nomadism as a prism through which to witness the 
creation of a country, in the same spirit as excellent work by Adrienne Lynne Edgar and 
others.83 Nor does it wish to justify the treatment of Kazakhs by the state as the state’s 
own historians did before 1991, or to chronicle the brutal subjugation of non-Russian 
cultural and economic practices in the periphery of a Soviet Empire, as in 
comprehensive pieces by Pipes or Michaels.84 The thesis does not attempt another 
account of the collectivisation period in Kazakhstan, using the 1920s as introductory 
context for an explanation of sedentarisation. This has been achieved with success by 
scholars in both Russian and English-language publications. To reiterate the assertions 
made in Chapter One, this thesis takes as its principal aim an analysis of the treatment 
of nomadic Kazakhs from 1920 to 1928, based on the perceptions and actions of the 
Soviet state and Party apparatus in the republic, and to conclude its account with a 
summary of the period 1929-1934. In various ways, all the different categories of 
literature described above contribute to this thesis’ objective. 
Soviet historiography, while obviously limited by the political circumstances in 
which it was written, provides useful statistical information and must be read if 
English-language scholarship produced during the Cold War is to be properly assessed. 
Said scholarship of the Cold War correctly identified some of the most important 
trends in the state’s relationship with its Kazakh nomadic citizens, but was restricted 
by its source base. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and revelations about 
sedentarisation and collectivisation were made public, the most relevant academic 
literature may be said to have bifurcated. On the one hand there is a growing body of 
national histories of Kazakhstan, connecting the contemporary, independent Kazakh 
Republic with history which predates both Soviet and Tsarist rule. On the other hand 
there has been great interest in the more recent origins of Kazakh nationhood, focusing 
on early Bolshevik actions and, to a lesser extent but just as importantly, on the late 
Tsarist era. Pre-Tsarist information on Kazakh cultural and economic practices is 
certainly useful, and the nation-making paradigm has substantially influenced this 
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thesis’ analytical approach. Neither branch of the recent historiography, however, 
focuses primarily on nomads and nomadism, and those studies which are interested in 
this subject continue to gravitate towards 1928 and collectivisation. Thus, it is its 
simultaneous focus on Kazakh nomadism and the NEP period which makes this thesis 
unique among the literature here described.  
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Chapter Three: Soviet Perceptions of Kazakh Nomadism 
 
“A Kazakh grew up astride camels, 
and astride camels he should stay”.1 
 
Chapter Three: 
Soviet Perceptions of Kazakh Nomadism 
 
At the first sitting of the Congress of Workers for Sedentarisation in 1930, a 
Comrade Koshkunov was giving a report on the previous year’s campaigning when he 
was interrupted from the floor: 
[Koshkunov] … And as a result of that year we have it that the bedniak and 
seredniak mass have themselves started to declare support for 
sedentarisation, in spite of agitation from bais and nationalistic elements. 
They were saying that this sedentarisation turns Kazakhs – 
Rejoinder: Into Russians (laughter). 
[Koshkunov] These chauvinistic elements interfered with our work.2 
This throwaway interruption to Koshkunov’s report was a simple summary of a 
complex situation in Kazakh life of the time, encapsulating how nomads were 
understood by state administrators and Party members and helping to explain the 
relationship between nomad and state by the beginning of the 1930s. The rejoinder 
mocked a prevalent anxiety, that sedentarisation equated to Russification. It thereby 
undermined the arguments of those in Soviet Central Asia, characterised by Koshkunov 
as class enemies and nationalist deviationists, who wanted to protect the nomadic way 
of life from Party and state. That these ‘bais and nationalistic elements’ said they did 
not want to see nomads become Russians, implying that sedentary Kazakhs is a 
                                                          
1 The quote comes from the first sitting of the Congress of Workers for Sedentarisation in 1930, 
and is a mocking caricature of  the defenders of nomadism, by then dismissed as agitators for 
the preservation of ‘feudal relations’: TsGARK fond 1179, opis′ 6, delo 3, list 14 (henceforth 
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chairman of the Kazakh Regional Control Committee: K. S. Aldazhumanov et al., Narkomy 
Kazakhstana 1920-1946 gg.: Biograficheskii spravochnik (Almaty: Arys, 2007), p. 202. Broadly, a 
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These terms are included in the glossary, and explained later in this chapter where their 
meaning is more immediately relevant. 
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contradiction in terms, reveals something very significant about the nature of political 
discourse at this stage in Soviet history. 
The language of nationality, as will be emphasised in this chapter and throughout 
remaining chapters, permeated Kazakh political affairs in the 1920s. This is why the 
image of Kazakhs being transformed into Russians was meaningful whether treated 
with earnestness or, as at the Congress of Workers for Sedentarisation, with derisive 
amusement. The concepts of nomadic and sedentary life, on the other hand, were less 
commonly discussed, and within the Party they were far less intellectually developed. 
The decision to stress the nomads’ national status, rather than an identity based on 
their lifestyle, emerged from a lack of common understanding of what nomadic and 
sedentary meant in contrast to far more developed ideas of nations and nationhood. 
How had political discourse around nomadism come to be so indeterminate? Three 
factors present themselves for appraisal. 
First, Karl Marx and other leading contributors to Bolshevik thought had 
relatively little to say about nomads.3 Kevin B. Anderson indicates that Marx’s 
theorisation about Asiatic nomadic tribes was not altogether critical, in that he 
declared them to be devoid of private property and capable of communal forms of 
production.4 But as Anderson himself acknowledges, what little there was of nomadism 
in Marx’s canon was largely located in his journalistic or unpublished works and would 
have had less impact on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union than his more famous 
economic tracts.5 There, Asiatic nomadism is presented simply as stagnant.6 Unlike on 
matters of statehood or class, therefore, leading Communists came to power in Soviet 
Kazakhstan without any rich theoretical commentary on nomadism from which to 
draw inspiration. Nor did they have any aggressive critique of the nomads’ 
circumstances to motivate change. 
Second, nomadism was not generally perceived to be a problem which would 
linger. At the first all-Kazakh conference, a small number of members asserted their 
view that Kazakhs were nomadic by instinct and would remain so forever.7  But this 
was already a minority attitude in June 1921 and rapidly lost what few advocates it had. 
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For various reasons, including the instability of the nomadic economy, the supposed 
desirability of life in a socialist urban environment, and the new possibilities of 
technological innovation and financial investment, it was assumed that the remaining 
nomads of the former Tsarist Empire would settle shortly after the Civil War. Marx may 
also have played a role in this, as when he did discuss Asiatic nomads, he placed them 
at the very earliest stages of human progress.8 They would therefore have to change 
very quickly to keep up with the swiftly changing socialist society liberated by the 
October Revolution. If they were soon to go extinct, then, there would have seemed 
little reason to agonise about nomads and how best to manage them.    
Third, in terms of cultural heritage, members of the Kazakh Communist Party 
were often European and always sedentary. Leaders in the Party branch such as Aron 
Vainshtein and Filipp Goloshchekin were drafted in from European Russia. Other 
prominent figures with a Central Asian background often originated from the ‘nomadic 
heartlands’ of central Kazakhstan, but had received an education in urban centres and 
so had ceased to practice nomadism if indeed they ever had.9 At the lower echelons of 
the Party structure, basic requirements of literacy excluded most still-migrating 
communities.10 It is instructive to contrast this state of affairs with the importance of 
having grown up in a proletarian household when applying to join the Communist 
Party.11 By systematically promoting members of the proletariat and demoting the 
bourgeoisie, the Party effected a radical redefinition of class in the former Tsarist 
Empire and created cadres of individuals fully willing to embrace the new definition, 
with the proletariat in a foremost position. No such alteration took place regarding 
nomads; either the Party was run by Europeans with no personal experience of 
nomadism, or by settled Central Asians. Thus the first-hand nomadic perspective was 
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as excluded from Communist Party congresses as it had been from the meetings of 
Tsarist officials.  
If 1917 did not make a huge difference to how nomads were widely 
conceptualised, what were the pre-1917 origins of the Soviet view of nomads, and what 
form did that view eventually take in the 1920s? It is essential to answer these 
questions before a full review of the state’s treatment of nomads can be made in later 
chapters of this thesis. The following sections of this chapter, then, will look at the 
attitudes of Communist Party members and Soviet-era scholars towards Kazakh 
nomads and nomadism. Both appear to have been influenced by three bodies of 
thought: Marxism (influential despite lacking a clear position on nomads), the everyday 
observations of non-nomadic peoples and the studies of Russia’s old imperial 
ethnographers, each of which will be addressed. The third section of this chapter will 
review the 1926 all-Union census, which reveals the flaws of a combined effort 
between Party and scholarship to understand nomadism.  
Section One: Communist Party Members 
By the mid-1920s the power of the Communist Party in Soviet Kazakhstan was 
preeminent, making the prevailing attitudes of its members vitally important. From 
these attitudes, after all, emerged all Party policy. The quantity of sources from Party 
organs, and the variety of opinion and debate which characterized the earlier years of 
Soviet rule, make it possible to observe changing conceptions of nomads and 
nomadism from 1920 to 1930 and beyond. Trends can be carefully ascribed to certain 
individuals within the Party, whose influence waxed and waned depending on broader 
political circumstances. 
Common to all significant Party members was the view that nomadic existence 
was arduous, even wretched. It is a view best summarised by the comments of Victor 
Radius-Zenkovich in June 1921 when he sat on the Kazakh Council of People’s 
Commissars (Sovnarkom KSSR).12 As an ethnic Russian and native of Arkhangelsk, 
Radius-Zenkovich confessed that when he familiarised himself with the life and living 
conditions of the Kazakhs (perhaps in preparation for his appointment to the 
Sovnarkom), he expected them to be even lower than those normally associated with 
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‘backward peoples.’13 In fact, he found life on the steppe to be worse still, darker than 
could have been anticipated and limited by ‘death and degeneracy.’14 
Radius-Zenkovich’s words bear some significant resemblance to the general view 
amongst Russians, Ukrainians and Cossacks in the Kustanai (now Kostanai) Governate. 
These were peasants with no connections to Party or state, and their opinions were 
summarised in a report in 1922. They apparently considered Kazakhs to be indolent, 
abject and uneducated, too preoccupied with self-inflicted hunger to be properly 
organised.15 Among labourers in mid-1923 it was broadly believed that young Kazakhs 
received preferential treatment over Russians, possibly an early example of 
korenizatsiia or the promotion of ethnic minorities in their own territories, which 
caused generalised hostility towards nomadic and sedentary Kazakhs alike.16 Other 
Russians outside the Party system were resentful that nomads had to occupy so much 
land to yield so little agricultural produce.17 The invasion of Russian farmland by 
nomadic communities during and after the Civil War, an important topic discussed in 
more depth in Chapter Four, cemented the popular view that nomads were a regressive 
force in post-war reconstruction efforts.18 
This popular view had long roots. The Golden Horde, one of various successor 
states to the Mongol Empire, ruled Russia from around 1240 to 1480, and is widely 
held to have had a profound influence on Russian culture, creating a lingering suspicion 
of the ‘nomadic barbarism’ of Central Asia.19  Up until the early eighteenth century 
Russian peasants were still regularly being taken hostage by raiding bands of Turkic 
nomads and others.20 As Russian colonization of the steppe accelerated from the 1730s 
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onwards, certain inter-ethnic hostilities had only intensified.21 Russian peasants 
appropriated more and more steppe land after local Kazakhs had been suppressed by 
Cossack mercenaries, but the permanent domination of the more mobile nomads 
proved difficult and reprisals quickly followed.22 This pattern of attack and counter-
attack, with neither side able to defend their territorial gains, expedited Russia’s 
imperial expansion southwards.23 Sergei Solov′ev, one the late nineteenth century’s 
most influential Russian historians, ‘depicted Russia’s historic and geographic destiny 
as the expulsion of Asiatic nomadism from Europe and the conquest of the transitional 
steppe zone between Europe and Asia for the superior, sedentary civilization of the 
West.’24 
In this context it is unsurprising that the Russian people were not always 
respectful of its nomadic neighbours, and the re-emergence of violence and banditry in 
the latest months of the Tsarist era, when Basmachi uprisings and lawlessness broke 
out on the steppe, sharpened opinions further.25 During the Civil War, Russian 
command staff in the Red Army were deeply disappointed with Kazakh troops, 
characterizing them as ‘not military stuff … lazy and physically ill-adapted to military 
training.’26 No matter how extensive their ideological training, all this was also part of 
the cultural heritage which Europeans (Ukrainian, Russian, Polish etc) brought with 
them to the Communist Party. 
Party members like Radius-Zenkovich who were born in European Russia were 
thus most likely to hold similar opinions to those expressed by the peasants of the 
Kustanai Governate and elsewhere. For these figures, whether at the bottom or top of 
the hierarchy, nomadism was a backward and highly unstable agricultural practice.27 
Some Party members with Central Asian heritage were slightly more likely to talk of 
nomadism more approvingly. But when they did so, it was often in opposition to the 
hateful colonising policies of the late Tsarist era. They claimed that the eviction of 
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nomads from the best steppe land by Russian peasants led many Kazakhs to settle in an 
abortive attempt to stay alive. Here, then, declining nomadism is associated with 
historical injustice.28 This was the closest most Party members came to celebrating the 
Kazakhs’ nomadic heritage, but it was not the same as saying that settlement was a 
negative development, or that nomadism was a fruitful endeavour. The lack of nomads 
in the Central Asian contingent precluded empathy. European contempt was merely 
replaced with pity from Central Asians.29 
Prejudices of this kind from Party members were compounded by a less emotive 
economic critique based on observation. During the 1920s, the Kazakh economy 
staggered from crisis to crisis as a result of violence, disruption, mismanagement and 
bad weather, and the Party members who heard about this, or saw it for themselves, 
drew conclusions about the nomadic lifestyle. The case is made clearest by this article 
from Pravda, published in 1927: 
‘DZHUT!’ 
‘Dzhut’ is the most awful scourge of the cattle-herding nomad. The 
population of Kazakhstan stands before the threat of great tragedy every 
year. 
When ‘dzhut’ seizes the expansive regions of the nomadic population, 
it carries off a hundred thousand heads of cattle. 
What is ‘dzhut’, and what causes it?... 
The conditions and living habits of the nomad do not allow the 
possibility of preserving food in sufficient quantity to properly feed cattle 
over the course of the long winter. In those years when the winter is typical, 
that is, with little precipitation, no sharp fluctuations in temperature, small 
amounts of snow and yielding soil, cattle can cope with the task of 
acquiring food. But when snow is accompanied by rain, or when there is a 
thaw and then a freeze on the surface of the soil, an icy crust is created, 
which represents an awful tragedy for cattle; ‘dzhut’…. 
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Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small People of the North (Ithaca: Cornell University 
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Over the decade this tragedy has been visited upon Kazakhstan three 
times; in 1917 it affected all the regions of Central Asia, in 1921 it gripped 
the whole expanse of the north-western region of Kazakhstan, in 1927 
‘dzhut’ made its way through the 18 volosts of the Semipalatinsk Governate. 
The most awful effects of ‘dzhut’ were in 1921, when ‘dzhut’ coincided with 
a year of famine. Not only cattle perished, but people too. The exact figures 
for the deceased are not known, but around 70% of cattle in the region 
died. In that year, in the period of the Civil War in Central Asia and famine 
in the Volga region, the state did not have the possibility to provide the 
necessary aid to those regions suffering from ‘dzhut’…30 
For the readers of such material, nomadic herds seemed less stable than their 
sedentary counterparts and more vulnerable to external shocks.31 Nomadic regions, it 
followed, were the least reliably productive regions of the republic.32 The prevailing 
feeling was of permanent crisis. Just as Party reports in 1920 described nomadic 
communities on the brink of famine and collapse, and Party newspapers reported on 
the continuing series of crises as they occurred, Narkomzem KASSR imputed a ‘crisis 
condition’ to the nomadic economy in January 1930.33 Few outside the nomadic aul, a 
small community of Kazakhs which has been translated as ‘mobile village’, were in any 
doubt that the lifestyle exacerbated the problem.34 The ultimate consequence of all this 
was simple; almost every major Party figure concurred that it would be best if nomads 
settled and the lifestyle was extinguished.35 Crucially, this consensus was all but 
complete long before widespread and systematic collectivisation began elsewhere in 
the USSR, but it is true that disagreement about this basic proposition had been more 
prevalent in the earliest years of the 1920s. 
In contrast, the methods of sedentarisation (allowing the process to occur 
naturally, offering incentives, and coercion) and the management of pre-sedentarised 
nomads were more fractious topics at Party conferences and committees. Kazakh 
historians are right to say that ‘…the paths of progress for the Kazakh peasantry were 
associated with the transformation (state-directed) of the animal herding economy 
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into an arable or sedentary animal farming economy,’ but not all discussants agreed on 
the nature of state-direction.36 The differing opinions of these early Party leaders may 
originate from their post-Civil War experiences of the steppe. Many of them were sent 
on investigative errands in 1921-1922, with Seitkali Mendeshev heading to the north-
west, Alibi Dzhangil′din to the north, and a certain Comrade Danilov travelling to the 
east.37 
Other, related points of disagreement surfaced over the the origins or causes of 
nomadism and the class structures of the nomadic aul. Some Party members preferred 
to describe impoverished nomads or those of low social status as batraks, a word 
meaning a labourer engaged in manual, usually agricultural work38. Others divided up 
nomadic society into more distinct economic classes including bedniaks, the poor, 
seredniaks, those of moderate wealth, and the bais. Bai was a Kazakh social category, 
unrelated to Marxist class categories until the arrival of the Bolsheviks, and it included 
Kazakhs of greater wealth but also those of higher social status and civic authority.39 As 
will be shown, the Communist Party’s opinion of the bais was seldom positive, but as 
time progressed the bai came to play a similar role to that of the kulak in the Party’s 
assessment of Kazakh society, leading to increasingly repressive measures. More 
broadly Party members disagreed about the existence and degree of class stratification 
in the aul, over whether the bais represented a powerful capitalist bourgeoisie or 
something less dangerous and potent. 
Here, then, divergence between different members is observable, so different 
sets of opinion should be introduced. This section will briefly discuss the attitudes of 
four foremost Party leaders. Mendeshev, Dzhangil′din and Aron Vainshtein are 
representative of the predominant range of opinion in the Communist Party in the 
earlier part of the decade. Filipp Goloshchekin’s view was always present, but grew 
increasingly prevalent and then utterly dominant as the decade progressed and dissent 
within the Party became more dangerous. His assessment of nomadism should be 
considered definitive for Party policy by the start of the 1930s. Each of these men will 
feature again throughout the thesis, and through their actions reveal much about their 
personal conceptions of nomadism.  
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Seitkali Mendeshev 
A vocal figure from the beginning of the decade, Seitkali Mendeshev would 
become involved in a host of inter-Party disputes about nomads and nomadism.40  A 
former school teacher who tutored future members of the Kazakh administration in 
their adolescence, in 1919 Mendeshev became a leading member of the Kazakh 
Revolutionary Committee (Kirrevkom) and within two years was serving on the 
Presidium of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee.41 He remained there until 1925, 
then he served in economic organs first for the Kazakh Republic, and then for the 
RSFSR.42 
Of all four figures to be discussed, Mendeshev was least scornful about 
nomadism. He did not deny that Kazakh nomadic society was poor, and that its 
impoverishment had been steadily worsening since before 1917. His first point of 
departure from some of his colleagues was his unrelenting emphasis on Tsarist 
exploitation as the cardinal explanation for Kazakh poverty. He rebuked senior Party 
members for lambasting backwardness on the steppe without appending this essential 
contextual detail.43 This was a habit which would not leave him, and in later years he 
did not hesitate to draw comparisons between Soviet policy and the actions of the 
Tsarist administration when things displeased him.44 The environment, too, played a 
crucial role in Mendeshev’s thinking. For him, ‘the position of the KSSR is such, that 
there are places where agriculture is completely impossible.’45 This attitude would also 
remain firmly embedded in Mendeshev’s analysis. As other Party members contracted 
Moscow’s infectious faith in technology’s ability to conquer the natural world, 
Mendeshev contended that, woeful or not, nomadism was the only viable lifestyle in 
some areas.46 
The implication of Mendeshev’s emphasis on historical injustice and the 
difficulties of the steppe environment was that outright condemnation of the nomadic 
economy was unhelpful, and nuances should be recognised. He counselled that 
                                                          
40 His name is sometimes transliterated ‘Seitgali’. 
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pp. 50-54. Its transmission to the Kazakh Communist Party is discussed again in Chapter Four. 
45 
 
 
Chapter Three: Soviet Perceptions of Kazakh Nomadism 
 
sedentarisation was not the only feasible option for nomads, and that alternative 
improvements to their lifestyle could be found in the short term.47 Further, Mendeshev 
was sceptical about claims of class stratification amongst nomads. At the third Kazakh 
Communist Party Congress in 1923, delegates heard stories of the wealthy Kazakh bais 
handing out the leftovers of each of their meals to queues of sullen nomadic bedniaks, 
or lending a horse to a disadvantaged pauper only to demand crippling payments of 
food and other goods in return.48 Mendeshev did not repudiate these stories of 
exploitation, but would not have them attributed to capitalism. For him, capitalist 
forms of exploitation could not yet be found in ‘the purely nomadic Kazakh aul.’49 To 
describe exploitation between nomads, he preferred a Russian term with connotations 
of debt slavery: kabal′noe otnoshenie.50 Critical as he was, then, of some social relations 
in nomadic communities, his refutation of capitalistic influence had serious 
implications for the Party’s wider theorisations of nomadism. ‘Here, labour and means 
of labour’, argued Mendeshev, ‘do not yet play such a role [as they did in the sedentary 
economy].’51  
Having disregarded excessive theorising about nomadic life as  ‘logomachy’ in 
June 1921, Mendeshev henceforth emerges from Party documentation as a practical 
and assertive policy maker, convinced of the nomads’ need for material aid from the 
state.52 In the mid-1920s he took the side of agricultural organs lobbying for more 
loans for settling nomads.53 In the summer of 1924 he would make use of his expertise 
in the creation of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border through nomadic territories.54 Four years 
later his repeated objections to the reconfiguration of administrative boundaries in the 
west of the Kazakh Republic demonstrated the resilience of his convictions. As the 
sedentarisation campaign reached the peak of its activity in 1932, he submitted a 
critical report on the plight of Kazakhs in the Aktiubinsk area directly to Filipp 
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Goloshchekin. 55 Despite his opposition to the decisions of the Central Committee, 
Mendeshev would continue to serve in high office, serving as Kazakh People’s 
Commissar for Education 1930-1933 and chairman of the Kazakh Committee for 
Science 1930-1937. He was arrested as part of the Party purge in 1937 and executed by 
firing squad in February 1938.56 Another Party member with views similar to those of 
Seitkali Mendeshev was Smagul Sadvokasov, who helped to coordinate an (ultimately 
unsuccessful) opposition to Goloshchekin’s leadership over a three year period from 
1925 to 1928.57 
Alibi Dzhangil′din 
Like Mendeshev, Alibi Dzhangil′din was made a member of the Kirrevkom in 
1919, but the intellectual journeys of the two men had been different prior to this 
moment and would diverge henceforth.58 Dzhangil’din had travelled extensively in 
Europe and Asia prior to the Russian Revolution, and led a Red Army battalion in 
Central Asia during the Civil War.59 Though Dzhangil′din was as keenly aware of 
Kazakhstan’s recent colonial history as any of his colleagues, this left him no less 
relaxed about the profound backwardness of nomadic life. Among his other 
endeavours, he served on the People’s Commissariat of Social Security from 1921 to 
May 1925 and again from October 1925 to 1928. He also headed the Koshchi Union for 
a brief period in the late 1920s and joined the Kazakh Central Executive Committee in 
1930.60 
For much of 1922 Dzhangil′din lived among the Adai nomads to the east of the 
Caspian Sea, as part of a kind of anthropological survey of the peoples of the new 
Kazakh Republic. Dzhangil′din called Adai individuals ‘nomad-adai’, and claimed in a 
report to the Kazakh Communist Party’s central organs that the nomad-adai lived at 
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the complete mercy of nature.61 His report repeatedly emphasised the fragility of Adai 
society, and that at any time it could be profoundly destabilized by dzhut. More 
explicitly than Mendeshev, Dzhangil′din believed that nomadism was a natural reaction 
to a hostile natural environment. It was his clear conviction that the nomad-adai 
fervently wanted to settle, but the land would not allow it. He depicted constant 
migration as a vicious circle in which nomads were trapped; utterly dependent on 
cattle because they had no crops, unable to grow crops because they had to migrate to 
keep their cattle alive.62 
This more extensive emphasis on hardship and shortage would have been 
compounded by his frenetic reporting on the famine which afflicted north-western 
Kazakhstan and elsewhere after the Civil War. As a key figure in the Red Caravan 
investigatory team, he chose to stress the isolation and underdevelopment of the 
peoples of the steppe. 63  Perhaps a more ideological thinker than Mendeshev, 
Dzhangil′din also prioritised the involvement of nomads in the business of the Party, 
their education in socialist theory, and their contribution to the Red Army.64 Embedded 
within Dzhangil′din’s analysis was a certain respect for the complexities of nomadic 
practice. He cautioned his Party colleagues that it was impossible to be certain about 
Kazakh nomads without first having lived amongst them and properly learned their 
customs.65 Yet he was still comfortable with the application of Marxist analysis to 
Kazakh nomadic society. In March 1923 he was publicly accused of fraternising with 
reactionary Mullahs and nomadic bais during his travels with the Red Caravan.66 His 
muddled response fully accepted the existence of stratified economic classes in the aul. 
To defend himself from bourgeois sympathies, he countered that by enjoying the 
hospitality of class enemies he exploited them, thereby giving reactionary elements a 
taste of their own medicine.67 The declarations of Red Caravan committees repeatedly 
brought attention to the plight specifically of the Kazakh poor, though other 
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documentation from Caravan participants discussed ‘kulak-migrants’, appearing to 
accuse Russian peasants of exacerbating the famine among Kazakhs.68 
Dzhangil′din would eventually be tasked with negotiating ceasefires with armed 
Kazakhs rebelling against the collectivisation campaign in 1930, and in the following 
year he coordinated efforts to return by force emigrant Kazakhs who had fled into 
China to avoid repression and hunger. He would survive Party purges and remain at 
the pinnacle of Kazakh politics until his death in 1953.69   
Aron Vainshtein 
Born into Vilnius’ substantial Jewish population, Aron Vainshtein joined the 
Communist Party in 1920 and was sent from his post in Belarus to join the governing 
institutions of the new Kazakh Republic in March 1922.70 One year later, Vainshstein 
submitted a report to the Kazakh Party Conference which would divide opinion. 
Mendeshev was one of many attendees who signalled their resistance to the report’s 
key theses.71  Central to Vainshtein’s vision was the unquestionable class stratification 
of the aul. He seems to have considered it his role in Orenburg to educate the more 
provincial Kazakh Party in proper Marxist doctrine. He admonished listeners for failing 
to read and understand Marxist texts, and explained to members that stratification was 
not only a fact in 1923, but had been since at least the mid-1890s. He sought to prove 
this with meticulous detail, offering percentages of rich and poor Kazakhs by region at 
a time when reliable information on the steppe population was known to be scarce; 
many attendees questioned the origins of his data, revealing scepticism which he 
tersely rebuked.72 He also expressed his irreconcilable intolerance for the practice of 
class exploitation by the bais and his intention to eradicate class stratification with 
haste.73 For him, stratification could be measured in livestock. He conceptualised cattle, 
horses and sheep as instruments of production, to be redistributed or collectivised 
much as industrial machinery might be.74 
Vainshtein was one of the first members to talk openly and coherently about 
methods of sedentarisation. In doing so he presented himself as a man ready to grasp a 
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nettle which his more timid colleagues would rather leave to seed. An associate had 
warned him not to advocate a special, punitive tax on the bais, he claimed, but 
Vainshtein outlined it anyway.75 A special fund needed to be created, he said, to create 
exemplary settlements of former nomads for other nomads to imitate.76 All this was 
supported by Vainshtein’s firmly-held belief that ‘the population wishes to settle.’77 
Environmental obstacles to the populations’ desires received scant attention in 
Vainshtein’s report. 
Vainshtein was a pugnacious speaker. He upbraided Smagul Sadvokasov, an 
outspoken critic of punitive taxation, and summarised Sadvokasov’s line with a quote 
from Tsarist Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, a figure responsible for wide-ranging 
agricultural reform in late Imperial Russia: ‘You are in need of great upheavals, we are 
in need of a great Russia.’ ‘But what you need, Comrade Sadvokasov’, Vainshtein 
concluded, ‘I’m very afraid to say and do not want to utter,’ to laughter from the 
assembled members.78 Vainshtein would return to Moscow later in 1923 to begin work 
in an all-Union financial organisation, and was eventually shot at the same time as 
Mendeshev in February 1938.79 In spite of his brief tenure in the Kazakh capital, 
Vainshtein’s intervention is significant as a portent for what was to come in Kazakhstan. 
He was perhaps one of the vectors which transmitted Moscow’s ideological self-
confidence first to Orenburg, then to Kyzylorda, and finally to Alma-Ata. As will be 
argued in later chapters, Vainshtein’s view would become a matter of emphatic 
consensus in the Kazakh Republic in the late 1920s. The arguments he intensified 
about class stratification in the aul even became a matter of international debate, as the 
anti-Soviet agitator Mustafa Shokay intervened from abroad to state that Kazakhs had 
no taste for class war.80 Other advocates of Vainshtein’s perspective included Zakhar 
Mindlin and the aforementioned Kharchenko.81  
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Filipp Goloshchekin 
‘The old, backward, nomadic, semi-nomadic aul is dying, and should die.’82 So 
proclaimed Filipp Goloshchekin in September 1931. Descriptions of Goloshchekin in 
recent historiography can be barbed. His personal involvement in the murder of the 
Romanov royal family is mentioned pointedly.83 The incongruous fact that he had 
trained as a dentist before coming to lead the largest of the Soviet Union’s Central Asian 
republics is also used to imply that he was elevated far beyond his field of 
competence.84 The primary accusation, however, relates to the responsibility he bears 
for the policies of collectivisation and sedentarisation, enforced as they were when he 
was secretary of the Kazakh Regional Committee (Kazkraikom), a role previously held 
by Mendeshev.85 Goloshchekin instituted what he called the ‘Little October’, which 
began in 1926 and continued for many years, characterised by political arrests, 
confiscation, exile, collectivization and sedentarisation.86 The massive loss of life which 
followed these policies in Kazakhstan has been described by a number of Kazakh 
historians as ‘Goloshchekin’s genocide’ or ‘Kazakh-cide’ (Kazakhtsid).87 The changing 
political and social circumstances observable towards the end of the 1920s will be 
addressed in various ways by each of the remaining chapters of this thesis, and the 
accusations of genocide made by certain historians will be assessed specifically in 
Chapter Eight. For the purposes of this chapter, it remains to be asked: what was 
Goloshchekin’s conception of nomads and nomadism?  
In his frequently-cited address to the sixth Kazakh Party Conference in 1926, 
Goloshchekin spoke expansively on the economic problems facing Kazakhs and their 
republic.88 On nomadism he was unequivocal. He told his Party members that the 
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population they governed was ‘sharply divided’ into two parts, one sedentary, one 
nomadic or semi-nomadic.89 He explained that approximately fifty percent of the 
republic’s population fell into each part, but that ninety percent of the state and party’s 
attention was devoted to the sedentary half of the republic; that is, until he was 
interrupted from the floor by a speaker who insisted that in fact no resources or efforts 
were expended on nomadic herders. This Goloshchekin accepted. He presented the 
nomads as helpless victims of neglect, and the Party as neglectful for pursuing 
sedentarisation without consistency or sufficient eagerness.90 Unlike Dzhangil′din or 
Vainshtein, Goloshchekin had little faith in the nomads’ inherent desire or capacity to 
settle.91 Unlike Mendeshev, however, he also had no respect for the nomadic economy 
itself, portraying it as unproductive and highly unstable.92 He was simultaneously 
sceptical about nomadism’s viability and pessimistic about the nomads’ ability to 
escape their own state of being. Concerted intervention, of a scale previously unseen on 
the steppe, could be the only answer to the problem Goloshchekin raised. 
The bais were to be placed directly in the state’s line of fire. Goloshchekin 
explained in his 1926 report that dzhut may hurt the bais, but that it hurt the nomadic 
bedniak and seredniak far more. Hardship alone could not be expected to drive nomads 
to settlement while the bais remained powerful, and Goloshchekin’s answer was to 
improve and increase livestock herding in the republic to break the stranglehold of the 
bais.93 Improvement, of course, could not be achieved within the choking limitations of 
nomadism. All this depended on a class-based analysis of the nomadic aul, which 
Goloshchekin fully endorsed, encouraging use of a ‘semi-feudal’ model for 
understanding Kazakh communities.94 Nomadic feudalism was a social model created 
and endorsed by Boris Vladimirtsov, an expert on Mongolian peoples trained in the 
Tsarist era whose works on Ghengis Khan and Mongol rule over Russia would be 
hugely influential on later Soviet scholars.95  
 Goloshchekin’s administration persecuted regional and central Party figures 
who disagreed with its policy direction, eventually forcing oppositionists like 
Mendeshev to flee the republic. Various factors including repressive actions, a changing 
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culture within the Party, and ascendant aspects of Bolshevik ideology all ensured that 
Goloshchekin’s diagnosis and remedy for the nomadic economy became unassailable. 
The use of quantitative data and the division of nomadic society into economic classes 
by numbers of livestock, as first advocated by Vainshtein, became standardised.96 
Regional organs began using the feudal/semi-feudal model for understanding the 
nomadic economy.97 Goloshchekin himself would eventually be arrested and shot after 
a Party purge in 1941.98 
Section Two: Soviet Scholarship 
Amid the institutional disarray of the Soviet 1920s, any distinction between 
scholars and Party activists was a fine one. Certainly the likes of Mendeshev and 
Dzhangil′din presented themselves as intellectuals as much as administrators or 
politicians.99 For the purposes of this chapter, a division is made between those who 
wielded power, those who directed the apparatus of the state on a regional and 
republic-wide level, including Goloshchekin and Vainshtein but also Dzhangil′din and 
Mendeshev, and those who held only influence, intellectuals whom the Party consulted 
but could choose to disregard. Even if figures shortly to be discussed, like Zarubin and 
Donich, were never able directly to dictate Party policy, the reports to be analysed in 
this section were intended to influence the thinking of senior Communists, not to act as 
a blueprint for state actions. As such they are treated as scholarly interventions. 
The scholarship of the 1920s was heavily influenced by Marxism, but also by 
academic currents originating from before the Russian revolution.100 In the nascent 
ethnographic schools of late Imperial Russia, one can find the typical condescension 
and racial supremacism so vilified by Edward Said and other critics of Orientalism.101 
Mongol and Turkish nomads were, in the view of one imperial scholar lecturing in 
1851, more destructive for civilisation than plagues, floods or volcanoes. Their 
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nomadism made them even more backward than the sedentary peoples of the 
Orient.102  
Yet, as the work of Vera Tolz has shown, there were also nuances in the Russian 
scholarly attitude towards Asiatic nomads which belie easy assumptions about the 
arrogance of European civilization.103 Some argued, for example, that the clan system of 
the steppe nomads was not necessarily inferior to the settled lives of Russian peasants. 
This view was augmented by a generalised respect for the culture and history of 
Central Asia, for which Russian scholars sometimes indulged in self-congratulation.104 
For periods during the Tsarist era, Kazakh nomads were also thought to be less 
devoutly Islamic than the peoples of Turkestan, and therefore more amenable to 
assimilation into a pluralistic Russian nationalism.105 The Tsar’s Frontier Commission, 
based in Orenburg, had scholars migrate with nomadic Kazakhs in order to better 
understand their customs and dialects, with one linguist developing an abiding love for 
the Kazakh language.106 Importantly, however, the imperial administration established 
agricultural schools in the Zhetysu and Semipalatinsk regions, designed to encourage 
nomads to settle.107 This gives some indication of how far Russian scholarly admiration 
for Kazakh culture would ever extend, and to what extent this admiration was shared 
by the Tsarist state. 
Moving into the Soviet period, the effect of these precedents was a slight 
corrective against the dismissal of non-Russians as backward. Alongside typical 
portrayals of the nomadic aul as a micro-despotism, an expedition made to Mongolia by 
the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the mid-1920s drew modestly positive conclusions 
about the nature of Mongolian nomadic life, for example.108 Soviet scholars also 
followed the precedent set by Marr and Ol′denburg by criticising the relationship 
between European academia and imperialism, and would go on to incorporate non-
Russian pre-revolutionary sources into their analyses (including ancient Greek, Roman 
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and Chinese materials).109 It is further notable that Party documents, partly following 
this scholarly line, can rarely if ever be described as racially prejudiced. If the capacity 
of Kazakhs to rescue themselves from nomadism was questioned it was seldom done 
so on a racial basis. In other words nomadism was not associated with any racial 
deficiencies on the part of its practitioners; one Communist Party member came closest 
to this view when he said in June 1921 ‘the soul of a nomadic population sits in them 
[Kazakhs] very strongly’.110 Most of all, however, the scholarship of the 1920s inherited 
imperial academia’s fascination with nationality. Many of the Russian Empire’s 
ethnographers were heavily influenced by Johann Herder’s volksgeist and expended 
much energy dividing the Tsar’s various subjects into nations.111 Given its intense work 
on the National Question, as described by Francine Hirsch and others, the dominance of 
the Communist Party would only intensify and accelerate this trend.112 
One of the most informative published accounts of nomadic Kazakhs comes from 
Ivan I. Zarubin, whose short academic pamphlet ‘A List of Peoples of the Turkestan 
Territory’ was published in 1925.113 Zarubin wrote at a time when the Russian Kazak 
was replacing Kirgiz as the foremost appellation for the tribes of Kazakhstan, and the 
principal aim of his pamphlet was to define and distinguish the nationalities of Soviet 
Central Asia as his predecessors had done.114 Yet for all its modish focus on national 
identity, Zarubin did write his piece with a sensitivity to the importance of nomadism 
as a qualifier to group identities. He was one of a number of Soviet academics who 
adopted a self-consciously complex system of ethnic categorisation in Central Asia, in 
response to the complexity they perceived in real life.115 
Zarubin depicts Turkestan as a region containing a mix of amorphous national 
groups, where one’s identity might change from day to day or could simply encompass 
more than one nationality at a time.  But points of sharp differentiation did exist 
around the islands of settled Central Asians which were scattered across nomadic areas 
in 1925. Here, settled farmers had chosen a nationality and cited it emphatically 
whenever asked to self-identify. Zarubin had an explanation for this. These farmers 
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were more self-conscious about their national identity because they wanted to displace 
the other, less favourable identities which would otherwise have been ascribed to them 
by nomads. One such identity was sart.116 There had been some confusion over the 
provenance of sart, which may have originated as a neutral tribal affiliation. Zarubin 
however failed to locate any ‘sart dialect,’ and so declared that it was not a nationality 
but originally the Kazakh word for Russians. Its definition had subsequently expanded 
to encompass any untrustworthy sedentary peoples.117 Settled Central Asians did not 
like this pejorative appellation, nor did they wish to be associated with Russians, so 
they began more forcefully referring to themselves as Uzbek or Tajik, for example, to 
counter the use of sart. As sedentary communities took greater pride in their 
nationality, the nomads around them did so too, thereby becoming more likely to 
define themselves as Kazakhs when asked. Zarubin here credited nomadism with a 
demonstrable role in the generation of identity. 
In keeping with this argument Zarubin further contended that, among the Turkic 
peoples of Soviet Central Asia, there was a meaningful difference between those who 
still practised nomadism and those who had adopted a sedentary or semi-sedentary 
way of life.118 As the adoption of settled agriculture accelerated national differentiation, 
the settlement of some Kazakhs hastened their ‘Turkification’ and therefore their 
divergence from Uzbeks, whose heritage was Iranian.119 Nomadism suppressed the 
Turkic aspects of Kazakh identity, but an essential ethnic distinction such as this 
remained in waiting until settlement facilitated its more salient expression. 
Zarubin informs his readers that he could not have written his text any earlier 
because he was so reliant on the first four volumes of the 1920 All-Russian Census. He 
emphasised the indispensability of the census whilst simultaneously acknowledging its 
various inaccuracies.120 This is a reminder of how little material was available to 
administrators and academics alike in 1925, and three years later, when A. N. Donich 
produced his slim academic volume, pertinent information remained far from 
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abundant in spite of the huge amounts of data yielded by the 1926 census. The 
Communist Party’s disproportionately greater presence in urban areas was still 
perpetuating its ignorance of realities in rural areas at the time.121  
Donich’s ‘Problem of the New Kazakh Aul′ was published by the Kazakh Gosplan 
in 1928, the year of the first, localised forced sedetarisation experiments.122 He starts 
his book with a literature review, thereby providing invaluable detail on the condition 
of Soviet academic opinion at the dawn of a new and disturbing period in the 
relationship between nomad and state.  
The first body of opinion among Soviet academics is represented for Donich by M. 
G. Sirius and S. P. Shvetsov, who both argued that the nomadic lifestyle was perfectly 
adapted to the environment of the steppe and if anything should be deliberately 
revived.123 Donich quotes Shvetsov: Nomadism has been preserved in Kazakhstan not 
because Kazakhs are backward, but because ‘he [the nomadic herdsman] cannot be 
different in the presence of his given environmental conditions.’124 Another of 
Shvetsov’s assertions, made in 1926 and cited by historian Talas Omarbekov, augments 
this view: ‘the annihilation of nomadic life in Kazakhstan would signify not only the 
death of steppe livestock-herding and the Kazakh economy, but also the transformation 
of the arid steppe into a deserted wilderness’.125 Sirius in turn argued that a fully-
developed agricultural economy in Kazakhstan was impossible because profitable 
agriculture was environmentally unsustainable in all but the most peripheral regions of 
the republic.126 Shvetsov and Sirius’ acceptance of environmental limitations echoes 
the opinions of earlier historians and, in the early 1920s, Kazakh Communist members, 
opinions which by this time were represented in the Party by Mendeshev and only a 
few others.127 
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The second prevailing attitude among Soviet academics was, according to Donich, 
in opposition to the first but was less intellectually developed. Donich chose M. B. 
Murzin as its representative, and quotes Murzin as follows: Nomadism impoverishes its 
practitioners and inevitably leads to intermittent crises; ‘The fundamental and 
unavoidable prerequisite for cultural development … is the settlement of nomadic 
communities.’128 Whereas Murzin favoured forced settlement, other writers such as A. 
P. Pototskim agreed with his diagnosis but offered an alternative prescription, namely 
preferential state investment in sedentary agriculture across the republic to tempt 
nomads onto the farms.129 Vainshtein and Dzhangil′din would each have found much to 
agree with here, though like Pototskim and Murzin at times they would have disagreed 
about the appropriate solution.  
With thesis and antithesis declared, Donich offers synthesis.130 He agrees with 
Shvetsov and Sirius that nomadism had been the most suitable means of exploiting the 
hostile terrain of the steppe, but he poses the question: is it worth exploiting the steppe 
at such a penurious level of development? His answer amounts to one of the most 
compelling assessments of the problem it is possible to find in any source from any 
time: 
Schooling, libraries, museums, the theatre with its props and scenery, 
the postal system, the telegraph, telephone, the publication of newspapers, 
medical aid (particularly in the area of birth control), sanitary conditions, 
financial matters, the electrification of the aul, the development of industry 
on a contemporary scale, the use of the majority of domestic implements 
(beginning with the separator), - all this demands settlement and is 
inconceivable without it.131 
For Donich, the point was not the long heritage of nomadism, nor its economic 
productivity, but its irreconcilable incompatibility with modern life.132 With such a 
clear conception of the future in mind, the author proceeds to argue that no one had yet 
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proved that the Kazakh Steppe could not be adapted for the purposes of sedentary 
agriculture.133 A self-assured ally of those Party members who had come to see the 
steppe environment as a surmountable challenge, Donich commits much of the rest of 
his book to proposals for sedentarisation, to be discussed in Chapter Eight. 
Finally, there is an additional interesting feature of the Soviet-era view, shared 
both by many Party members and scholars; a belief that nomads were unusually 
receptive or amenable to the lure of socialism, an echo of older Tsarist-era prejudices. 
In the later Russian imperial period it was sometimes suggested that Kazakhs had only 
recently and superficially been ‘Islamised’ by Tatar merchants under the rule of 
Catherine the Great, a claim Allen J. Frank refutes, suggesting that its appeal came from 
advocates of Russification who hoped that nomads would be more susceptible to 
Orthodox Christianity than the sedentary Muslims of Russian Turkestan.134  Again in 
the imperial context, it was further argued that the wretchedness of nomadic existence 
made nomads more willingly complicit in their own colonisation because of the 
obvious benefits of Russian sedentary life.135 Within the Communist Party, the widely 
recognised inadequacy of nomadism played a similar role but instead of Orthodoxy the 
offer was socialism. It was also argued by Soviet scholars that nomadic women were 
subjected to less restrictive gender norms because nomadism afforded Kazakh family 
life a certain informality which was closer to the socialist ideal. In theory this meant 
that the Communist Party’s family policies would meet with less reactionary 
aggression in nomadic regions.136 The thesis will address such parallels between the 
Tsarist and Soviet mentalities regarding nomads particularly in its concluding chapter. 
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Section Three: The 1926 Census 
The 1926 census was a product of scholarly and Party cooperation.137 The 
priorities and perceptions of both groups are therefore in evidence in a single source. 
Zarubin, for example, had strenuously argued against the inclusion of sart as a national 
category for census takers in 1926, because of his belief that sart stemmed from 
economic or agricultural circumstances, not ethnic ones.138 This might be read as a 
small defence of the importance of agricultural categories in opposition to national 
ones, though it will be shown than nationality became a dominant feature of the census 
materials nonetheless. 
The 1926 census was the first of its kind to be held across the entire Soviet Union, 
and was a massive undertaking. Of previous attempts, the 1920 census was limited 
geographically by ongoing military clashes, and left out large swathes of Central Asia.139 
A second census in 1923 focused only on urban areas, thereby again excluding rural 
Kazakhs.140 Both had, in the view of the census-takers of 1926, lacked a properly 
scientific approach to social categorisation, and this had yielded a dizzyingly long and 
incoherent list of national identities. It is indicative of the political and intellectual 
atmosphere of the mid-1920s that a lack of precision about the different nationalities 
of the Soviet population should have been a cause for concern, and that the Soviet 
administration expended such considerable efforts to avoid repeating this mistake in 
1926. Building on extensive ethnographical work begun in the late Tsarist period, the 
writers of the 1926 census produced a series of standardised national categories into 
which identities deemed sub-national or tribal could be assimilated.141 This was 
intended to prevent the proliferation of non-standard or highly idiosyncratic identities, 
with some limited success.142 
Francine Hirsch contends that the national categorisations of the 1926 census 
were a crucial phase in the creation of the multinational Soviet state. But she is clear 
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that for many peasants and nomads in rural areas the national identity attributed to 
them seemed arbitrary or meaningless. Indeed, many were unfamiliar with the concept 
of nationality itself, and so treated their status as a matter of convenience rather than 
fact.143 Even in the 1930s, for example, some Kazakhs were found to refer to 
themselves as Kirgiz when in the company of Russians, as Kirgiz had been their official 
Russian-language name until 1925 and the Kazakhs wished to be helpful.144 Other 
historians confirm Hirsch’s overall view.145 
As will be argued in Chapter Five, the Soviet administration’s fascination with 
nationality led it to delimit Central Asia into national republics with clear borders, 
borders which were carefully placed to reflect perceived national differences but which 
poorly accommodated nomadic practice. Just as national distinctions would supplant 
distinctions of agricultural activity in the delimitation of national borders, nationality 
appears to have diverted attention from nomadism in the census of 1926. 
The evidence for this claim is the absence of any kind of nomadic category in the 
results of the census, which were released in a series of vast multi-volume publications 
in the late 1920s. Section one, volume eight of the census lists the people of the Kazakh 
Republic according to nationality, native tongue, age and literacy, but fails to mention 
nomadism.146 Section two, volume fifteen of the census concerns the economy of the 
Kazakh Republic, and divides the population into ten categories according to their 
economic role, such as labourer, unemployed or dependent.147 It also goes on to 
distinguish between famers, herders, and agricultural workers on peasant 
farmsteads.148  All this only hints at nomadic identity since all farmers were likely to 
have been sedentary but not all herders were nomadic. Finally, section three volume 
forty-two contains information on family life, place of birth and period of residence at 
the site the census was taken.149 Information here shows a highly mobile population, 
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but is presented primarily to reveal the number of recently arrived migrants in 
Kazakhstan, and makes no distinction between habitual and temporary migration.150   
This oversight has been noticed before. Grigorii Fedorovich Dakhshleiger, a 
Soviet expert on Kazakhstan who published extensively in the 1960s and 1970s, was 
able to use data from 1926 to discuss Kazakh nomadic practice. His indirect usage of 
the information, however, reveals the weaknesses of the census materials. To ascertain 
how many Kazakhs settled in the early 1920s, he first sought to divide the Kazakh 
population of the time into proportions of sedentary and nomadic. With nomads not 
having been asked to self-identify as such in 1926, Dakhshleiger cites a statistical 
report from the same year, which aimed to identify each Kazakh’s migratory range 
based on their period of residence and place of birth, information taken from the 
census results. Dakhshleiger extrapolated from this report that forty-three percent of 
Kazakh respondents were nomadic by the time of the census, because they were over 
ten kilometres from where they were born. The potential for inaccuracy in such an 
approach is obvious. With even less demographic information available prior to this 
date, furthermore, he is unable to make a convincing estimate of how many had settled 
since 1917.151 Dakhshleiger here was building an analysis with limited resources 
around forty years after the census. For Communist Party officials managing nomadic 
activities during and immediately following 1926, the inadequacy of the census data for 
their purposes must have been painfully apparent, only reinforced by the oncoming 
superabundance of information about national difference on the steppe.  
This is not to say that Central Asians identified first and foremost as nomadic or 
sedentary, and would have regarded a census question on the matter to have been 
eminently pertinent.152 Nomadism was an important part of the Kazakhs’ shared 
heritage, as indicated by the complaint from the bais mentioned above that 
sedentarisation turned Kazakhs ‘into Russians.’153 But in the view of various historians, 
the predominant means of self-identification amongst the Kazakhs under the Tsar had 
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been one’s membership to a clan or tribe, determined by an individual’s ancestry.154 
‘Each nomad was expected to know his or her genealogical background (shezire or 
zheti ata) at least to the seventh generation.’155  
Rather than suggesting that agricultural or clan-based distinctions in Kazakh 
communities were more real than national ones, this thesis holds simply that the 
Communist Party’s decision to treat Soviet Central Asia as a collection of nations came 
at the expense of other ways of seeing the region. While the nomadic-sedentary divide 
was not forgotten, as made clear in the preceding sections of this chapter, it received 
nothing like the resources and intellectual attention that nationhood did, in spite of the 
fact that nationality was an exotic concept for many Central Asians.156 Crucially, this 
was during an important period (1924-1928), which for Hirsch is characterised by 
‘conceptual conquest’, as opposed to the ‘physical conquest’ of 1917-1924. 157   
After establishing itself as the foremost military and bureaucratic authority in Central 
Asia, the Communist Party started in 1924 to monopolise communal and individual 
identities, establishing its conceptions of nationhood and class (even as these remained 
contested within the Party) and forcing out or neglecting alternatives based, for 
example, on faith or agricultural tradition.158 Thus the Party’s conceptual conquest of 
Central Asia was not fully extended to nomadism, which received relatively little 
attention from local cadres and was less often the subject of ideological guidance from 
the centre. 
As one example of how this feature of conceptual conquest might have expressed 
itself, David Lane confirms the deep significance of agricultural practice in his article on 
ethnic and class stratification in Soviet Kazakhstan, when he says: ‘The urban-rural 
dichotomy was one of the main ways in which differential incorporation of the 
                                                          
154 Saulesh Yessenova, '"Routes and Roots" of Kazakh Identity: Urban Migration in Postsocialist 
Kazakhstan,' Russian Review 64, no. 4 (2005), p. 663. Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: The 
Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 8. There is 
some reason to include Schatz here too: Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, p. 30. 
155 Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, p. 28. For a concise definition of the shezire, see: Kassymova, 
Kundakbaeva, and Markus, eds., Historical Dictionary, p. 246.  
156 As made clear in Chapter Two, recent scholarship on early-Soviet Kazakhstan is often eager 
to emphasise the huge efforts made to understand and enumerate the nations of the USSR. 
157 Hirsch, 'The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress,' p. 254. 
158 These chronological divisions of the decade are clearly not intended to be precise, so Michael 
Rouland’s decision to begin his period of Soviet ‘consolidation in Kazakhstan’ in 1925 therefore 
coincides with Hirsch’s own timeline: Rouland, 'Music and the Making of the Kazak Nation,' PhD 
thesis, p. 272. Interestingly, 1925 is also the year in which Kazakh history increasingly comes to 
be written from a national perspective, according to Zifa-Alua Auezova: Auezova, "Conceiving a 
People's History," pp. 241-261. 
63 
 
 
Chapter Three: Soviet Perceptions of Kazakh Nomadism 
 
indigenous population persisted.’159 That is, the incorporation of many Kazakhs into 
the Party apparatus gave the impression of equality between nations in Soviet Central 
Asia, but masked another inequality. In terms of access to the Party, and as indicated 
earlier in this chapter, urban Kazakhs were in a privileged position in comparison to 
their rural compatriots. As nomadic Kazakhs were by definition rural, the Party’s blind 
spot for nomadism created a vicious circle, in which only urban Kazakhs joined the 
Party, lacked the insight necessary to attract nomadic Kazakhs, and so welcomed new 
generations of members also recruited only from the cities. 
As a project involving both powerful and influential members of the new ruling 
elite, the census is broadly representative of a trend across various Communist Party 
policies in the Kazakh Republic. Eagerness to identify and institutionalise national 
difference in Central Asia distracted from the management of nomadic peoples, 
sometimes to their detriment, sometimes to their benefit. The national delimitation of 
Central Asia itself was obstructive, because the administrative reorganisation it 
necessitated delayed and complicated the collection of demographic data, forcing at 
least one scholar to postpone his research into nomadism until the procedure was 
complete.160 The intersection between nomadism and nationality was an important 
feature of Soviet perceptions of nomads, one of many to be discussed repeatedly in the 
remaining thesis. 
Conclusion 
The proper conceptualisation of nomadism was debated in the 1920s, but 
differences of opinion should not be overstated. It would be trite to exaggerate the 
divergence within the Party or between scholars. The Party’s lack of faith in the 
productivity and stability of the nomadic economy was a constant, and those who 
resisted it generally offered little more than palliative comfort by emphasising 
historical or environmental context. This had profound consequences. During the 
famine in 1921 the Kazakh Central Executive Committee was fully aware of the 
particular hardships experienced by nomads.161 By 1930 plans for sedentarisation 
stated that the nomadic economy was impoverished and facilitated the exploitation of 
paupers.162 This perception lingered on in the Soviet Union long after the vast majority 
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of Kazakhs had been settled. For A. Tursunbaev looking back on the era from the 1950s, 
Kazakhstan’s rural population had generally been far more backward than in Russia, 
the latter being notorious for its underdevelopment before 1917.163 Tursunbaev also 
perpetuated the view, by then long-standing, that Kazakh backwardness was 
exacerbated by the regressive influence of the ‘bai-kulak elite’, a matter of great 
importance in the 1920s.164  
Class stratification was one of a number of aspects of the nomadic identity which 
were rigorously contested at this time. Others included the desires of the nomads 
themselves and the viability of alternative agricultural practices on certain corners of 
the Central Asian Steppe. As will be shown in the following chapters, each of which 
addresses some of the major events of the decade, prevailing attitudes towards these 
contentious issues shifted over time. Again, however, this seems less a result of 
meaningful intellectual disagreement and more to do with the lack of a coherent 
theoretical framework for the problem. The consensus that nomadism was 
unproductive and unstable seems to have emerged largely from the base prejudices of 
Communist Party members, which led them to interpret the economic emergencies 
experienced by Kazakh nomads after the Civil War as the swan song of an outdated 
lifestyle. Resistance to this conclusion within the administration often relied on vague 
assertions about the nomadic instincts of the Kazakh people, and given the widespread 
faith in socialism to bring about prosperity, and the comparable impoverishment on 
the steppe, dismissing Kazakhs as inherently nomadic may have appeared appallingly 
callous in that it excluded them on an ethnic basis from the socialist future made 
possible in 1917.   
In her innovative and comprehensive doctoral thesis ‘The Hungry Steppe: Soviet 
Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Famine, 1921–1934’, Sarah Cameron titles her first chapter 
‘Solving the ‘Nomad Question’: Kazakhstan and Early Soviet Planning, 1921-1927.’165 It 
is telling that her citation for the phrase ‘nomad question’ comes, indirectly through 
Ernest Gellner, from a piece published in 1947 by M. P. Viatkin, a Soviet scholar 
involved in the debate about nomadic feudalism.166 Finding reference to a ‘nomad 
question’ from sources contemporary with the 1920s would be difficult because, in 
truth, the conceptualisation and management of Kazakh nomads during the decade was 
                                                          
163  A. Tursunbaev, Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia v Kazakhstane (Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1957), p. 25. 
164 Ibid., p. 25. 
165 Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe,' PhD thesis, p. 25. 
166 Gellner, 'Foreword,' p. xvi. 
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never standardized nor debated with anything like the alacrity afforded the ‘National 
Question’. There was no ‘nomad question’; nor was there much ‘planning’. Nomadism 
took its form in the Soviet imagination largely from old, instinctive prejudices dating 
from the Tsarist era and ‘a tradition in the understanding of civilizational markers.’167 
It was thrown into relief as a problem by class-based models derived mostly from 
Marxism. Scholarship on the matter was limited, less theoretical than practical and 
intended to solve immediate economic problems. There were no grand congresses 
convened to reconcile itinerancy with Communism. The Kazakh state for years lacked 
organs and personnel devoted to managing nomads and overcoming the specificities of 
nomadic life. The steppe population was corralled into a national republic with the 
same kind of borders and institutions which elsewhere administered sedentary 
peoples. Disagreement did not stem from a multiplicity of plans, but because there was 
no plan. 
The existence of a single ‘nomad question’ might only be suggested by reading 
later Soviet academic sources, as scholars of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s engaged in a 
prolonged argument about the validity of Vladimirtsov’s model of feudal nomadism.168 
These indeed were theoretical debates, drawing on a canon of Marxist intellectual 
developments to create social models for nomadic life.169 Had the likes of Mendeshev 
and Goloshchekin had these models in the 1920s history may have been different, but 
Party documentation from their era actually presents us with an organisation resolving 
the problems posed by a nomadic population ad hoc; implementing and reversing 
policies, protecting and persecuting families, making predictions and regretting them, 
estimating quantitative data and then refuting them. These are the processes 
repeatedly in evidence in the following chapters of the thesis. 
                                                          
167 Aldazhumanov et al., eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, p. 263. 
168 For more information on this body of the historiography, see Chapter Two. 
169 Gellner, 'Foreword,' pp. xiv-xxiv. 
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‘What we used to call a “region” is now going to be called a “district”.’ 
Someone in the know would start the conversation along these lines,  
having just discovered what had been enacted two years previously. 
Mukhamet Shayakhmetov1 
 
Chapter Four: 
The Politics of Land Use in Early Soviet Kazakhstan 
 
Most descriptions of the early Kazakh Republic offer no more than a flat, 
featureless landscape. Readers are asked to imagine themselves confronted by a ‘vast 
swathe of steppe-land’ or ‘seemingly unending expanses of steppe’, alongside nomads 
who travelled lightly and unobstructed towards an oblate horizon.2 The scale of the 
Central Asian plains has always been a gift for writers seeking descriptive detail, and 
the habit of emphasising empty enormity is not new. Tsarist and Soviet-era sources are 
replete with the same images. The dispersal of a small Kazakh population over a huge 
geographical area was a frequent theme, as were the hostile natural conditions with 
which it contended daily.3 Newspapers described the Communist Party’s Red Yurts as 
‘islands in the steppe’, beautifully conveying both the perceived ideological aridity of 
the people and the flat, sea-like continuity of the territory.4 
Yet as the above quote from Mukhament Shayakhmetov’s memoir suggests, 
Kazakh nomads were accustomed to the imposition of artificial borders. Before its 
collapse, the Tsarist administration had begun to distinguish between steppe regions 
based on the agricultural behaviour of their populations.5 After the establishment of 
                                                          
1 Mukhamet Shayakhmetov, The Silent Steppe: The Memoir of a Nomad under Stalin (New York: 
Overlook/Rookery, 2007), p. 2. 
2 Ibid., p. vii. Sarah Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe: Soviet Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Famine, 
1921-1934', PhD thesis (Yale University, 2011)p. 31. Shirin Akiner, The Formation of Kazakh 
Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State, Former Soviet South Project (London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995), p. 5. 
3 Grigorii Fedorovich Dakhshleiger and M. Abilova, Sotsial'isticheskoe stroitel'stvo v Kazakhstane 
v vosstanovitelnyi period, 1921-1925 gg : sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Alma-Ata: 
Arkheologiia Zhane Etnografiia Instituty, 1962), pp. 22-32. APRK 139/1/541: 123. 
4 The Red Yurts were expeditions of medical staff and Communist Party members who practised 
on the Kazakh Steppe. See: Paula A. Michaels, Curative Powers: Medicine and Empire in Stalin's 
Central Asia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), p. 155. 
5 Nurbulat Masanov, Kochevaia tsivilizatsiia Kazakhov: osnovy zhiznedeiatel'nosti nomadnogo 
obshchestva (Almaty: Fond Nurbulat Masanov, 2011), pp. 518, 520-521. See also: Lewis 
Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society: Between Revolutions, 1918 - 1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 137. 
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Soviet power a matrix of nomadic, semi-nomadic, and settled administrative districts 
was created, with the first two associated with pastoral stock-rearing and the latter 
with farming.6 In fact, documents from regional committees in the 1920s divide and 
subdivide the landscape unrelentingly, revealing the alacrity with which the steppe 
was disaggregated into strips of land with nominally different economic, natural or 
social profiles. The corollary of a land without natural borders was the proliferation of 
man-made alternatives.7  
Like some other Bolshevik policies, these man-made borders suited the steppe 
and its people like an ill-fitting garment. The early administration had chosen a 
traditional way of categorizing economic activity by geographical location, which 
worked well in most areas of the former Tsarist Empire, but nomads could not be 
attributed to any one locale. To keep a comparable, manageable number of individuals 
within both sedentary and nomadic districts, or volosts, nomadic volosts were given no 
delineated geographical location or any clear borders.8 In fact these volosts were bands 
of nomadic yurts dispersed over areas of variable size and containing variable numbers 
of people. In places, the borders of sedentary volosts were also ill-defined, but they did 
at least refrain from roaming the steppe at will.9 
Though distinct from one another, Chapters Four and Five share a theme. 
Together they describe the manner in which steppe land was distributed in the 1920s, 
within and around the edges of the Kazakh (Autonomous) Soviet Socialist Republic. 
They are associated with one another both by the similar processes they describe, and 
by the highly important political and economic context which contributed to the 
formation and implementation of land-ownership policies. Both, for example, are 
partly products of raionirovanie or regionalisation, a policy which began as an attempt 
                                                          
6 Matthew J. Payne, 'Seeing Like a Soviet State: Settlement of Nomadic Kazakhs, 1928-1934,' in 
Writing the Stalin Era: Sheila Fitzpatrick and Soviet Historiography, ed. Golfo Alexopoulos, Julie 
Hessler, and Kiril Tomoff (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2011), p. 64. 
7 There is a clear parallel here with the Russian Empire’s search for a natural frontier in Central 
Asia during its imperial expansion. See: Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The 
Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). 
8 In certain areas such as around Orenburg, the Tsarist Empire had also recognised the 
kochevaia volost, or something similar. Orenburg nominated special representatives in each 
nomadic aul for the purposes of communication, and sub-divided its territory into 
‘administrativnye auly’. In the Siberian-governed region of the steppe, an administrative aul 
would typically contain 50-70 tents. Such systems allowed the Empire to tax its nomadic 
subjects. Masanov, Kochevaia tsivilizatsiia Kazakhov, pp. 518, 520-521. 
9 Dakhshleiger and Abilova, Sotsial'isticheskoe stroitel'stvo v Kazakhstane, pp. 26-30. 
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to divide Soviet land into economically efficient units but became part of the creation of 
national territories.10 
Chapter Five, entitled ‘The Borders of a Nomadic Republic’, will demonstrate that 
the Communist Party created discrete republics in Central Asia to accommodate the 
various nationalities believed to exist there. Discrete republics needed distinct borders, 
but new borders often destabilised nomadic communities by severing their traditional 
migratory routes. The state’s fixation on national difference distracted it from 
differences of agricultural practice, in some ways a more profound determinant of 
Central Asian identity at the time. This chapter, first, will look inwards, from the 
external borders of the republic to its internal, administrative borders. This type of 
border is much broader in definition, encompassing the boundaries between one 
administrative district and another, but also the space separating agricultural practices, 
the lands of particular communities, households and individuals, and the de facto 
barriers which were enforced when access to natural resources was prohibited. 
Writing about European Russia, James W. Heinzen describes this kind of ground level 
regulation as where ‘the social revolution found its real reflection, as the revolutionary 
state met rural Russia’.11 This communicates the significance of the process both in 
Russia and in Central Asia. 
It will be argued that internal borders often disrupted nomadic life on the steppe, 
but that in the early 1920s the same fixation on national autonomy which made 
external borders more challenging for nomads actually made internal borders less so. A 
spontaneous post-revolutionary period of decolonisation allowed for a considerable 
reordering of the administrative map and was understood in national terms. 
Correspondingly, in this case, as relatively less attention was paid to national matters 
the position of nomads became more deleterious. The Party’s increasing awareness of 
economic or agricultural identities took priority over matters of national identity, and 
made the process of internal regionalisation more onerous for nomads in the later 
1920s. Overall, regionalisation dictated land use in the republic, and as the distinction 
between nomads and sedentary farmers was so crucial, and their uses of the same land 
so incompatible, regionalisation was one of the cardinal policies of the first years of 
Soviet rule in Kazakhstan. 
                                                          
10 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 
1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 34. 
11 James W. Heinzen, '"Alien" Personnel in the Soviet State: The People's Commissariat of 
Agriculture under Proletarian Dictatorship, 1918-1929,' Slavic Review 56, no. 1 (1997), p. 96. 
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This chapter will progress chronologically, describing and analysing the various 
ways the steppe was shared out. It will juxtapose major legislative documents intended 
to regulate regionalisation – here described as governing frameworks – and petitions 
from localised disputes, in order to demonstrate how Party rulings influenced everyday 
decisions. Some petitions were submitted by Kazakh nomads themselves, and as Soviet 
archival materials offer lamentably few opportunities to hear from nomads, these 
petitions yield uniquely direct insights into nomadic life in the 1920s. Materials are 
spread over three sections covering three periods: 1920-1924, years dominated by 
decolonisation and bureaucratic weakness; 1924-1925, an interim when the Soviet 
state consolidated its administrative power; and 1925-1928, by which time economic 
ambition and self-confidence had led to greater centralisation in the Kazakh Republic. 
The chapter comes to an end in 1928 as this is when the first acts of forced 
sedentarisation were perpetrated, a campaign of such importance that it defines the 
years 1928-1934 and is addressed separately in Chapter Eight.  
Section One: Settling Grievances, 1920-1924 
Just as the 1920s ended with violence, they began with Civil War. Battle between 
Whites and Reds interrupted agricultural and distributive processes, leading to food 
shortages, famine, and then outbreaks of disease.12  This extreme hardship was the first 
and most pressing reason to regionalise.13 In the Kazakh Republic hardship was most 
pronounced to the north-west, and the party’s determination to ease suffering 
necessitated the accumulation of knowledge on a regional basis. The Red Caravan was 
intimately involved in this process. To be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Seven, 
the Red Caravan was a roving band of notable Party members, propagandists and 
investigators who collected information and disseminated instructions on behalf of the 
Kazakh capital after the Civil War.14 
 The Caravan produced a considerable number of reports on many north-
western volosts, principally by talking to local community leaders and party cells.15 
Volost-level information was subdivided into aul-level detail, in an effort to create a 
                                                          
12 K. S. Aldazhumanov et al., eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, 
vol. 4 (Almaty: Atamüra, 2010), p. 194.  Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe,' PhD thesis, pp. 44-46. 
13 For an excellent general account of this famine, see: Aldazhumanov et al., eds., Istoriia 
Kazakhstana: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, pp. 192-199. 
14 TsGARK 930/1/4: 26-26 ob.. 
15 For further information on The Red Caravan see Chapter Seven. For a broad range of the 
Caravan’s documentation regarding famine relief, see: APRK 139/1/339. 
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comprehensive topography of need. 16  Caravan leaders repeatedly called for a 
concerted crop-growing campaign to ease the suffering in destitute nomadic areas 
during the first famine.17 Many from the Red Caravan went on to occupy significant 
posts in the Kazakh Communist Party, taking their experience of urgent economic 
border-making with them.18 In fact, many of the Party’s most prominent members like 
Mendeshev, Danilov, Murzagaliev, Dzhangil’din and Zaromskov were sent on 
investigatory missions between 1920 and 1922. They were all personally practised in 
solving territorial disputes and assessing local deprivations, and this was a habit the 
administration would never lose.19 By the third all-Kazakh Conference in 1923 it was 
possible for delegates to discuss the average wealth of nomads in different areas, albeit 
in general terms.20  
As well as practised regionalisers, delegates were confirmed decolonisers. The 
Bolsheviks’ fixation on nationhood and national emancipation was an agenda which 
superseded any proper appreciation for certain non-national differences. Lenin himself 
was anxious about the post-revolutionary re-emergence of Great Russian chauvinism 
and the backlash it could provoke from Central Asian communities which had suffered 
Tsarist oppression, perpetrated by ethnic Russian colonialists.21 In spite of this anxiety, 
the very first Bolshevik administration in Turkestan amplified the resentments of local 
people by treating Central Asian nationalism with hostility.22 This administration was 
quickly replaced by new ruling cadres who were more sympathetic to local nationalists. 
Indeed, many nationalists were accepted into said cadres, and began drawing what 
they wanted from Leninist rhetoric.23 Some treated the Bolsheviks’ ‘instrumental’ 
support for national autonomy as recognition of ‘essential’ national identities.24 This 
stronger interpretation of nationalities policy was particularly evident amongst Uzbeks, 
and Kazakh authorities were able to imitate precedents set in the Uzbekistan area.25 
                                                          
16 APRK 139/1/339: 45-45 ob.. 
17 APRK 139/1/339: 2, 20, 23 ob., 53. 
18 APRK 139/1/339: 2. Aldazhumanov et al., eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana: s drevneishikh vremen do 
nashikh dnei, p. 177. 
19 APRK 139/1/254: 56, 98. 
20 APRK 139/1/541: 111-112. 
21 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, pp. 4-20. Hélène Carrère D’Encausse, The Great 
Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State 1917-1930 (London: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 
39. 
22 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 146. 
23 The obvious example in the Kazakh case is the Alash Party, sometimes referred to 
erroneously as Alash Orda: Didar Kassymova, Zhanat Kundakbaeva, and Ustina Markus, eds., 
Historical Dictionary of Kazakhstan (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2012), p. 24. 
24 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 151. 
25 Ibid. pp. 151-152. 
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The creation of external borders would be a union-wide project, but the revision 
of internal borders between agricultural practices and strips of cultivated land took on 
Central Asian specificities. Here Communist endorsement of nationalism allowed for a 
more aggressive post-imperial paradigm which justified decolonisation, defined for the 
purposes of this chapter as the forceful eviction of Europeans from a new Central Asian 
nation’s land. This was unofficial or unregulated regionalisation, in that the borders 
between Russian-occupied land and Central Asian land were redrawn without state 
regulation in the Central Asians’ favour. Turkestani authorities claimed that from 1921 
to 1922 161 Russian villages were liquidated and 232,891 desiatinas (over 980 square 
miles) of land were confiscated in the Turkestan Republic, including part of what 
became southern Kazakhstan.26 Documents declaring these seizures in 1923 admitted 
that the figures were estimates because the work was carried out hastily and with 
urgency; in reality much confiscation had been perpetrated by Central Asians 
spontaneously, without any prompt from the Party at all, and was tolerated with little 
more than Moscow’s tacit approval.27 Tashkent, the capital of the Turkestan Republic at 
this time, experimented with legislation designed to direct the development of 
requisitioned land.28 
For their part, administrators in the Kazakh Republic began laying the legal 
foundations over which land requisitions could take place in their own territory.29 As in 
Turkestan, ire was concentrated on the Resettlement Administration, a Tsarist organ 
established in 1896 which supervised the arrival of 640,000 European settlers to the 
best lands of the steppe between the year of its creation and 1909.30 On 2nd February 
1921 the Kazakh Central Executive Committee (KTsIK) declared that all land formerly 
                                                          
26 APRK 139/1/109: 1. 
27 Jeremy Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-23 (London: Macmillan, 1999), 
pp. 88-89. Inter-ethnic violence in the Turkestan region had been increasingly viscous in the 
years prior to 1917, as vividly discussed by Jeff Sahadeo here: Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial 
Society in Tashkent, 1865-1923 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), pp. 127-128, 197. 
28 Tashkent also made early efforts to dictate the use of land in nomadic and semi-nomadic 
regions. See: GARF 1235/123/346:6. For an account of autonomous Central Asia political 
movements outside Tashkent, see: Sergey Abashin et al., 'Soviet Rule and the Delineation of 
Borders in the Ferghana Valley, 1917-1930,' in Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia, ed. S. 
Frederick Starr (London: M. E Sharpe, 2011), pp. 94-97. 
29 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, First ed., Studies of Nationalities in the USSR (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 157. 
30 APRK 139/1/109: 1. Alexander Morrison, '"Sowing the Seed of National Strife in this Alien 
Region": The Pahlen Report and Pereselenie in Turkestan, 1908-1910,' Acta Slavica Iaponica 31 
(2012), p. 11. Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph S. Clem, Nationality and 
Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970 (New York: 
Praeger, 1976), p. 232. The Resettlement Administration would continue to be demonised 
throughout the decade, as in these minutes from a plenum of the Kustanai Okrug Committee: 
RGASPI 17/25/174: 81-82. 
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owned by the Resettlement Administration should be returned to the Kazakhs.31 The 
Kazakh People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem KSSR) published 
instructions for the redistribution of this land in December 1921.32 In March the 
following year, land deemed to have been occupied illegally since the 1917 revolution 
was also placed into the hands of the working Kazakh population.33 Regions occupied 
by Cossacks were targeted specifically in these early years due to widespread hatred of 
Cossacks as the Tsar’s enforcers.34 Kazakh Volost Committees were given clear 
instructions to distribute all free land quickly, favouring Kazakhs first and other 
nationalities second.35 It seems true that the eviction of Russians in Central Asia mainly 
took place in the Zhetysu region, much of which would be added to the Kazakh 
Republic from Turkestan in 1925. But Jeremy Smith’s claim that eviction was restricted 
to that area alone is not convincing.36 Russians were displaced, and their proportion of 
the population of the Kazakh Republic diminished substantially between 1920 and 
1926.37 The pressure on Europeans to head north would have come in many forms. 
In the spring of 1921, for example, one community of Russian settlers near the 
town of Atbasar became subject to a decree from the Kazakh Council of People’s 
Commissars (Sovnarkom KSSR) about the return of farmsteads to the working Kazakh 
people. Petitioning for appeal, the farmers placed heavy emphasis on the effort they 
had invested in ploughing the soil and planting crops over a great distance, only to have 
their work destroyed by Kazakhs who, having heard about the new decree, arrived 
with their livestock and ‘boldly’ allowed their herds to take pasture over the freshly 
ploughed fields.38 The Russians’ harvest was destroyed and, fearing hunger, they fled to 
                                                          
31 APRK 139/1/337: 17. 
32 APRK 139/1/337: 19. 
33 The phrase ‘working Kazakh’ was intended to inject a class element to the decolonisation 
process, and was ubiquitous at the time. 
34 APRK 139/1/337: 17, 19. 
35 APRK 139/1/337: 20-20 ob.. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 61. Martha Brill Olcott 
claims that Moscow explicitly banned any policy which expressly favoured Kazakhs over 
Russians: Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 163. This instruction was evidently ignored, though its 
existence now seems dubious: Terry Martin, 'An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as 
the Highest Form of Imperialism,' in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of 
Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), pp. 72-76. 
36 Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National Question, pp. 88-89. 
37 N. E. Masanov et al., eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana: narody i kul'tury (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2001), p. 
368. 
38 GARF 3260/1/25: 33. 
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Kokchetav (now Kokshetau).39 When displaced in this manner it was most common for 
peasants to petition for new land somewhere in European Russia.40  
It is tempting here to claim that national and agricultural borders inside the 
Kazakh Republic had evaporated, as the arbitrary wandering of Kazakh nomadism lost 
all restraint. No doubt this is how some evicted Russians interpreted events. But the 
implication that an ordered Russian administrative landscape was being replaced by 
Kazakh chaos should be avoided. Rather, parts of the landscape were returning to an 
alternative system less discernible to the state but mutually understood by many 
Kazakhs. As indicated by Edward Schatz, ‘The Kazakh nomadic pastoralists had a loose, 
but still notable, attachment to territory.’41 Nurbulat Masanov goes further, describing 
the Kazakhs’ relationship to land as complex and dictated by concrete conditions.42 
Some nomads may have trampled Russian crops randomly, in a spirit of vengeance, but 
they could also have understood their actions as the reestablishment of older tribal and 
agricultural boundaries, not to be found on any Russian map, but deeply meaningful 
nonetheless.  
The rhetoric of Kazakh Soviet organs at the time was characterised by the same 
interpretation of nationalism as seen in Tashkent, more assertive than Party organs in 
Moscow would likely have preferred.43 At the first All-Kazakh Party Conference in June 
1921, Cossacks were described as the tool with which the Tsar subjugated the Kazakh 
people, and violence perpetrated on Cossack settlers was largely overlooked. The 
generosity of the Kazakh spirit was contrasted with the rapacious greed of Russian 
arrivals; some Kazakhs, it was suggested, tragically believed that there was no free land 
left in Russia (why else would they arrive in such numbers?), and so Russian settlers 
should be treated magnanimously on the capacious steppe.44 At the same conference, a 
delegate explained that any Kazakhs who expressed hostility towards European 
settlers did so because it was those European settlers who had kept the Kazakhs in 
                                                          
39 GARF 3260/1/25: 33. 
40 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 62. 
41 Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics: The Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and Beyond (London: 
University of Washington Press, 2004), p. 29. 
42 Masanov, Kochevaia tsivilizatsiia Kazakhov, pp. 442-443. 
43 Martin also includes Kazakhstan in a list of ‘aggressive republics’ when it came to the later 
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economic backwardness.45 Thus the Bolsheviks’ nationalities policy found expression 
more in terms of post-imperial reparations than post-imperial freedoms; the assertion 
of grievance, not independence, in the KSSR. The rhetoric of grievance lingered. In 
1926, a resolution from the Semipalatinsk Governate Committee began with a 
denunciation of the Tsar’s colonising policies, and the imperial theft of the best Kazakh 
land which was said to still affect economic relations.46 A year later, at the sixth all-
Kazakh Party Conference, the ejection of Kazakhs from the best land was once again 
cited as a reason for continuing economic underperformance, demonstrating the 
continued significance of land use.47 
Sections of the Communist Party clearly acknowledged that decolonisation was 
unavoidable. Land reform was the question du jour across much of the former Russian 
Empire and the Bolsheviks’ canny handling of the matter was critical for the early 
consolidation of their power.48 In Central Asia this meant negotiating disputes which 
manifested themselves as ethnic antagonism. As one Kazakh state document put it: 
‘The fundamental question defining the interrelations between the native and 
immigrant European population is, surely, the land question.’49 The initial weakness of 
Soviet power in Central Asia made it impossible to assuage post-imperial resentment. 
Instead, the party sought only to mitigate the most destabilising effects of spontaneous 
internal border-making. 
It did this with a series of governing frameworks which first gave some structure 
to decolonization, though later they took on different priorities and aims. A resolution 
of the second Federal Committee for Land Affairs (Federal′nyi komitet po zemel′nym 
delam) was one of the first union-wide frameworks, and one of the most 
comprehensive. Produced in December 1921, this piece of legislation reveals the 
attitudes of a central organ, subject to VTsIK, which was seeking generalisable 
principles for a territory as large and diverse as that which the USSR became.50 The 
resolution called for an end to all Russian colonisation in the newly-established 
autonomous republics, identifying nomads as one group which particularly struggled 
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with migration before 1917.51 In part, the confidence with which the committee called 
a halt to colonisation presumably came from the belief, documented in the resolution, 
that ten million desiatinas of desert and semi-desert in Soviet Central Asia would never 
be suitable for sedentary farming anyway, and would be left for nomadic use.52 There is 
a certain fatalism here about the extent to which socialism could overcome climactic 
realities. Common also in the Kazakh Communist Party just after the Civil War, this 
fatalism was not shared by many in urban Russia and would be supplanted by a lethal 
self-confidence in later years, as will be explained in section three. 
As well as the environment, the resolution was sceptical about democratic 
engagement on the steppe. It indicated that annual migration put nomads at a 
disadvantage when negotiating land use, as they could not be kept in constant contact 
with administrators. As such, the committee requested that these administrators 
exercise special thoughtfulness when providing for the land needs of nomads, and pay 
close attention to local custom.53 Future delineation of land, and the selection of plots 
for industrial or agricultural development, was to be confirmed at special agricultural 
congresses with local nomads in attendance. Nomads, the resolution asserted, should 
be involved in district, governate, oblast and republic-level decision-making whenever 
internal borders were to change.54 With hindsight, the resolution’s final demands, such 
as the provision of water and food supplies to nomads at different points of their 
seasonal migration, look particularly fanciful, but the democratic element of 
regionalisation in nomadic areas was one proposal which persisted.55 
The Kazakh People’s Commissariat of Agriculture immediately began receiving 
documents which proved the impact of the Federal Committee for Land Affairs’ 
resolution. In mid-1921, 330 migrants from near Kaluga in Russia had received a plot 
of land in the Akmola (now Astana) Governate for the cultivation of crops. The next 
year, the strict prohibition on colonisation imposed by the Federal Committee for Land 
Affairs was applied retrospectively, and the land was reclaimed. All 330 settlers were 
told to return to Kaluga. Though they raised opposition to this decision, claiming that 
their land was being used and so was not eligible for redistribution, their protests were 
ignored and Kazakhs moved their animals onto the farmland. Destitute and homeless, 
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the settlers made their way to Petropavlovsk, where authorities paid for their train 
journeys back to central Russia.56 
Petitions submitted by European communities might create the image of a 
republic-wide invasion by Kazakhs in 1921, but in the same year settlers also tried to 
seize new land from Kazakhs.57 In many parts of the former-Tsarist Empire legislators 
capitulated to Russian peasants who took advantage of revolutionary chaos to expand 
the borders of their land, just as some nomads did.58 Not all settlement was understood 
as illegal colonisation in these years, and all centrally-devised legislation was 
inconsistently applied.59 Some displaced settlers seem to have taken to the road 
temporarily before returning to their old farmsteads, provoking further rancour.60 The 
Party employed surveyors to negotiate terms between settlers and Kazakhs who were 
happy to lease their land in return for funds.61 The impression is given of various Party 
organs, Kazakh and All-Union, issuing resolutions which sought only to reflect and 
influence the prevailing zeitgeist. 
On 19th April 1921 the Federal People’s Commissariat of Agriculture 
(Narkomzem RSFSR) made an official attempt to dictate the path of nomadic migration 
along the Ural River. On the west side of the Ural delta, on the opposite side to a 
collection of Cossack fishing communities, nomads were given permission to pasture 
their livestock on a seasonal basis.62 This was a post hoc authorization of something 
that was clearly already happening, since regulation for the practice had been devised 
only lately. The month before the Commissariat’s ruling, temporary encampment 
within one verst of high tide was prohibited along the Ural, to maintain some distance 
between fishing Cossacks and herding Kazakhs.63 This prohibition would surely have 
contradicted the promise made later that year, that nomads should be provided access 
to water resources during their seasonal migrations, but the legislative incoherence of 
the decade should never be underestimated. 
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In any case the prohibition was ignored. In February 1922 Glavryba, the body 
charged with supervising the Cossack fishermen, contacted Narkomzem RSFSR about 
the situation on the delta. 64 Since autumn 1921 the riverbanks had undergone a ‘mass 
occupation’ from arriving nomads.65 Plant fodder on the delta had been trampled or 
consumed by Kazakh herds. Some Kazakhs had done some fishing of their own, which 
Glavryba referred to as ‘poaching’.66 The effect on the fishing industry was said to be 
catastrophic. Local fishermen had to travel further in search of fodder for their own 
livestock, and fish were scared into deeper waters by the presence of animals so close 
to the banks. Glavryba warned that, if the situation did not improve, the Ural River 
might share the fate of the Emba further east, which had lost all value to the fishing 
industry.67 Most interestingly, Glavryba blamed the ‘connivance of the local economic 
organs’ for the Kazakh influx.68 Glavryba asked Moscow to intervene, enforce its earlier 
ban, and establish clear and recognized borders between two incompatible enterprises: 
nomadic animal husbandry and sedentary fishing. 
As made clear in the first All-Kazakh Conference, there is no doubt that Cossacks 
were closely associated with Tsarist-era colonization. Perhaps in deference to this 
association the affair was treated as a matter of national autonomy to be resolved by 
Kazakh organs of state. Narkomzem RSFSR forwarded the complaint from Glavryba to 
its Kazakh counterpart in Orenburg, and the Kazakh Central Executive Committee 
consequentially sent a delegation to the Ural estuary to investigate.69 For Moscow’s 
part it seems to have been assumed that the Cossacks would remain in place. Before 
hearing the results of Orenburg’s excursion to the north Caspian, Narkomzem RSFSR 
asked Orenburg what measures were being taken to prevent further migration to the 
banks of the Ural, implying that the displacement of the Cossacks was undesirable.70 
Locally though, given Glavryba’s accusations, sympathies seem to have been with the 
Kazakhs. 
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At this early stage the practice and politics of decolonisation contributed to a 
governing framework which often worked in the nomads’ favour.71 As made clear by 
petitions from dispossessed Russians, the boundaries of nomadic pasture expanded 
after the Civil War. The Party’s counter-imperial platform in Central Asia precluded 
official condemnation of the nomads’ actions, and nomads themselves were afforded 
substantial rhetorical support.72 Yet guidelines were nevertheless published. The Party 
could ill-afford to allow the chaotic and unstructured wanderings of the nomads, as 
their migrations were often perceived, to disrupt any enterprise at random. The 1921 
resolution’s answer to this was to permit nomads to choose their own pastureland, but 
with the condition that their choices not threaten the stability of other communities.73 
Clearly this specification was frequently ignored, but not always. When sedentary areas 
were considered economically indispensable, they were more likely to be protected. As 
will be seen, the fishermen of the Ural would become associated with a larger 
developmental plan for their region, far more important than the farmers of Akmola 
and Atbasar. In the Zhetysu Governate nomadic migration near the Turksib Railway’s 
construction sites was supervised particularly closely.74 Nomads were also told to stay 
away from land designated for urban development.75 The Party’s policy on national 
autonomy came into conflict with the imperative of economic development, and certain 
internal borders had to be recognised by nomadic communities for the new post-
imperial system to flourish.76 Even as nomadic migrations were extended, the principle 
that they can and should be contained and controlled stood firm. 
Section Two: Asserting Control, 1924-1925 
At points throughout the decade, this control of migratory routes lost some of its 
provincial status and became associated with increasingly ambitious macroeconomic 
policy. The success of major industrial projects, such as the Turksib, was of far greater 
concern to the economy of the Soviet Union than the viability of the occasional 
farmstead. Not only were nomads kept away from construction sites, but sedentary 
agriculture in neighbouring lands had to be pursued with renewed vigour to feed 
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industrial workers.77  Local committees in western Kazakh regions were under 
pressure from state-managed oil agencies to accommodate and encourage oil 
production wherever possible.78  The isolation of oil-extraction points near the 
northeast coast of the Caspian Sea was of particular concern. On 19th June 1922 the 
managing board of the oil industry in the Ural-Emba region wrote to Moscow, 
complaining that local systems of communication were inadequate and that oil 
workers relied wholly on imported foodstuffs because of the salinity of the soil and the 
lack of inhabitants nearby. The board lobbied for land-reclamation in the area to help 
solve these problems.79 Local Kazakhs would have migrated across these apparently 
uninhabited regions, and any land reclamation would likely have caused nomads 
considerable problems.80 
In the face of overbearing macroeconomic ambitions and localised 
disagreements, there is evidence that the Federal Committee for Land Affairs made 
efforts to maintain its ruling in the Kazakh Republic and to support nomadic interests. 
It demanded the presence of prominent Kazakh Party leaders at commissions on 
nomadic affairs in the early 1920s.81 But as other laws proliferated and economic 
organs squabbled over priorities, the framework became complicated.82  A new, 
similarly ambitious framework was introduced in March 1924, in the declaration on 
Land Development for the Nomadic, Semi-Nomadic and Settling Population of the 
Autonomous Kazakh Socialist Soviet Republic. 83 This declaration was the product of 
cooperation between major institutions in Moscow and Orenburg (still at this time the 
capital of the KSSR), and it contained two significant clauses on the question of land use. 
First, in areas dominated by animal-husbandry where the question of land use was not 
contentious, tracts of land were to be found and partitioned for the pursuit of other 
agricultural activities, the nature of which would depend on local environmental 
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conditions. Where arguments erupted during the act of partition, these would be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis at special land commissions or other agricultural 
institutions.84 Second, particularly intractable arguments over land use were to be 
passed upwards within the administrative hierarchy, to be solved by uezd, governate 
or republic-wide bodies.85 
Between 1921 when the first governing framework was established and 1924 
when the new declaration was made, the political circumstances on the steppe had 
changed considerably. Differences of context led to differences of content. First, after 
three years, the politics of decolonisation was beginning to lose its intensity, and inter-
ethnic violence was less acute.86 Thus the 1924 framework could make explicit 
provisions for the occupation of certain areas by sedentary farmers without fear of 
provocation. Second, the legislative cacophony of the earliest years was being stifled. 
Administrative structures were gaining coherence. The authors of the new declaration 
expressed confidence in the growing formalisation of Soviet power in Central Asia by 
describing an institutional hierarchy of regional and district committees each with 
their own jurisdiction and powers, and by entrusting this hierarchy with the resolution 
of controversies regarding the use of land. In doing so, the declaration itself helped to 
formalise Soviet power structures.87 
The land commissions mentioned in the declaration were at the front line of 
regionalisation efforts in the republic. They had been operating since 1922, but their 
role and formation were standardized in 1924. Three to five local individuals would 
typically constitute a commission.88 Their personal details were recorded when they 
were vested with judicial competence, and documentation reveals that they were 
normally men, as young as in their early twenties, who would not have to be 
Communist Party members, though among Russian peasants youth was the 
characteristic which most often correlated with Party membership and the same may 
have been true on the steppe.89 Commission members were expected to have some 
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experience in agriculture but would not need higher educational qualifications.90 These 
men sat at the bottom of an intricate institutional system which was further refined 
later in the decade, but their authority was considerable given their lack of training.91 
Unlike the legal people’s courts operating in European Russia after 1920, the land 
commissions did not require the oversight or presence of a trained professional or 
judge.92 In 1925 alone, Kazakh land commissions resolved over 4,000 disagreements.93 
For administrative purposes, these cases were divided into 16 separate types of 
dispute, including the allotment of farmland, the demarcation of farmland, and the 
location of nomadic migratory routes.94 
A glimpse of how these commissions operated further reveals the changing logic 
of internal borders halfway through the decade. In March 1924, a group of 94 nomadic 
Kazakhs in the eastern half of the republic sought permission to settle, and utilised the 
state’s petition system to request resources to make their new farming activities a 
success.95 These 94 individuals amounted to 18 tents in a nomadic community of 32, 
and from the remaining 14 tents dissent was raised about the petition.  A volost land 
commission considered the case on 21st April 1924, and found that the proposed 
settlement would affect the winter pasture land of the nomads who wished to continue 
migrating. A month later the uezd land commission concurred with the original verdict, 
but on 11th August 1924 the Semipalatinsk Governate’s land commission, which had 
also been consulted, decided that it had insufficient evidence to intercede. The nomads 
hoping to settle recalibrated their plan, distancing their proposed settlement from their 
fellow nomads’ winter pastures and resubmitting their petition.96 The remaining 
nomads then complained that the alternative proposal would destroy their seasonal 
hayfields, and complicate their access to water.97 Not until 12th August 1925 did the 
uezd land committee finally rule in the settling nomads’ favour. The borders of a new 
sedentary farm were established, and use of land within those borders by nomadic 
herds, formerly permissible, became illegal. 
At this point, protesting nomads sought to employ the decolonising nationality 
politics which had been applied so effectively years before. They pointed out that, at 
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the hearing of the final uezd land commission in August, not a single Kazakh who spoke 
Russian competently was in attendance, and the proceedings had nevertheless been 
held in that language. The translator was weak, and the land commission thus ‘did not 
get to the essence of the case.’98 It seems the 1921 resolution’s doubts about the 
difficulty of including nomads in consultative processes were justified. Yet as already 
suggested the politics of decolonisation and retribution were in decline. The Russians 
at the land commission may have had a cultural prejudice in favour of settlement, but it 
was a prejudice increasingly shared by governate-level organs, who upheld the uezd 
land commission’s decision at an open congress on 16th November 1925.99 Most 
interestingly, the nomads who petitioned to settle adopted another feature of the 
Party’s rhetoric at this time, apparently dismissing national differences and instead 
opting to call their still-migrating fellow Kazakhs ‘kulak-bais’.100 The odd combination 
of Russian and Kazakh words here may have been the translator’s invention, but 
assuming it is a fair rendering, the term implies that stubborn affluent nomads were 
agitating to keep their community in the past. Class-based insults were becoming the 
language of choice for astute nomads petitioning a commission of Russians, even as the 
rhetoric of post-imperial grievance was losing its resonance among administrators. 
Class and economic development were the new guiding principles of internal border-
making. 
As the Kazakhs’ native bourgeoisie in Communist Party ideology, the bais were 
becoming hate-figures in Communist Party propaganda.101 It was argued that the bais 
thrived in nomadic society, and kept the Kazakhs trapped by a primordial nomadic 
lifestyle so as to better exploit their labour. One means of doing this was controlling 
access to water. The state’s regulation of water on the steppe thus became a liberating 
slogan as well as a pillar of Soviet agricultural policy in Central Asia.102 Initial 
legislation restricted itself to guaranteeing sufficient water access for nomads and 
settlers.103 The declaration on Land Development from 1924 included an unequivocal 
clause on this matter. It specified that nomads and semi-nomads could under no 
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circumstances be prohibited from using water resources, even when those resources 
were under constant use by sedentary communities, though the declaration also 
recognised the necessity of protecting wetlands from damage by nomadic herds.104 
Despite the absence of wetlands nearby, the Semipalatinsk Governate’s land 
commission was not acting inconsistently when it disregarded concerns that a new 
farm would obstruct nomadic access to water. The bais among the remaining nomads 
may have been strengthened by the commission’s decision, but the nomads with 
permission to settle had theoretically freed themselves from the power of the bais 
forever. Settlement was progressive and emancipatory. 
Section Three: Class and Development, 1925-1928 
It is of crucial importance that any protection of nomadic subsistence was 
intended to bring nomadism to an end. Ensuring access to water undermined the 
retrograde influence of the bais. Giving land to settling nomads encouraged others to 
follow suit.  Sensitivity about colonisation by non-Kazakhs did not disappear, but when 
it was Kazakhs effectively doing the colonising by settling permanently on nomadic 
pastures, commissions up and down the institutional hierarchy were amenable. The 
Kazakh administration was steadily including more mechanisms for the development 
and settlement of land within its jurisdiction. The declaration on Land Development of 
1924 was ratified shortly before the production of a register of government funds to be 
allocated to various regions for the pursuit of sedentary agriculture.105 With the 
register, Sovnarkom KASSR planned to settle nomads in specially-designated areas, 
demonstrating the increasing sophistication of an administrative topography the state 
first began developing in response to famine after the Civil War. Space was selected for 
the fertility of its land, the success of its previous harvests, its under-population and 
access to water. The intention of the register was to deliver resources to nomads as 
planned by the Federal Committee for Land Affairs in 1921, but also to control and 
restrict their migrations to a smaller share of the steppe.106 In later years the Party 
would use its map of nomadic regions to mitigate upheaval after another winter of 
dzhut.107 
Attempts to induce settlement among nomads were often justified as a way of 
breaking the power of the bais and liberating poor Kazakhs, but the actual rationale 
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was larger and more profound than that.108 As explained in Chapter Three, the nomadic 
economy was always believed to be inefficient. At a time of widespread food shortages 
in urban areas, the vast tracts of land required to sustain a relatively small nomadic 
population seemed poorly employed.109 When the state set about categorising territory 
by economic strength and agricultural practice, nomadic regions and impoverished 
regions were found to be the same thing.110 This was true in both the Kazakh and 
Turkestan Republics from the beginning of the decade.111 Much intra-Party debate in 
the 1920s was characterized by a growing belief that the kind of animal husbandry 
practised by nomads was productive only to the level of subsistence.112 Economic data, 
categorised by geographical area, facilitated the Party’s increasingly negative 
understanding of nomadism.113 As random decolonisation gave way to focused 
administrative regionalisation, it became possible to highlight the disparities between 
nomadic and sedentary areas and to encourage nomads to become farmers. 
With the Party thereby extending the ambition of its developmental aims, it 
found its administrative structures wanting. The Collegiate of Higher Control over Land 
Disputes (Kollegiia vysshego kontrolia po zemel′nym sporam) was the foremost 
supervisory body for the Kazakh Republic’s internal border-making for much of the 
1920s.114 It predated Narkomzem KSSR but would become part of that larger body, and 
collected a good deal of documentation from land commissions and other organs 
throughout its time in operation.115 But its oversight of local land commissions was 
severely hampered by its own lack of resources, and doubts about the efficacy of the 
commissions themselves had become a matter of real concern by 1925.116 Theoretically 
the Collegiate acted as a Court of Cassation for the commissions, resolving cases mired 
in disagreement. But with insufficient personnel most of its cases were forwarded to 
organisations in Moscow, where files were lost or forgotten for years at a time.117 In 
this context the land commissions looked unaccountable, and the predominance of 
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Europeans in the commissions caused ongoing disquiet. Similar criticisms were made 
about other agricultural authorities, whose inattention to contentious land-use was 
said to be exacerbating ethnic tensions.118 
For the purposes of further development and the swift resolution of conflicts, the 
governing framework would again be changed. Later frameworks for land use in the 
republic made references to the KASSR’s Land Code, itself a crucially important piece of 
legislation. The first Land Code was introduced for the RSFSR in 1922 under Lenin’s 
personal supervision, after which other Soviet republics set about creating their own, 
though the collectivisation of agriculture in the early 1930s would render them largely 
obsolete.119 Following lobbying from KTsIK, VTsIK was persuaded to include article 
207 of the Kazakh Land Code into the systematic resolution of land disputes. The result 
of this decision was the centralisation of power in the Kazakh Republic in 1927, 
constraining the local land commissions after they had been strengthened in 1924, and 
extending the powers of the Collegiate of Higher Control over Land Disputes to reduce 
its dependence on Moscow.120 As well as using the Land Code to centralise, republic-
level authorities made further efforts to extend their power and authority over the 
conciliation of disagreements in January 1927 and later in 1928, years when union-
wide economic policy was also taking a more interventionist direction.121 All this was 
justified as a way for Party members to triumph over patriarchal or bourgeois 
elements in rural areas.122 
What were the consequences for nomads? Answers can be found in the creation 
of the Gur′ev and Ural Okrugs in the west of the republic. In 1928, Gur′ev (today called 
Atyrau) was the governing centre of the Gur′ev Uezd, an administrative area reaching 
around the north-eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. This uezd was particularly diverse. 
It included some of the same Cossack fishing collectives and oil extraction points 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, and in June 1925 its north-western borders had been 
extended to include some of the nomadic territories of the former Bukey Governate (to 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five).123 
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For an urban centre managing oil and fishing efforts, the fresh addition of 
nomadic charges was a new kind of bureaucratic burden. When the public prosecutor’s 
office (prokuror) in the town became responsible for administering the north-western 
nomads of the Gur′ev Uezd it immediately experienced complication and disorder. The 
nomadic population only remained in the uezd for three to four months annually, 
spending the rest of the year over borders in other uezds. Investigatory work became 
immeasurably harder, summoning nomads to court was impossible and court actions 
reportedly took years.124 A protocol from the Gur′ev Uezd committee on 23rd March 
1926 confirms also that the counting of nomadic herds, the collection of taxes from 
nomads, and the support of nomadic agriculture was all far more troublesome than in 
Gur′ev’s settled regions.125 
Partially in response to the problems experienced by administrators in Gur′ev, in 
1928 KTsIK suggested that the Ural Governate, which contained the Gur′ev Uezd, be 
divided into two new economic zones, the Gur′ev and Ural Okrugs.126 This was to be 
part of the next phase of rainirovanie, in which the former system of governates was 
replaced with a smaller collection of large okrugs based on the prevailing economic 
characteristics of each area.127 Thus the divergent regions of the Gur′ev Uezd would be 
divided between the two okrugs.128 The Gur′ev Okrug, including the southern half of 
the Gur′ev Uezd, would contain local industrial and advanced agricultural enterprises. 
These could be more effectively managed from Gur′ev itself, freeing it to become a 
productive fishing exporter, a major industrial centre, and an important docking 
station sitting on the Ural delta. Such an economic hub would have no time to manage 
the backward nomads who used land in the north-west; they would have to join the 
largely agrarian Ural Okrug. KTsIK presented this change as a reversion to the more 
                                                          
124 RGASPI 17/25/285: 104. 
125 RGASPI 17/25/285: 132. 
126 A number of documents confirm this proposed delimitation. This declaration from VTsIK on 
3rd September 1928 describes the final territorial divisions of the region in most detail: GARF 
1235/140/1029: 2-3 ob.. However, for evidence of support for the division from KTsIK, see: 
GARF 1235/140/1029: 5-6. For the VTsIK’s direct response to this, see: 1235/140/1029: 9-10 
ob.. 
127 Asal Khamraeva-Aubert, "Economic Planning and the Construction of Territorial Limits in 
Soviet Central Asia: the Case of the Uzbek SSR" paper presented at the BASEES European 
Congress, (Cambridge, 7th April 2013).  
128  GARF 1235/140/1029: 5-6. It is worth emphasizing here the rate of flux in the 
administrative regionalization of the USSR. By 1928, the system of governates had been 
superseded by ten Kazakh okrugs, and a full description of the republic’s structures at this time 
can be found here: GARF 1235/123/345: 2-5. These okrugs also proved ephemeral, however. 
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rational, economically-minded administrative structure which existed before the 
Gur′ev Uezd had taken lands from the Bukey Governate.129 
As for the new Ural Okrug, this region would consolidate all the challenges 
involved in governing a more balanced population of sedentary Russians and nomadic 
Kazakhs.130 According to KTsIK, the plans for the Ural Okrug included a ‘colonization 
fund for the Bukey Kazakhs’ in the north of the former Gur′ev Uezd, who had in recent 
years been struggling with Russian farmers over use of land.131 The fund would have 
involved the provision of resources to help nomads settle, which many of them were 
presumed to be doing anyway.132 
We see in the report from KTsIK a common tendency to see nomads as an 
economic burden rather than an economic resource. Instead of fighting over them, 
okrugs grudgingly shared responsibility for them. The report identified the Kazakh 
herders of the Dengizskii district, a part of the former Bukey Governate which was to 
stay under Gur′ev’s control, as not at all nomadic.133 In the same clause the report 
described these herders as having an ‘industrial character.’134 The implication was that 
most northern nomadic herders were not ‘industrial’ enough for an industrial 
powerhouse. 
Resistance to this plan came primarily from Seitkali Mendeshev, then a member 
of the Economic Congress of the Soviet of People’s Commissars (EKOSO), who 
petitioned VTsIK for several months in an attempt to persuade them to reject the 
Kazakh government’s proposals.135 He was initially successful, as demonstrated by a 
declaration from VTsIK on 20th August 1928 and a corresponding rebuttal from 
KTsIK. 136  Nomadism was of crucial importance to Mendeshev’s argument. He 
contended that the proposed division of the Gur′ev Uezd would be disastrous for local 
                                                          
129 GARF 1235/140/1029: 5. 
130 GARF 1235/140/1029: 5 ob..  
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134 GARF 1235/140/1029: 5 ob.. 
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Chapter Three.  
136 GARF 1235/140/1029: 1, 5. 
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nomads, and substantiated his claim by describing the landscape of the area.137 The 
majority of the uezd was characterised by aridity and the ‘bitter salinity’ of the soil 
there.138 Such conditions made crop cultivation impossible, and this is why the Kazakh 
population often travelled from north to south in the Gur′ev Uezd, using fertile 
pastures where available.139 Thus drawing an administrative borderline between the 
Ural and Gur′ev Okrugs, separating the barren south from the fertile north, would 
hamper the Kazakhs’ migration northwards and seriously destabilise their 
communities. 
Further, the KTsIK was wrong to suggest that the new Gur′ev Okrug would 
govern a largely sedentary or even industrial population. Because they lived on 
scrubland which could only support livestock at certain times of year, Mendeshev 
argued that some of Gur′ev’s Kazakhs instead ‘had a semi-nomadic character’ and 
travelled north annually.140 If, in an effort to avert catastrophe, nomads were permitted 
to migrate into and out of different okrugs, the administrative situation would become 
only more complicated. Mendeshev made a forceful comparison between the potential 
folly of the KTsIK and a similar reform made by the Tsarist powers in 1868, which had 
terrible consequences for the Kazakhs it affected.141 Instead of splitting the Ural 
Governate into two okrugy, Mendeshev favoured the recreation of a distinct Bukey 
administrative region, this time a Bukey Okrug.142 
Responding to Mendeshev, on 30th June 1928 KTsIK simply reasserted its claim 
that the economic activity of the Gur′ev area could usefully be divided between north 
and south, and that the southern Kazakhs infrequently interfered in the lives of their 
northern compatriots. It added that it would be impossible to govern the Pre-Caspian 
region from the village of Slomikhina, which Mendeshev had chosen as the capital of his 
alternative Bukey Okrug. The only option was to put Ural′sk, the capital of the Ural 
                                                          
137 This information comes from one of Mendeshev’s petitions, signed on 7th August 1928: GARF 
1235/123/345: 22-30. For some very useful topographical maps of Kazakhstan, including the 
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outlined here, in a vypiska from a meeting of the Presidium of the Kazakh Central Executive 
Committee on 30th June 1928: GARF 1235/123/345: 17-18. 
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Okrug, in charge of north-western territories and to have Gur′ev specialise in the 
management of its local industries.143 
Ultimately, on 3rd September 1928, VTsIK resolved the argument and sanctioned 
the division of the Ural Governate into the Ural and Gur′ev Okrugs, in accordance with 
KTsIK’s wishes.144  The Gur′ev Uezd was cut in half. The southern Kazakh herders 
joined an okrug which specialised in oil production and fishing. The northern herders 
were to be administered from distant Ural′sk. At this late stage in the decade, during 
the implementation of the first Five Year Plan, KTsIK’s desire to create an industrial 
powerhouse in Gur′ev was taking precedence over nomads’ access to natural resources. 
Industrialisation was vastly more important than post-colonial reparations. A year 
later in 1929 the Adai Okrug to the south was dissolved, and the Gur′ev Okrug 
accumulated some of the Adai Okrug’s northern lands, where fishing communities 
were also present.145 This second readjustment was again made in the name of 
economic expediency; the Adai Okrug was among the most impoverished and least 
productive in the republic. Its population was principally nomadic. This was a further 
denial of Mendeshev’s logic, in which nomads should be consolidated within a single 
administrative area so as to reduce their chances of migrating across borders and 
ending their relationship with the authorities. Instead, dissolving a principally nomadic 
okrug would enable it to secure the foundations of a meaningful economic 
reconstruction. 146  Again Muscovite authorities agreed, and ratified this 
recommendation by Kazakh Republic-level bodies in spring 1929.147 
Land commissions were not uniformly sympathetic to nomadic needs, but their 
place at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy at least gave them some 
understanding of local affairs. Central organs were hardly in a position to appreciate 
the ambiguities of nomadic land-use, and it was their authority which had been 
strengthened by the reforms of 1927 and 1928. Their economic priorities were 
macroeconomic priorities, Union-wide, and after the publication of the first Five Year 
Plan this meant the structures of the Kazakh Republic should be built around oil 
extraction, not subsistence animal husbandry. As Kate Brown states in her 
epigrammatic piece: ‘Land that to Kazakh nomads had been a flowing body of winter 
and summer pastures marked with ancestral burial grounds became to the Europeans 
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who conquered it a series of parcels, surveyed and assigned value in square meters and 
millions of rubles.’148 
A cultural change had taken place in these central organs by this time, a change 
from which Mendeshev seems to have been excluded. Looking back to the early 1920s, 
it is hard to overstate how different the Russian Revolution’s intellectual impact had 
been for rural Kazakhstan and urban Russia. The transient lack of authority in Moscow 
allowed a varied and sometimes bizarre series of political experiments to find 
expression in modes of dress, art and interpersonal communication.149 But, to be clear, 
there were no nudists or atonal orchestras practicing on the Kazakh Steppe.150 Sat 
between the socialism and anarchism of European Russia, and the liberal Islamism of 
Turkestan, the nomads of the Kazakh region experienced conflict and decolonisation 
with comparably little intellectual radicalism.151 As stated above, the nomads invading 
Russian farmsteads were likely to see their actions as the resumption of an old way of 
life, not a transgressive political statement. Revolutionary intellectual currents took 
longer to reach the Kazakh Republic and in many ways would never penetrate nomadic 
culture. But some did eventually embed themselves among the Kazakh Party elite. One 
example was faith in man’s ability to rule nature.  
 In the earliest meetings of the Communist Party’s Kazakh branch, respect for the 
steppe’s forbidding climate led to an explicit consensus that there were areas of the 
republic irrevocably unsuited to sedentary farming.152 Decolonisation was justified for 
this reason; as Tsarist-era Russian colonists could only farm the best land, nomads had 
been left with the least fertile pastures and a balance had to be redrawn. Mendeshev 
continued to make this argument up until the late 1920s, but the common view had 
changed. Journalists and Party members became convinced that a properly managed 
socialist society could overcome any obstacle of the natural environment, and so ‘lost 
interest in nature’.153 By 1926 Filipp Goloshchekin was heading the Kazakh Communist 
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Party.154 He contended that substantial investment from the Soviet state would tame 
the wild steppe, imitating the earlier self-confident boasts of leaders in Moscow.155 
Localised projects such as irrigation and land reclamation became the preferred 
solution, as did the Koshchi Union (Soiuz Koshchi, sometimes Soiuzkoshchi or Soiuz 
Zharli), a Party-backed agricultural campaign in the republic.156 All these projects were 
evidence that the Party had become convinced of its ability to make more Central Asian 
districts habitable.157 As well as taking control of administrative regionalisation, central 
Party figures were asserting control over the natural environment.158 This was 
something nomads had not been able to do when they were forced onto infertile lands 
by Tsarist colonisers, because of their retrograde practices.159 Development became 
inevitable and backwardness inexcusable. Nomads could no longer use their hostile 
homeland as an excuse not to join the socialist, sedentary future, and any land could 
serve a purpose more productive than nomadic pasture. Yet still regionalisation went 
on, this time for the purposes of economic specialisation and the proper delivery of 
resources.160 Koshchi cells were told not to expend resources operating in extremely 
under-populated volosts, containing no more than two or three encampments, and this 
required regionalisation in demographic terms.161 In 1930 the Alma-Ata Okrug 
                                                                                                                                                                    
further discussion of the trend, and its legacies in contemporary historiography, see: Cameron, 
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160 See this example of the regionalisation of economic data and need in a 1928 resolution from 
the Zhetysu Governate Committee: RGASPI 17/25/156: 133. 
161 RGASPI 17/25/208, 86. 
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established a commission to identify nomadic regions where kolkhozes were likely to 
fail, and to take measures to preclude this failure.162 
The extension of cultivated land, particularly fields of grain but also cotton and 
other agricultural produce, was an avowed Party aim as early as 1921.163 But the 
Party’s growing self-assurance about man’s mastery over nature encouraged policy-
makers to expand their ambitions ever deeper into the arid steppe. Meanwhile the 
common assumption that the nomadic economy was irredeemably inefficient had 
never left administrators or Party members. If nomadic regions were economically 
underperforming, it followed that the extension of sedentary regions, in the form of 
cultivated land, would improve the republic’s economy. By 1928 post-imperial 
sensitivities would no longer act as a brake on agricultural policy, which was always 
configured throughout the decade in regionalising terms; documentation might discuss 
the republic’s growing ‘sown area’, the ‘extension of cereal farming’ or the ‘extension of 
the limits of arable farming.’164 The number of ploughed desiatinas was a foremost 
measure of economic development for Kazakh Party members, and the crop yield from 
these desiatinas could be cited to signify economic devastation or improvement.165 
Perhaps the most indicative phrase comes from a formal report from VTsIK on a 
declaration made by its Kazakh counterpart in November 1928. Here, VTsIK 
emphasises the importance of ‘expediting the inclusion of vacant land into the 
economic revolution.’166 Here again is implied the old trope of an empty expanse of 
steppe land and a dynamic, transformative revolution waiting to crowd it with 
productive activity. Towards the very end of the 1920s, rural areas across the USSR 
witnessed a new kind of colonisation, led by the Red Army and the ‘25,000-ers’.167 As in 
the Great Plains of North America, it was forgotten that these lands were not 
necessarily vacant, but populated by a people whose lifestyle was invisible to the forces 
of, respectively, capitalism and communism.168 
Given this, it is not so remarkable that, in 1930, the First Congress of Workers for 
Sedentarisation discussed the prior failure to extend cultivated land whilst at the same 
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time lamenting the administration’s lack of success in settling nomads.169 By then, the 
increase of one kind of land (cultivated) at the expense of another (pasture) was a 
euphemism for the brutal social transformation which sedentarisation became. 
Conclusion 
By the late 1920s the attitudes and ambitions of the Party were inflated enough 
to make the oncoming sedentarisation campaign seem a reasonable proposition, but a 
final blow to the nomadic economy was due. In 1928 the republic prepared reluctantly 
for the arrival of 500,000 new immigrants, an influx permitted and supervised from 
Moscow.170 Migrants were to be directed to land, selected for its fertility, in the north of 
the republic or along the Turksib railway line, one of the Soviet republic’s most 
important infrastructural developments. 171  The Kazakh administration under 
Goloshchekin defended its right to specify where migrants should be allowed to settle, 
and chose two vast plots of land in the Ural and Petropavlovsk Okrugs.172 As in the 
early years of famine, organs of state were compelled to delimit space on the steppe by 
circumstances beyond their immediate control, as the decision to encourage half a 
million Europeans into the KASSR was taken by VTsIK and Sovnarkom USSR in 
Moscow.173 The reappearance on the steppe of dzhut at the height of this influx of 
Europeans intensified concerns about Kazakh citizens, and in January 1930 the Kazakh 
People’s Commissariat of Agriculture offered up a list of areas where state organs, 
already overstretched by immigration and defined by the poverty of their natural 
resources, might buckle.174 Within a decade, the Kazakh Communist Party had gone 
from supporting the right of Kazakhs to use land as they saw fit to supervising an influx 
of 500,000 migrants to the best lands of the republic. 
The delimitation of the steppe had been a product of the Bolshevik Party’s two 
most salient policy platforms in Central Asia, economic development and national 
emancipation. The Party’s emphasis on national identity was utilised by Kazakhs both 
in and out of the Communist Party to justify the reclamation of land recently colonized 
by Europeans, creating a distinction between legally and illegally-owned land. The 
                                                          
169 TsGARK 1179/6/3: 4-6. 
170 This would happen again at an even larger scale in 1933. Michael Ellman confirms that again 
the Kazakh leadership, even if sceptical or unhappy with the proposals, accepted them without 
explicit resistance: Michael Ellman, 'Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 Revisited,' Europe-
Asia Studies 59, no. 4 (2007), p. 666. 
171 TsGARK 30/1/1090b: 2. 
172 TsGARK 30/1/1090b: 8-8 ob.. 
173 TsGARK 30/1/1090b: 2. 
174 TsGARK 30/1/1090b: 39. 
94 
 
Party’s urge to select and support industrial zones, mitigate the effects of famine, 
rationally disperse immigrants and pursue agricultural efficiency also necessitated 
regional distinctions, whether based on lifestyle, economic output or the presence of 
natural resources. The Tsarist administration had been developing a similar 
bureaucratic map of the steppe, albeit with less speed or sophistication, and so to some 
extent the Party was completing a job begun by Russian Imperial officers. Party 
members carried another long-standing prejudice with them into the 1920s, of a 
featureless and practically deserted Central Asian landscape which could now be 
adapted to the needs of the state and filled with productive farmers. Nomads were 
therefore forced to live ‘gridded lives’.175 
Regionalisation facilitated the Party’s growing appreciation for the instability 
and poverty of Kazakh nomadic communities, as a high proportion of nomads in the 
population often correlated with low levels of productivity, but much like the external 
border-making discussed in the next chapter, internal borders became the problem 
even as they seemed to be the solution. Regionalisation separated nomads from the 
resources they needed, and reminded administrators that the extension of cultivated 
land could increase a particular region’s economic output even as it inconvenienced 
local people. Systems of reconciliation were widespread, but were difficult to supervise 
and seemed to carry an inherent European bias. This made land commissions less 
responsive to a body of republic-wide legislation which was strikingly clear in its 
defence of nomadic interests. As the decade ended, even central organs seemed blind 
to the demands of this legislation, focused as they were on macro-economic concerns 
embedded in the first Five Year Plan.  
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The Borders of a Nomadic Republic 
 
The creation of national borders in Soviet Central Asia has received much 
scholarly attention. Studies of Soviet Kazakhstan will invariably include a list of works 
by figures such as Terry Martin, Francine Hirsch, Yuri Slezkine, Jeremy Smith and 
Adeeb Khalid. 1  Hirsch in particular describes the diligent ethnographic and 
anthropological processes by which Soviet scholars and administrators distinguished 
Kazakhs from Uzbeks, Kalmyks, Turkmen and others.2 These processes are taken as the 
intellectual origins for the boundaries of contemporary Kazakhstan, boundaries 
established in the 1920s but which remain almost unchanged today. The 
historiography of border-making is extremely comprehensive and has done much to 
explain the political and economic environment of the USSR’s non-European periphery. 
In a sense, however, the bulk of this scholarship shares a specific blind spot with 
the Soviet authorities it analyses. The prevailing fascination with the origins of the 
Central Asian nations engenders investigation of those phenomena which acted as the 
building blocks of nationhood in the region;  culture, lifestyle, religious faith, language, 
ethnicity and so on.3 But this thesis argues that nomadism was seldom if ever given the 
chance to inform, still less define, Kazakh national identity in the Soviet context. So 
when academics describe the manner in which national boundaries were established, 
agricultural practice is not often mentioned. 
As this chapter will show, this does not mean that Kazakh nomadism had no 
effect on the process of Soviet border-making. Rather, nomadism and border-making 
literally and theoretically intersected as frequently as might be expected. It is too 
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simplistic to say that nomadism is incompatible with the division of land, but whereas a 
settled community might have a new dividing line imposed just metres from its 
outermost suburbs without trouble, a nomadic or transhumant community is likely to 
find that such a line deprives its people of essential resources. Similarly, it would be 
misleading to claim that Kazakh nomads had no traditional understanding of land 
ownership or land rights, but it is true that their sense of ownership was more flexible 
and adaptable than the vulgarities of national delimitation might allow.4 Overall, 
Kazakh nomadism made the borders of the Kazakh Republic more difficult to establish 
and police, because the state struggled to ascertain and prioritise the habits of nomadic 
land use and lacked the resources to control a highly mobile population. Meanwhile 
sedentary communities looking to acquire more land found it easier to present 
nomadic territory as vacant. Subsequent colonisation again confounded and 
complicated border-making processes. 
Whereas Chapter Four conceived of borders in the broad, abstract sense as 
related to land use and land ownership, this chapter will look at the process of border-
making in its more traditional, literal sense. That is, the establishment of the Kazakh 
Republic’s external borders in the 1920s. As such, this chapter is more concerned with 
negotiation between national republics than between communities or institutions, but 
the phenomenon of raionirovanie also remains relevant. Terry Martin describes early-
Soviet raionirovanie as a process by which large macro-economic regions were created 
whilst a patchwork of smaller administrative areas was simplified, and the old Tsarist 
system of governates was gradually replaced with okrugs. Martin contends that the 
National Question was of recurrent importance to this process, and the primacy of 
economics in raionirovanie has been recently emphasised as well, but here nomadism 
will also be added to the list of pertinent factors.5 
In this chapter, sections are arranged into approximate chronological order; 
though all of them describe social phenomena originating long before 1920, each of 
them became most salient at different points in the 1920s. Section one will consider 
two case studies in western Kazakhstan, the Bukey Governate and the Adai Uezd. 
                                                          
4 Edward Schatz, for example, suggests: ‘The Kazakh nomadic pastoralists had a loose, but still 
notable, attachment to territory.’: Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics: The Power of "Blood" in 
Kazakhstan and Beyond (London: University of Washington Press, 2004), p. 29. 
5 Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 34. Asal Khamraeva-Aubert, in her own research on 
the Uzbek Republic, notes that economic priorities were of foremost importance in the creation 
of new administrative regions: Asal Khamraeva-Aubert, "Economic Planning and the 
Construction of Territorial Limits in Soviet Central Asia: the Case of the Uzbek SSR" paper 
presented at the BASEES European Congress, (Cambridge, 7th April 2013). 
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Section two will look at eastern Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Republic’s borders with 
Siberia and China. 
The chapter will place heavy emphasis on the importance of local history in each 
of the case studies, but argues that there are clear common trends. In all four cases, the 
location of political and economic borders was of powerful significance to the everyday 
lives of nearby nomads, and the everyday lives of nearby nomads was a major factor in 
the success or failure of the border-making process, whether that be defined by the 
productivity of economic activity, the resolution of inter-ethnic conflict, or the effective 
supervision of mass migration. Roughly speaking, in the first half of the decade the 
state’s fixation on nationality and national difference interfered with its appreciation of 
nomadic issues when establishing boundaries.6 In the second half of the decade, the 
state began to show greater concern for economic rather than national factors, and 
delimited accordingly. Sometimes these economic factors directly related to nomadism. 
At other times, such as along the border with Siberia, the absence of nomadism seems 
to have allowed for more straightforward economic judgements. The case studies 
suggest that raionirovanie generally served to disrupt migratory habits and thereby 
destabilise nomadic society. Even where lines were drawn around migratory paths 
rather than through them, the resulting economic areas came to be seen as some of the 
most impoverished even before sedentarisation dominated the agenda. 
This chapter will refer repeatedly to national territorial autonomy. It should be 
emphasised here that national autonomy was always of a limited kind in the Soviet 
context, and nothing like the full constitutional federalism that the phrase ‘autonomy’ 
might now suggest. But the principle existed both in the rhetoric and actions of the 
Communist Party, and should be presented as such at least to make a distinction with 
the later era of more profound centralisation. 
  
                                                          
6 For further discussion of nationality policy in the Soviet Union, see Chapters Three and Four. 
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Section One: Western Kazakhstan 
Beyond the Ural River7 
 
In 1801, Tsarist authorities gave a collection of Kazakh families permission to 
cross the Ural River westwards and establish the new Bukey Khanate, sometimes 
known as the Fourth or Inner Juz.8 They were led by Sultan Bukey, who sought to 
escape the intertribal violence which afflicted his relatives in the Younger Juz back on 
the eastern side of the river. Nominally autonomous, Bukey’s nomads delivered taxes 
to the Tsar in exchange for their own land north of the Caspian Sea.9 Their lives had 
been arduous. Previously, imperial policy prohibited their annual migration across the 
Ural River because it led to conflict with nearby Cossacks.10 Now given a monopoly on 
land beyond the Ural River under Bukey’s leadership, they had some early success. 
                                                          
7 This sub-heading bears comparison with V. Connolly, Beyond the Urals: Economic Development 
in Soviet Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), though in that instance it was the Ural 
Mountains being approached from the west, at a very different time in Kazakhstan’s 
development. See also: M. Holdsworth, 'Review,' Middle Eastern Studies 7, no. 3 (1971), pp. 378-
381. 
8 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 182. A Juz was one of the Kazakhs’ three tribal 
conglomerations. 
9 Martha Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs, First ed., Studies of Nationalities in the USSR (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 49. 
10 Didar Kassymova, Zhanat Kundakbaeva, and Ustina Markus, eds., Historical Dictionary of 
Kazakhstan (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2012), pp. 54-55. 
The approximate north-western 
borders of the Kazakh Republic circa 
1922. 
99 
 
Chapter Five: The Borders of a Nomadic Republic 
 
From an original population of between five and seven and a half thousand families, the 
new khanate’s population grew to ten thousand families by 1825.11 
The fortunes of these Kazakhs fluctuated throughout the nineteenth century. 
First rumours of forced conversion to Orthodox Christianity, then bad winter weather 
encouraged some members of the Bukey Khanate to again cross the Ural River, west to 
east, and return to the Younger Juz, only to be repeatedly driven back by Russian forces. 
The Russian habit of leasing land to nomads around Astrakhan led to mutual 
accusations of exploitation and ethnic conflict. 12  Imperial soldiers eventually 
intervened to prevent an uprising within Kazakh territory.13 On the death of Bukey’s 
successor, Khan Jangir, in 1845, the khanate was officially abolished, though the 
Kazakhs remained.14 Their land came under the jurisdiction of Astrakhan and they 
became part of the Astrakhan Governate, a governate (guberniia) being the largest 
administrative sub-division of the Russian Empire. New systems of imperial 
administration were introduced.15 
Despite the transformation of the former khanate’s organisational structures, the 
population’s religious and agricultural practices persisted. By 1887, eighty-six years 
after Bukey first crossed the Ural river, the Kazakh population stood at 207,000 
individuals.16 Though officially subjects of the Tsar, most still identified with the 
Islamic world.17 The vast majority were still nomads.18 In the later years of the Tsarist 
Empire, these nomads encountered increasingly rapid colonization, first from Cossacks, 
then Russians. Slavic settlers brought new and expansive forms of sedentary 
                                                          
11 Bukey was officially designated as Khan in 1812. Khodarkovsky estimates the lower original 
figure here: Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, p. 182. Olcott gives the higher original 
figure and the increased number here: Olcott, The Kazakhs, pp. 49-50. 
12 Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, p. 200. Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 63.  
13 Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 64. 
14 In Svat Soucek’s summary of these events, the ‘elimination’ of Bukey’s polity in 1845 was an 
act of deliberate suppression by Saint Petersburg: Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 197. 
15 Allen J. Frank, 'Islam and Ethnic Relations in the Kazakh Inner Horde: Muslim Cossacks, Tatar 
Merchants, and Kazakh Nomads in Turkic Manuscripts, 1870-1910,' in Muslim Culture in Russia 
and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries, ed. Anke von Kügelen, Michael Kemper, 
and Allen J Frank (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998), p. 218. Olcott, The Kazakhs, pp. 61-62. 
The particular transliteration of Kazakh names also comes from Olcott.  
16  Allen J. Frank, Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of 
Novouzensk and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1880-1910 (Boston: Brill, 2001), p. 91. 
17 Ibid., p. 316. 
18 Frank, "Islam and Ethnic Relations," p. 218.  
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agriculture with them, and developed mixed relations with the Kazakhs: sometimes 
hostile, sometimes cooperative.19 
  The inclusion of a Bukey Governate into the new Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic (KSSR) in 1920 recognised and represented the Kazakh population living in 
the former territory of the Bukey Khanate. The administrative centre of the governate 
was moved from the majority-Russian city of Astrakhan to Urda, a small town now in 
far-western Kazakhstan.20 The second tier of authority for the governate was the 
capital of the Kazakhs’ republic: Orenburg from 1920 to 1925, Kyzyl-Orda from 1925 to 
1927, and Alma-Ata from 1927 onwards.21 The third and highest tier of power was 
Moscow. Managing the Bukey nomads thus necessitated dialogue between Urda, the 
Kazakh capital and the Soviet capital. Astrakhan, as will be seen, also retained a voice of 
sorts. 
Already the story of the Bukey territory, thinly told, reveals one of the most 
profound differences between Tsarist and Soviet power in Central Asia. As argued by 
Alexander Morrison, Svetlana Gorshenina and others, the Tsar’s colonial officers 
operated on the assumption that there existed topographical factors which placed 
geographical limits on the expansion and consolidation of imperial power.22 Michael 
Khodarkovsky attributes this in large part to the nomadic lifestyle of many in Central 
Asia. As raiding nomads did not ‘define and agree upon common lines of partition’ with 
Russia, the Empire looked for mountain ranges and rivers to signify the beginning of 
Moscow’s jurisdiction, behind which attacks on Russian peasants would be met with 
forceful retribution.23 The Ural River was first used to divide Russian farmers from 
Kazakh nomads. Then after 1801 it was used to divide two groups of nomads, one set 
                                                          
19 George J. Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University, 1969), pp. 110-116, 45-46. It is notable that the first arrivals were Cossacks because, 
as will be discussed further in section two, the relationship between Cossacks, Russians and 
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan would cause much disquiet among the Soviet authorities. Martin, The 
Affirmative Action Empire, p. 63. For further detail on the fractious relationship between 
Russians and Central Asian nomads before 1917, see: Daniel Brower, 'Kyrgyz Nomads and 
Russian Pioneers: Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Turkestan Revolt of 1916,' Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas 44, no. 1 (1996), pp. 41-53. 
20 As is evident from correspondence of the time, including this communiqué sent from the 
Kazakh central government in 1921, letters addressed to the Bukey Governate’s Executive 
Committee (Bukgubispolkom) were sent to Urda; GARF 1318/11/32: 86. 
21 Kassymova, Kundakbaeva, and Markus, eds., Historical Dictionary, pp. 205-206, 170-171, 26-
27. 
22 Alexander Morrison, 'Russia, Khoqand, and the Search for a "Natural" Frontier, 1893-1865,' 
Ab Imperio 2 (2014), pp. 1-27. Svetlana Gorshenina, 'A Theory of “Natural Boundaries” and the 
Conquest of Kuldja (1870–1871): A Self-portrait of Russian Military and Diplomatic Elites in St. 
Petersburg and Turkestan,' Ab Imperio 2 (2014), pp. 102-165. 
23 Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, p. 47. 
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more fully assimilated into the Empire than the other. The river, therefore, was an 
important administrative symbol, used to define the terms of Saint Petersburg’s control. 
Yet in 1920 the river’s political significance ran dry and a dual process began. 
Ostensible political power was not divided between the governors of geographically 
distinct areas, but between national territories. The predominance of Kazakhs west of 
the Ural River was more important than the practicalities of the landscape, and so the 
predominantly Russian Astrakhan ceded power over the area to Urda. Simultaneously, 
of course, Moscow would steadily gain more power over the jurisdictions of Orenburg 
and any other national capital as time progressed. Nevertheless the new national basis 
for the border beyond the Ural River would never lose its importance. Though the 
actions of the Russian Empire prior to 1917 had an obvious influence on later events, it 
is principally the new Soviet approach to territory and borders which so clearly 
defined events in the Bukey case and in all the other instances discussed in this chapter. 
On 3rd October 1921 the People’s Commissariat for Agriculture (Narkomzem 
RSFSR), based in Moscow, turned its attention to two pending territorial disputes 
between two governates. Though both officially within the boundaries of the RSFSR, 
the Bukey Governate was also part of the Kazakh national republic. In contrast, 
territorial membership of the RSFSR alone did not designate a governate as nationally 
Russian, and so the Astrakhan Governate had no national definition beyond its 
aforementioned position inside the RSFSR, but with its largely Russian population, 
Astrakhan might have been described as de facto Russian in national terms.24 Thus the 
disputes submitted to Narkomzem RSFSR were not only administrative but also 
national in character thanks to each governates’ affiliation, one official and one de facto, 
with a different national identity.25 The first dispute concerned 10,677 desiatinas of 
land connected to Lake Baskunchak, a landlocked body of salt water around 160 miles 
                                                          
24 GARF 1318/11/32: 84. The presidium actually considered two further contended territories 
on that day. It declined to rule on a region occupied by the Kunderovskii Tatars, arguing that 
this was not relevant to the Kazakh Republic. Questions over the southern part of the Volga 
delta were deferred to the Administrative Committee of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee. 
25 Unlike Kazakhs and many other nations in the USSR, Russians were officially denied their 
own titular republic with its attendant Russian institutional framework. This is connected again 
with the National Question and fears of ‘Great Russian chauvinism’. See: Jeremy Smith, The 
Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-23 (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 15-16. Terry 
Martin, 'An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism,' in 
A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor 
Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 80. Note that from 1926 
Russian national soviets were permitted. This created more opportunities for the formal 
recognition of Russian identity. See: Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, p. 39. 
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north of the Caspian Sea and not far east of the Volga.26 The second related to the 
50,977 desiatinas encompassed by the ‘Regular Nomadic Encampment’ (Ocherednoe 
Kochev′e).27 This ‘encampment’ was in fact a swathe of land claimed by Kazakhs during 
the Bukey influx but increasingly leased to Russian farmers since. It sat between Lake 
Baskunchak and the Volga River.28 The Astrakhan and Bukey Governates each 
professed an interest in these two regions, which straddled a border between 
administrative jurisdictions, between national territories, and between agricultural 
practices. 
 After a preliminary appraisal the presidium of the Federal Committee of 
Narkomzem RSFSR actually deferred any decision on the Baskunchak tract and the 
Regular Nomadic Encampment until the following day, allowing the group’s deputy 
chairman time to consult the Administrative Committee of the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee (VTsIK).29   With the Administrative Committee consulted, 
Narkomzem RSFSR produced a declaration on 4th October 1921.30 Present at the 
presidium were two representatives of the Kazakh Commissariat for Agriculture 
(Narkomzem KSSR) and one member of the Astrakhan Governate Committee 
(Gubkom).31 Both disputed regions, the presidium decided, should be considered part 
of the Kazakh Republic. Further, all those Russians living continuously within either 
area retained their rights to land use, but now on the basis of Kazakh law. Russians not 
permanently resident in either area but using land therein were offered a choice by the 
declaration; take up occupancy within the Kazakh Republic and live by its rules, or 
move to the Astrakhan Governate and lose all rights to use Kazakh land. Appeals would 
be heard until 1st March 1922, and all Russian farmsteads newly deemed illegal had to 
                                                          
26 A desiatina amounted to around 1.0925 hectares. Its use would be officially prohibited in 
autumn 1927. 
27 GARF 1318/11/32: 84. Original documentation from the dispute uses the rounded figures of 
10,000 and 50,000 desiatinas to describe the scale of the Baskunchak tract and the Ocherednoe 
Kochev′e respectively. The more specific sizes given above can be found here: GARF 3260/1/30: 
1. 
28 References in the secondary literature to the ocherednoe kochev’e are extremely sparse. Clear 
information on its geographical location can be found in this report from the Astrakhan 
Governate’s Agricultural Department (Gubzemotdel), dated 20th October 1921; 3260/1/31: 6-6 
ob.. As can be seen from this report, there was some small confusion over the ethnic 
composition of the nomads in the camp. Given the diversity of the region, and its proximity to 
what is now the Republic of Kalmykia, the population is unlikely to have been ethnically 
homogenous. Since the Soviet authorities ultimately treated the camp as Kirgiz (Kazakh) this 
thesis treats the ocherednoe kochev′e case as representative of the treatment of Kazakh nomads 
generally. 
29 GARF 1318/11/32: 84.  
30 Evidence of a dialogue between the Administrative Committee VTsIK and Narkomzem RSFSR 
on this issue can be found here: GARF 3260/1/31: 3.  
31 GARF 3260/1/30: 2. This document, dated 19th October 1921, informed members of 
Narkomzem RSFSR of the decision made by the presidium fifteen days previously. 
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be dismantled by 1st March 1923.32 The presidium’s ruling reflects the spirit of 
decolonisation prevalent at the time, as discussed in the preceding chapter. 
Narkomzem RSFSR did not have to wait until March 1922 for complaints to 
arrive. Astrakhan was informed of the commissariat’s decision, and ordered to fulfil the 
requirements of the protocol, on 18th October 1921.33 The next day the Astrakhan 
Gubkom questioned the wisdom of those operating in Moscow, and supplemented its 
case with a report addressed to the Federal Committee of Narkomzem RSFSR.34 The 
report made the concession, possibly tactical, that the fifty thousand desiatinas of the 
Regular Nomadic Encampment had been de jure owned by Kazakhs.35 Ever since the 
Bukey influx in Tsarist times, however, land had been leased back to Russians on a 
haphazard basis and the Russians had ploughed up more and more of the camp. Crops 
had been sown and food production among the Russians had increased, as had their 
herds of cattle.36 Besides, it was argued, the Kazakhs did not even use the land. It had 
become Russian by custom.37 In the letter accompanying the report, Astrakhan 
reminded Narkomzem RSFSR that the Russian population of both the Baskunchak tract 
and the Regular Nomadic Encampment was larger than the local Kazakh population, 
and that further colonization by the Russians had been permitted and regulated by two 
Krai Congresses of Soviets since the revolution.38 Astrakhan was using its status as a 
largely Russian city to argue that it should govern areas where Russians were a 
majority. Urda, as part of the KSSR, was less appropriate for the task. The nationality of 
                                                          
32 The relevant protocol from the meeting can be found here: GARF 1318/11/32: 85-85 ob.. 
Decisions of this nature, which favoured Kazakhs when land or water rights were reformed, 
were fairly common in the early 1920s. It is a tendency in early policy which Matthew Payne 
describes as ‘philo-Kazakh’: Matthew J. Payne, 'Seeing Like a Soviet State: Settlement of 
Nomadic Kazakhs, 1928-1934,' in Writing the Stalin Era: Sheila Fitzpatrick and Soviet 
Historiography, ed. Golfo Alexopoulos, Julie Hessler, and Kiril Tomoff (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2011), p. 61.  
33 GARF 3260/1/31: 1. The Kazakh People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (Kirnarkomzem) was 
also informed around this time: GARF 3260/1/31: 2. 
34 The first communiqué from the Astrakhan Gubkom can be found here: GARF 3260/1/31: 5-5 
ob.. Its report was received the next day, on 20th October 1921: GARF 3260/1/31: 6-6 ob..  
35 According to the report, the Regular Nomadic Encampment was originally leased to the 
Kazakh population of the Bukey Juz, but was subsequently given to them freely: GARF 
3260/1/31: 6 
36 GARF 3260/1/31: 6 ob.. The Astrakhan Gubkom also argued in its letter to Moscow that the 
Russian population’s stocks of cattle and crops exceeded those of the Kazakhs in the Regular 
Nomadic Encampment: GARF 3260/1/31: 5. For an account of this process in late-Soviet 
scholarship, see: S. B. Baishev, Ocherki ekonomicheskoi istorii Kazakhskoi SSR (1860-1970 gg.) 
(Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo Kazakhstan 1974), p. 89. 
37 GARF 3260/1/31: 6. 
38 GARF 3260/1/31: 5-5 ob.. It should be noted that the Russians encroaching upon Kazakh land 
would not necessarily have come from Astrakhan or its surrounding area. Pre-revolutionary 
Russian immigrants came from all across the Russian Empire. Demko, The Russian Colonization 
of Kazakhstan, p. 65. 
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the populations in question was not the only relevant factor, however: Astrakhan 
further implied that productive Russian farmsteads were being put under threat by 
governing bodies in Urda, whose sympathies lay more with the rival interests of 
Kazakh nomads. Astrakhan therefore admitted the presence and importance of nomads 
in the debate, but only in terms of the threat they posed to productive farmers. 
Nomadic interests were the misguided priority of the opposition. 
Some of Astrakhan’s account was questionable. Studies conducted in 1920 found 
a population of 239,300 in the Bukey Governate and described no less than 99 percent 
of this number as Kazakh, the remaining 1 percent being Russian. In no other Kazakh-
run governate were Russians found to be such a minority.39 These statistics should be 
treated with a high degree of scepticism given the paucity of available sources at the 
time and the extremely limited resources enjoyed by administrators and scholars after 
the Civil War. Besides, as is clear from the dispute between Urda and Astrakhan itself, 
the official boundaries of what was considered the Bukey Governate would have been 
ambiguous in 1920 to anyone conducting research. Nevertheless, Narkomzem RSFSR 
had seen reports on the preponderance of Kazakhs in the Bukey Governate by late 
1922, and this can only have damaged the credibility of claims made by Astrakhan 
about the number of Russians on the borderlands.40 Most probably, ambiguity arose 
from the lack of consensus on what constituted residence and land-ownership. Because 
much of the Kazakh population was always migrating and its habits were poorly 
understood by local Russians, Astrakhan was able to underestimate the number of 
Kazakhs and the extent of their land use, either through mistake or wilful 
misunderstanding. Other organs were free to exaggerate it.41 
In the absence of consensus, the Kazakh authorities were well prepared for a 
response from the Astrakhan Gubkom. Around the time that Astrakhan made its 
disquiet known, the central government of the Kazakh Republic wrote to the Bukey 
Governate’s Executive Committee.42  Central authorities proclaimed their explicit 
intention to protect the interests of the Bukey Governate Committee in Urda, and 
requested further information from the governate so that its various territorial 
                                                          
39 GARF 3260/1/25: 144.  
40 GARF 3260/1/25: 143, 144-146.  
41 The claims of the data collected in 1920 look similarly untrustworthy next to George J. 
Demko’s series of maps documenting demographic change in pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan. 
According to his study from 1969, Kazakhs were barely an absolute majority in north-western 
Kazakhstan the year before the revolution: Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, pp. 
133-136.  
42 To be precise, a communique was dispatched on 13th October 1921, less than a less before 
Astrakhan’s response to the ruling: GARF 1318/11/32: 86. 
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disputes could be resolved with Moscow. The direct involvement of republic-level 
officials again implied that the dispute was national rather than administrative in 
character, since a matter of bureaucratic expediency may have been more astutely 
resolved by the bureaucrats in Astrakhan and Urda, both more directly involved than 
anyone in Orenburg. 
Faced with the involvement of the central Kazakh authorities, Astrakhan’s 
disputations continued long after Narkomzem RSFSR’s original deadline for complaints 
had passed. Twice in 1923, on 23rd April and 24th August, Narkomzem RSFSR made 
declarations stating that it saw no credible reason to reverse the original decision it 
had made in October 1921.43 Repeatedly over this two-year period, the authorities in 
Moscow endorsed the principle that the Bukey Kazakhs should be managed by Kazakh 
organs of state. Whilst simultaneously appealing against Moscow’s ruling, Astrakhan 
made efforts to demonstrate compliance. In 1922 the governate’s eleventh Congress of 
Soviets conceded that chaos had been created by the unsystematic settlement of 
nomadic territory, and that Russians had encroached on swathes of land far larger than 
had originally been intended.44 These claims bare some resemblance to the rhetoric of 
many in the Kazakh branch of the Communist Party at this time, and may have been a 
symbolic accommodation of the prevailing anti-colonial paradigm which was so closely 
associated with the National Question in the early 1920s.45 
However, Astrakhan’s conciliatory sentiments belied the hardship experienced 
by those actually living on the borderline between governates because the 
encroachment and unregulated settlement of land by Russians was continuing apace. 
In April 1923, the year after Astrakhan’s rhetorical concessions, Narkomzem RSFSR 
demanded an explanation from the Astrakhan Gubkom for its continuing ‘onslaught’ on 
the Kazakh Republic.46 Though Orenburg was granted control over the former Bukey 
Khanate, Russians from neighbouring Astrakhan were continuing to colonize and settle 
the land there, perpetuating the serious disruption of nomadic migratory habits in the 
area. Back in Moscow, notable figures such as Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev acknowledged the 
plight of the Bukey Kazakhs and held meetings to discuss it with Party members 
involved in agricultural policy.47 Nomadism was complicating the western border of 
the Kazakh Republic, but not only because nomads came and went. It also affected the 
                                                          
43 GARF 3260/1/30: 19, 21. 
44 GARF 3260/1/30: 1. 
45 See, for example: APRK 139/1/2: 79. Chapter Four discusses post-colonial reparations and 
rhetoric in further detail. 
46 GARF 3260/1/30: 19. 
47 GARF 3260/1/30: 15, 16. 
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behaviour of sedentary communities. Counter-intuitively, sedentary Russians were 
more likely to ignore the border and colonise the land of a neighbouring republic, 
acting on the pretence of their administrators in Astrakhan that nomadic land was 
vacant land. Similar processes appear to have been ongoing at other points around the 
Kazakh Republic, and not only along its northern border.48 
How was this being allowed to happen? The implication made by the Astrakhan 
Gubkom in 1921 was that government from Urda would favour the nomadic minority 
in the Baskunchak tract and the Regular Nomadic Encampment, placing productive 
Russian farmsteads under threat at a time of extensive food shortages. Ignoring this 
warning, Narkomzem RSFSR had granted Urda control over the disputed areas, 
specifically declaring that Russian farmers would henceforth live by Kazakh laws. The 
stage did indeed seem set for the invasion of cultivated arable farmland by nomadic 
herds. Yet a year and a half later the opposite was happening. To an extent this might 
be explained by the relative weakness and inability of the state, at this early stage after 
the Civil War, to halt processes which had been underway long before 1917. But a 
further reason is that, as repeatedly emphasised, both sides so assiduously fought this 
territorial dispute in national terms. Orenburg stated its commitment to ‘the defence of 
the interests of the Bukey’, and therefore to the competencies of Urda as a centre of the 
Kazakh Republic’s power, but not to the nomads nearby.49 Narkomzem RSFSR was 
adjudicating at a time of official sensitivity to the dangers of Great Russian chauvinism, 
and its rejection of Astrakhan’s arguments should be understood in this context. 
Nomadism may have caused the debate in the first place, as it complicated land-
ownership in the Bukey Governate and made it difficult to draw a clearly recognisable 
border. But the dispute was resolved by bodies speaking for Russians and Kazakhs, not 
farmers and nomads, and the extension of nomadic practice was subsequently raised 
mainly by administrators in Astrakhan scare-mongering about the intentions of those 
in Urda. 
The formal extension of the Kazakh Republic’s borders to encompass nomadic 
lands in the far west might at first seem like an early sign that nomadic life would be 
respected under Communism. In fact it was a sign that Kazakh national, territorial 
identity was gaining formal recognition, replacing the old Tsarist principles of 
topographical and administrative expediency. This meant Kazakh bodies were to 
                                                          
48 L. C. Gatagova, L. P. Kosheleva, and L. A. Pogovaia, TSK RKP(b)-VKP(b) i natsional'nyi vopros. 
Kniga 1, 1918-1933 gg., Dokumenty Sovetskoi Istorii (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005), p. 406. 
49 GARF 1318/11/32: 86. 
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govern lands in which Kazakhs predominated, irrespective of whether those Kazakhs 
were nomadic or how well those nomads would be treated. Indeed, even as the Kazakh 
national border was firmly set in place to the west of the Ural River, the agricultural 
borders of arable farming thundered eastwards. As will be repeatedly shown in later 
chapters, there was no particularly compelling reason to expect Kazakh authorities to 
be anything more than ambivalent about the extension of farmland into nomadic 
pastures, providing national territory was secured. This was a pattern which will recur 
later in this chapter, and further events in the same area of the Kazakh Republic 
reinforce the case. Chapter Four describes the eventual assimilation and division of the 
old Bukey Governate into other administrative territories of the Kazakh Republic, 
largely at the expense of the nomads who lived there. 
Around the Caspian Sea 
 
At the dawn of the Soviet era, Kazakh migrations around the Caspian Sea were 
bookended by conflict. As they reached their northernmost pastures west of the Ural 
River, each year the Kazakhs were finding larger European settlements where open 
grassland had been. When they headed south, onto the Ustyurt Plateau which sits 
between the Caspian and Aral Seas, they encountered competition of a different kind. 
The Mangïshlak Peninsula had long been a theatre for hostilities between nomadic 
tribes, who would soon be formally divided into either the Turkmen or Kazakh 
The approximate south-western 
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nations.50 Further still onto the Ustyurt, these communities found that the shallow 
Garabogazköl lagoon was a useful landmark with which to separate themselves from 
each other. Maps from after the national delimitation of 1925 show the lagoon under 
Kazakh control, whereas post-Soviet maps place it under Turkmen jurisdiction. But the 
border always sits close to the shore. 
The Kazakh and Turkmen communities of this region shared a nomadic lifestyle. 
As noted by a Soviet agent in October 1924, a common preference for nomadism did 
nothing to ameliorate the often fierce rivalry between groups of Central Asians, but it 
did mean that such conflict differed in some respects from that witnessed in the north-
west of the republic.51 The two agricultural traditions competing over the outermost 
reaches of the Bukey Governate could not co-exist in the same space; a field cannot 
provide both crops and pasturage. The matter was simpler still because agricultural 
practice appeared to correlate with nationality. Disagreements arose over where to 
draw the line between nomadism and farming, Kazakhs and Europeans, and in the 
deliberations on this question we see prevailing attitudes towards nomads emerge. In 
contrast, Turkmen and Kazakh nomads crossed paths repeatedly around the 
Garabogazköl and on the Mangïshlak Peninsula. This made the establishment of two 
national jurisdictions considerably more difficult. But once again the process reveals 
much about the relationship between state and nomad in early Soviet Kazakhstan. 
In post-Soviet historiography the Turkmen tribes are typically distinguished 
from the other titular nationalities of Soviet Central Asia by their particular 
interpretation of Islam.52 As with Kazakh tribal confederations, however, genealogy 
and kinship were vitally important to Turkmen allegiances. 53  Moreover the 
‘extraordinary ethnic complexity’ of Central Asia applied as much to Turkmen as to 
Kazakhs, and it would be inappropriate to suggest that the disorder along the shores of 
the Caspian Sea was the product of clashes between just two distinct groups.54 Yet, for 
the same practical and ideological reasons described in the preceding section, the 
Communist Party insisted on understanding violence between nomads in national 
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terms. That this is so will become immediately clear when this section addresses 
measures taken by the state to bring order to the Ustyurt Plateau. But first, what chaos 
was there to remedy? Why disentangle nomads from one another? 
These questions are neatly answered by a report produced by the Executive 
Committee of the Krasnovodsk Uezd, an administrative division encompassing many 
Turkmen in what was then the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.55 Sent 
in mid-July 1922, the document declared that since the beginning of that year Kazakhs 
from the bordering Adai Uezd had stolen 350 camels and 1,000 rams from Turkmen 
communities. Four Turkmen had been killed by Kazakhs. In response, six Kazakh 
women had been abducted and a number of cattle stolen. Though four of the women 
were subsequently returned, two remained kidnapped, and the Krasnovodsk 
Committee described how the Turkmen were preparing for a counter-attack.56 
New Soviet committees were already familiar with such behaviour. Since spring 
1921 local authorities had been encouraging Kazakhs to return livestock to Turkmen 
tribes in exactly the quantities that were stolen since before 1919. Murder, raids and 
attacks were all described and condemned.57 The Adai region was itself notorious. The 
Adai were originally a tribal confederation of the Kazakhs’ Younger Juz which rebelled 
against Tsarist authorities in 1870. Violent protests split the Kazakh elites in the area, 
some of whom sided with the Russian administration and were rewarded, whilst 
others continued to resist tax rises and the confiscation of pasturelands and were 
brutally repressed.58 Briefly part of the Turkestan Republic, the Adai Uezd joined the 
KSSR in October 1920. Though it remained an uezd, it was given the formal, more 
substantive powers of an oblast.59 It was also enlarged to encompass two nomadic 
volosts of the Krasnovodsk Uezd to the south. 
Alibi Dzhangil′din, an early Soviet visitor to the area and a significant figure in 
Kazakh politics, reported that the population of the Adai Uezd, whom he called 
adaevtsy, migrated perpetually throughout the year.60 This migration took them 
annually over the borders shared by the Kazakh Republic with Turkestan and the 
Khorezm People’s Soviet Republic (previously the Khanate of Khiva). Though he 
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considered them loyal to Soviet power, Dzhangil′din placed heavy emphasis on the 
primitive life of the adaevtsy, presenting them as helpless in the face of bad weather 
and a hostile natural environment.61 Adaevtsy were also used as examples of the most 
destitute of the republic’s population by foremost Party members.62 
It is itself notable that reports contain no references to Kirgiz or Kazakhs, 
preferring instead a derivation of the Adai title. 63 It shows that in January 1923, when 
Dzhangil′din’s report was written, an astute observer understood that the loyalties 
dividing the people of the Ustyurt Plateau were those of kinship, not nationhood. As 
well as weather and environmental conditions, the adaevtsy were also said to be at the 
mercy of raids from the Iomud. The Iomud were another tribal grouping, soon to be 
assimilated into the Turkmen nation.64 There is clear evidence that, when the Adai 
Uezd expanded southwards and claimed land formerly governed by Krasnovodsk, 
resident Iomuds showed little appreciation for this administrative reorganization. New 
Adai committees in the area had struggled to prevent fellow Adai from attacking the 
Iomud, but had also called upon the Krasnovodsk authorities to resist any temptation 
to interfere. It had become Kazakh land. Adai authorities instead recommended the 
creation of a governing assembly representing both peoples.65 
This explains the decision of the Krasnovodsk Uezd-City Executive Committee to 
convene a ‘Kirgiz-Iomud’ Conference in Krasnovodsk on 6th April 1921.66 It was one of 
the new Soviet state’s first major attempts at resolving inter-tribal conflict in nomadic 
regions, and it accepted the following agenda for the day: 
1) The establishment of borders between Turkmen and Kirgiz [Kazakh] 
migrations 
2) The liquidation of the Kirgiz-Iomud conflict67 
The conference felt unable to resolve the first matter. Kazakhs of the two volosts 
which had recently left the jurisdiction of Krasnovodsk and joined the Adai Uezd 
complained that their water sources and pasturage were over the border to the south, 
and so they had to enter Turkestan to survive. Attendees decided to allow the Kazakh 
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and Turkestan governments to solve this problem, and as a temporary solution they 
sought to dissuade Kazakhs from migrating too close to areas where conflict with 
Iomud was more likely. Around the Garabogazköl, in particular, Kazakh nomads were 
advised to migrate along a specific route.68 Turning to the second item on their agenda, 
conference members demanded an immediate cessation of all hostilities.  A second 
Kirgiz-Iomud Conference was scheduled for 1st July 1921, which would discuss 
conflicts in areas which had not dispatched a delegate to Krasnovodsk.69 
Hostilities, it is evident, did not cease for several years. The thought of convening 
a conference to conclude long-lived tribal antipathies is itself interesting. It perhaps 
speaks of the early self-confidence of Soviet administrators who believed that a talking-
shop could mitigate a fierce battle for the limited resources east of the Caspian. But the 
occurrence and subsequent failure of these staged events are easily connected to other, 
more specific trends in the relationship between Soviet state and Kazakh nomad. 
First, easy assumptions about the inherent disorder of nomadic society must be 
avoided, but abduction and raids were not new phenomena amongst these 
communities. Kazakh concepts such as barymta (cattle-rustling) and qun (blood feud) 
suggest that nomads saw such practices as more a part of everyday life, and less a crisis 
of lawlessness, than Soviet administrators were prepared to accept.70 This might be 
associated with what Edward Schatz calls ‘criminalising clans’; the Soviet intrusion into 
traditional forms of authority in Kazakh society.71 In other words, already in 1921 the 
Soviet state was motivated to sweep away some habits of nomadic life.72 
Second, the Krasnovodsk conference spoke of a Kirgiz-Iomud conflict, but also of 
a Kazakh-Turkmen border. A key source of the former, it was believed, was disrespect 
for the latter, as it was best to keep warring tribes apart. Immediately this necessitated 
the intervention of nation-wide authorities, and focus shot from the fundamentals of 
nomadic existence to the high politics of national jurisdiction. Like the conspicuous 
nomadic hole in the 1926 census data and the plight of nomads in the Bukey Governate, 
the nomadic idiosyncrasies of violence on the Ustyurt were again subsumed into a 
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nation-based understanding of Central Asia.73 Even a peace agreement signed on 8th 
August 1921 bore the names of representatives from the Kirgiz and the ‘Turkmen-
Iomud’ people, both quasi-national rather than tribal affiliations, in the fashion of a 
diplomatic accord.74 Similar efforts were made to establish peace between Turkmen 
and Uzbeks around Khiva.75 
Borders negotiated between nations created new problems for migrating 
nomads, whether Kirgiz or Turkmen-Iomud. In the 1920s the Mangïshlak was one of 
the few places where nomads continued to migrate perpetually throughout the year, 
and any new boundary separated people from resources which they had long used, but 
over which no formal ownership was agreed.76 The People’s Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs (Narkomvnutdel) had to try and supervise the expulsion of communities who 
found themselves on the wrong side of the divide.77 Further east along the border 
between Turkestan and the KSSR, it was reported in 1922 that nomads were 
continuing to travel south to trade, as they had done for generations. Typically Kazakhs 
would exchange their cattle for bread and other farming produce. On their return 
journeys, militia men at the border would find the nomads’ bread supplies and accuse 
them of speculation. The food would be requisitioned (sometimes for the border 
guards’ own consumption), and occasionally nomads were arrested.78 
The border negotiations between Turkmen and Kazakh territories bore more 
than a passing resemblance to those underway further north between Astrakhan and 
Urda. Like the Astrakhan Governate Committee, the Krasnovodsk Uezd-City Executive 
Committee was then part of a Soviet polity which did not engender one specific 
national identity. The Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was similar to 
the RSFSR in that it was conceived without a dominant titular nationality. Yet 
negotiators on both sides defended the rights of disparate nomadic tribes using the 
language of national territorial integrity. If this was done to protect those leading a 
nomadic lifestyle, the resolution of disagreements and the imposition of borders did 
not ease the difficulties experienced by nomads and may have exacerbated them. As in 
the Bukey Governate, nomads on the periphery of Kazakh territory were at the 
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epicenter of a power struggle over resources and control, but this would earn them no 
favours from Kazakh authorities with limited understanding of tribal conflicts and 
limited empathy for nomadic communities. Indeed, the national paradigm was even 
less suitable for understanding the processes at work in the Adai tribal lands than it 
was for understanding the colonization of land near Lake Baskunchak. The Russian 
identity around Astrakhan was at least clear, and in its juxtaposition the Kazakh 
identity was also thrown into relief. Around the Garabogazköl authorities were still 
dividing tribes up into Turkmen and Kazakh even as they were drawing a line between 
peoples who disagreed about much but were equally inconvenienced by territorial 
boundaries. 
 A second Kirgiz-Iomud conference took place in Krasnovodsk on 25th July 1922, 
but it was hardly constructive.79 Documentation from the event relates that Turkmen 
representatives complained about the small number of Kazakhs in attendance. They 
speculated that perhaps the Kazakhs simply had no desire to establish peaceful 
relations. There were no Kazakh delegates from any Adai institution present on the day, 
and it was declared that those Kazakhs who had made the journey were from families 
already migrating within Krasnovodsk territory. They were unable to negotiate alone 
without the authority of the Adai Uezd, the government of which had previously given 
its full support for the meeting of the conference. It was further declared that nothing 
more could be achieved that day without members of the Adai Uezd itself, and again 
that higher republic-wide authorities should involve themselves in the dispute.80 
Higher organs of power were indeed in contention over territory at this time, 
again reinforcing the perception that this was a matter of republic-wide and therefore 
national importance. The extension of the Adai Uezd southwards to include the 
Garabogazköl was strongly resisted by the Central Executive Committee of the 
Turkestan Republic. One committee member, an N. Iomudskii, claimed to have taken 
part in an expedition to the coastline and to have been well-informed on local 
circumstances there. He suggested that the prevalence of wells and pastures around 
the Garabogazköl would force Turkmen into Kazakh land and that this would 
exacerbate tensions. Though he supported the principle of a border, his stated aim was 
a border which reflected the social realities of the area.81 
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Iomudskii, as a member of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee, is likely 
to have espoused a particular conception of those social realities. Whereas reports 
originating from Krasnovodsk tend to present the Kazakhs as perpetrators of violence, 
Adai committees chose to emphasise the number of armed Iomuds on Kazakh land.82 
Already the vested interests of different national committees were pitting them against 
each other, meaning that border disputes were associated with national prestige and 
status rather than extremely local questions of agricultural practice. Regardless, 
Iomudskii did not get his way. Comprehensive documentation from the Central Asian 
Bureau in 1924 describes in detail the formalized national borders of Soviet Central 
Asia, including the new Turkmen Republic which emerged out of western Turkestan. 
Certainly, the Bureau and others recognized the extreme ethnic heterogeneity of the 
border-lands between the Kazakh Republic and its neighbours, remarking for example 
that many Kazakhs in or around the new Uzbek SSR were arable farmers, making them 
very difficult to distinguish from Uzbeks.83 The Krasnovodsk area is noted for the 
predominance of only two major livelihoods: sedentary fishing and nomadic animal 
husbandry.84 But no extension of Turkmen jurisdiction into the Adai Uezd is recorded 
at this time.85 
It is difficult to say whether a better placed border, or a border less stringently 
observed, could have encouraged greater prosperity in the area, but the economy of the 
Adai Uezd remained one of the weakest in the Kazakh Republic for the rest of the 
decade. By the 10th April 1929 it had been made into an okrug, and KTsIK and the 
Kazakh Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom KASSR) presented VTsIK with a 
joint declaration ‘on the liquidation of the Adai Okrug of Kazakhstan’.86 In the two years 
since the process of raionirovanie turned the Adai Uezd into an okrug, the region had 
consistently underperformed economically. With only 177,000 registered residents, 
despite its considerable size, the Adai Okrug contained a disproportionately small 
portion of the republic’s population. Sixty-seven percent of its budget came from 
subsidies, and its entire budget (1,021,000 rubles for 1928-1929) was the equivalent of 
only 1.4 percent of the republic’s overall budget.  The principal economic activity of the 
okrug was still nomadic animal husbandry. Only 2 percent of the population was 
described as sedentary; 23 percent were semi-nomadic; 28 percent were nomadic with 
a migratory radius of up to 300 versts and 47 percent were nomadic with a migratory 
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radius of 1,000 versts or more. These nomadic communities remained impoverished, 
underdeveloped and highly unstable. The trope of the wandering nomad at the mercy 
of the elements was as clear in this declaration as it was in Dzhangil′din’s 1923 
report.87  KTsIK and Sovnarkom KASSR further admitted in 1929 that half of the region 
was always outside of the state’s control, wherever its administrative centre was 
located, because of the infrastructural inadequacies of the okrug.88 
In the first half of the 1920s the Communist Party sought to resolve two border 
disputes in the western half of the Kazakh Republic. Both disputes had their origins in 
Tsarist-era history, but Bolshevik agents in Central Asia understood them in a wholly 
novel way. The principles of national territorial autonomy, coupled with an assumption 
that the peoples of the former Tsarist Empire could be divided into discrete national 
groups, replaced administrative expediency and topographical convenience as the 
authorities’ lodestar. This proved a hostage to fortune when Kazakh nomadic practice 
began complicating the boundaries of jurisdiction. North of the Caspian, Russian 
farmers colonized temporarily empty migratory zones arguing that they were vacant 
and could be put to better use. Around the Garabogazköl, the difficult business of 
distinguishing Kazakh land from Turkmen land was made more arduous by the 
tendency of the population to share or fight over precious resources. Rather than 
pursue localized efforts to resolve differences in agricultural culture and habit, the 
Party’s commitment to its national policy dragged these disputes into the heady 
heights of national, republic-level politics. Using a peace treaty between nations to halt 
kidnapping between tribes seems a kind of category error but, as evidenced by the 
ruinous effect of its Kazakh-Turkmen border and its complicity in the extension of 
arable farming, the Party never prioritized nomadism. Its ambition was here to 
delineate the internal boundaries of its new polity, and in this context nomadism was 
an inconvenience to be sidestepped rather than accommodated. As the decade 
progressed this story became more nuanced.  
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Before 1917, Cossacks had been placed at the vanguard of the Tsar’s colonizing 
forces in Siberia and on the Kazakh Steppe.89 Many of the first arable farmers to settle 
on the Russian Empire’s southern frontier were Cossacks, who withstood initial 
hostilities with Turkic nomads and stabilized their hold over new land in preparation 
for the arrival of Russian peasants.90 This being achieved, the imperial Steppe 
Governor-Generalship absorbed 640,000 new settlers between 1896 and 1909.91 Over 
a longer period, 1867-1916, the borderlands between Siberia and Akmolinsk witnessed 
a population increase of 100 percent.92 Between 1911 and 1913 alone the population 
of formerly Kazakh lands rose by over half a million.93 George J. Demko reveals that a 
large majority of newcomers penetrated the steppe from Siberia’s southern fringe, 
raising tensions in newly contested areas.94 
War in Europe did not allay colonization. As demonstrated by Peter Gatrell, the 
invasion of the Russian Empire’s western periphery by the Central Powers prompted a 
mass exodus of refugees, many of whom fled deep into Siberia or as far south as 
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Turkestan.95 Nor did this process come to an end after the Russian Revolution. On the 
contrary, its pace quickened. In 1917 branches of the Union of Siberian Farmers had 
emerged in towns across north-eastern Kazakh territory.96 During the Civil War the 
overall population of the Kazakh Steppe declined by around 13.2 percent, but the 
proportion of non-Kazakhs increased, reaching 53.4 percent by 1920.97 Arriving 
Europeans claimed ever greater quantities of land, creating shortages of pasturage 
near new settlements and the kind of inter-ethnic resentment already described in the 
Bukey Governate.98 Given the history of colonization up to this point, animosity 
between Cossacks and Kazakhs was especially acute.99 Fighting between Ural Cossacks 
and Kazakhs forced 300,000 Kazakhs to flee the westernmost areas of their republic in 
1920.100 
For the Soviet administrators of the mid-1920s, this was not mere history. Up to 
nine years after the fall of the Tsar, in a resolution on local agricultural development, 
the Semipalatinsk Governate Committee described a region cursed with inter-ethnic 
tensions and profound inequalities, and a nomadic economy in a ‘state of decline,’ 
blaming all this on the colonizing policies of the Tsar and the unregulated influx of new 
migrants since the revolution.101 Semipalatinsk shared a long northern border with 
Siberia, and the population of the governate was not only living with the legacies of 
colonization, but still experiencing it. In the view of the committee a powerful clique of 
Cossack and Russian land-owners were continuing to surface and exploit the 
dispossessed poor. Competition for free land was forcing migrating Kazakh 
communities into rivalry, with weaker groups being ejected.102 It was the explicit view 
of the committee that the Tsarist Government had stolen land from working Kazakhs 
and handed it to Siberian Cossack soldiers, and that land seizure had continued after 
February 1917.103 Here again nationality and nomadism were at work together. North-
eastern authorities in the KASSR pitted Russians and Cossacks against Kazakhs, and 
blamed Russians and Cossacks for the increasing instability of the nomadic economy. 
Nomadism intensified national tensions, and the extension of the rights of Kazakhs, as a 
national group, was perceived as a solution to nomadic problems. 
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The Semipalatinsk Committee proposed therefore that northern steppe lands 
owned by Ural and Siberian Cossacks should be returned to Kazakhs, regardless of 
those Kazakhs’ agricultural habits. 104  There were precedents for this decision, 
including a similar decree made in April 1921 and a declaration made in 1922 by the 
Akmolinsk Governate, which also bordered Siberia, that land wrongfully taken from the 
native Kazakh populace should be returned.105 But it would be no easier extricating 
European settlers than it was Turkmen nomads around the Garabogazköl. The 
agricultural economies of northern Kazakhstan and southern Siberia were so 
interconnected that at one point the Kazakh Soviet of Labour and Defence had even 
considered the formal unification of the Siberian and Kazakh People’s Commissariats 
for Food Supplies, though the proposal had been deemed unacceptable. 106 
Unsurprisingly given earlier events further west, anger in Semipalatinsk over the 
power of Cossacks and Russians also expressed itself in a border dispute. This is a 
dispute which can only be fully understood in the context of the anxieties just 
described, about the legacy of historical colonialism, the impact of colonialism as a 
current force, and the state of the nomadic economy. 
In 1924, the Semipalatinsk Governate Committee sought to push its own 
jurisdiction northwards, into the Siberian Krai. The Kaukul′skaia Volost was a small 
administrative division of the Kupino district, then part of the Omsk Governate in the 
Siberian Krai and, ultimately, the RSFSR. Kupino itself was a town close to the Siberian-
Kazakh border, north-east of Pavlodar. Authorities in Semipalatinsk identified the 
Kaukul′skaia Volost as populated primarily by Kazakhs, and brought this to the 
attention of KTsIK. It was argued that the whole volost should be made part of the 
Semipalatinsk Governate. This request was first submitted at least as early as 19th 
March 1924, and then again on 4th September 1925. The demand was justified on the 
basis of familiar ‘national cultural’ factors, essentially, that Kazakhs should govern 
Kazakhs.107 
As along the border of the Bukey and Astrakhan Governates, territorial disputes 
between Kazakh and Siberian authorities were understood in national terms and 
would be decided by republic-level institutions. But once again, a factor of key 
importance to the proper management of these divided areas was agricultural practice, 
                                                          
104 Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe,' PhD thesis, pp. 45-46. APRK 139/1/337: 17. 
105 APRK 139/1/337: 17-19 ob.. 
106 This took place in March 1922: GARF 130/5/504: 60. It should be added that one of the 
principal justifications for this proposal was also the development of transport infrastructure, 
particularly the Turkestan-Siberian Railway or Turksib. 
107 GARF 1235/122/287. 
119 
 
Chapter Five: The Borders of a Nomadic Republic 
 
or lifestyle. When the KTsIK first sided with Semipalatinsk in November 1925, and 
made a provisional declaration which assimilated the Kaukul′skaia Volost into its 
neighbouring Kazakh governate, it also stipulated that strip-farming in the volost be 
immediately and entirely prohibited. Apart from the actual redrawing of borders, this 
is the only provision the KTsIK recommended before presenting the decision to its 
presidium.108 It should be asked what would have been of greater consequence to the 
everyday lives of the Kaukul′skii Kazakhs: that they be made members of their titular 
republic, or that agricultural practice be regulated to favour people with less of a 
background in arable farming? Given the disregard eventually shown to the Bukey 
nomads by their Kazakh authorities, the answer was most likely the latter. The 
stipulation from KTsIK might be read as a rare occasion in which the well-being of 
nomads was weighted equally alongside the principle of national territorial autonomy. 
Actually, the relative importance of nomadism was also increasing in the judgements of 
other actors involved in the dispute. 
In spite of KTsIK’s clear response to the question, disagreements over the 
Kaukul′skaia Volost were only beginning. Siberian authorities were just as emphatic in 
their defence of the border as Kazakh authorities were in arguing for a redrawing of 
the map. In late February 1928 the Presidium VTsIK looked at the matter, though no 
conclusion was reached until May of the same year.109 Then, VTsIK noted the 
demographic features of the area, which after a period of raionirovanie had been placed 
inside the larger Siberian Barabinsk Okrug.110 Outside of Kupino, the contentious volost 
encompassed 17 auls, which together contained 2,008 individuals. Only 59 of these 
people were Russian, the rest Kazakh. Yet opinion within the volost was apparently 
divided. The mainly-Russian population of Kupino itself was set against any transfer. 
Furthermore, if the town was moved then the continuation of strip-farming would be 
unavoidable, as the Russians there would not countenance a ban any more than the 
new farmers of Astrakhan had done. It was for these reasons that VTsIK resolved to 
leave the Siberian-Kazakh boundary where it was, in addition to one more pivotal 
factor which clearly demonstrates the changing intersection between border-making 
and nomadism in this case. The report from VTsIK summarized its position with these 
words: 
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In conclusion, the economic life of the Kazakh population in these 
village councils in no way differs from the life of the surrounding Russian 
population: they pursue farming, and partake in a sedentary way of life, 
know the Russian language and have the most peaceful and benevolent 
relations with the Russian population. The economic gravitation of the 
aforementioned population points towards the regional centre of Kupino, 
and the close proximity to the railroad is certain.111 
There is a telling distinction here between the reasoning of central officials in 
Moscow in 1928 and the claims and recommendations made by authorities much 
earlier in the decade. In the Bukey Governate and Adai Uezd, the sheer number of 
Kazakhs in particular areas was justification enough for the state to transfer them into 
the embrace of their own republic where they would ostensibly be safeguarded against 
the lingering effects of imperialism. Regarding the Kaukul′skaia Volost in 1928, VTsIK 
acknowledged the predominance of Kazakhs there but went on to demonstrate the 
state’s increasing sensitivity to the nomadic-sedentary divide, a sensitivity which was 
leading to the very first Soviet attempts at forced sedentarisation in that same year. 
Nationality and lifestyle are both present in the considerations of VTsIK, but by this 
point lifestyle took priority. What does it matter if the rural population is 
predominantly Kazakh when they farm like Russians? Nationality was becoming less 
important than nomadism in border-making, and it is possible that the Kaukul′skaia 
Volost would have more likely joined the KSSR if its Kazakhs were predominantly 
nomadic. 
KTsIK itself had implicitly moved in this direction as well. It had emphasized the 
sheer number of Kazakhs in the Kaukul′skaia Volost, and was siding with a committee 
which made declarations about the crippling legacy of Tsarism and the requisitioning 
of land from Russians and Cossacks. Yet the immediate ban on strip-farming it had 
planned may have been a sign of acceptance that membership of the Kazakh Republic 
alone was not sufficient to protect a Kazakh from colonization. The Semipalatinsk 
Committee knew this well enough. By way of reassurance, when rejecting 
Semipalatinsk’s demand for Siberian land, VTsIK suggested that Siberian authorities 
pay closer regard to the interests of rural Kazakhs.112 In 1928, as confirmed by case 
studies in other chapters of this thesis, the state was learning the significance and 
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resilience of nomadism as an administrative problem, and discounting matters of 
nationality as a result. 
The important similarities between the Russians and Kazakhs of the Kaukul′skaia 
Volost were not beyond dispute. Back in 1924 when the disagreement began, a local 
citizen had petitioned in favour of Semipalatinsk. Nashmetdin Aityganovskii was a 
resident of the volost and claimed that of the four councils then governed by Kupino, all 
but one were dominated by cattle-herding Kazakhs, not arable farmers.113 Perhaps 
VTsIK suddenly realized that Aityganovskii’s claim still held true later in 1928, when it 
altered its position. Having declared the previous May that nothing would change, on 
12th November 1928 it moved large sections of the Kupino District into the Pavlodar 
Okrug, the new Kazakh authority which then bordered much of Siberia.114 Siberian 
officials protested ineffectually. Another likely catalyst for the extension of Kazakh 
borders may have been the trialing of a state farm (sovkhoz) in the Kaukul′skaia Volost. 
The farm was a sizeable sheep-rearing enterprise, and from its provisional basis it 
quickly grew in size without formal direction from supervisory bodies to do so. It was 
the land falling under the control of this state operation, spanning across various 
communities, which was divided between Siberian and Kazakh jurisdictions. One third 
of the farm remained in place, two thirds came under the management of Pavlodar. 
Siberian resentment about the decision continued, but in 1935 the Kazakh Republic 
assimilated the final third of the land involved.115 Though the original ruling on the 
Kaukul′skaia Volost was therefore reversed, this was justified on the same agricultural 
and economic bases which had originally superseded national ones. 
The Siberian case shows once again that national and agricultural identities 
competed for the attention of the Communist Party along the borders of the Kazakh 
Republic. As the Soviet administration lost its earlier enthusiasm for national 
autonomy, agricultural and economic concerns achieved primary import, but it 
remained the case that borders generally inconvenienced those who migrated nearby, 
as events along the Sino-Soviet border make clear. 
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Into China 
 
From its earliest manifestation, the Soviet Kazakh Republic only ever shared a 
land border with one non-Soviet polity, that of China. In spite of the nationalistic 
rhetoric, the confusion and miscommunication, territorial disputes between Soviet 
authorities would never have quite the same dynamic as those between the USSR and 
China. Unlike the previous three case studies, Moscow could not act as a final 
adjudicator that far east. Unlike the nomads entering Siberian or Turkmen jurisdiction, 
Kazakhs evaded Soviet power when they entered China. As will be seen, the governors 
of far-eastern Kazakh lands had to work hard not simply to manage nomads, but to 
avoid driving them away. 
The province of China which bordered the KSSR was Xinjiang, sometimes 
referred to as Chinese Turkestan, a majority Turkic Muslim region with established 
cultural connections with the nomads of Russian steppe lands.116 In spite of Chinese 
assimilationist policies of the late nineteenth century, Xinjiang had always shared its 
migratory populations with the Russian Empire and contained many Kazakhs.117 The 
political border between empires may not have signified much more to Kazakh nomads 
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than that it was a different type of uniformed soldier using intimidation to extract 
tribute or control the direction of seasonal migrations. Kazakhs had a long history of 
entering Xinjiang whenever the atmosphere on the steppe became threatening, and 
returning when rumours suggested that the situation had improved. The last exodus 
from imperial lands had occurred as late as 1916, with the subsequent influx beginning 
two years later.118 This was of course a process with nomadic specificities; sedentary 
communities are also able to flee across borders, but not habitually, and not with the 
rapidity and relative lack of disruption afforded to nomads. 
It should be noted that China was at least as fragmented and unstable as Soviet 
Central Asia in the early 1920s, and was little more empowered to control its people or 
borders than KTsIK or Sovnarkom KSSR. From 1912 to 1928 the Xinjiang province, a 
vast swathe of western China, was under the military rule of Yang Zengxin.119 The Yang 
administration treated non-Han peoples such as the Kazakhs with imperialistic disdain 
and maintained power by encouraging nomadic groups to fight each other, tactically 
arming some and neglecting others.120 
With martial rule and internecine struggle on both sides of the Sino-Russian 
border, during the Russian Civil War border markers between the two former empires 
were changed or destroyed at will. At one point Chinese border outposts deliberately 
receded, to draw migrating Kazakh nomads closer to the boundary and then demand 
tribute from them.  In 1920 local authorities in Xinjiang bought approximately 60 
square kilometres of land near Lake Zaysan from a Soviet uezd commissar, who 
subsequently followed the tract into China and escaped.121 
After the Civil War and throughout the 1920s, despite Chinese demands, the 
boundary between Chinese and Soviet territories was never officially altered. Yet any 
alteration would have been largely a formality, since the boundary was repeatedly 
ignored or changed without consent. As will be shown, new Soviet authorities were in 
no position to terminate the well-established tradition of cross-border Kazakh 
migration. China, furthermore, was not the only space in which emigrating Kazakhs 
sought refuge.  During the years of famine in the early 1930s, it is estimated that 
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200,000 Kazakhs fled to Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey, as well as China, and 
never returned.122 Given the official stasis but everyday flexibility of the Sino-Soviet 
boundary at this time, then, border-making here is a less instructive term than border 
control. 
The first major nomadic migration into China after the Civil War took place in 
1921. Perhaps betraying their ignorance about the typical state of affairs on the steppe, 
central authorities in Moscow were immediately alarmed at the scale and breadth of 
the wave. Sovnarkom RSFSR’s Soviet of Labour and Defence (Sovet Truda i Oborony) 
discovered that Kazakhs from both the Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk Governates had 
left Soviet land, heading into China and Mongolia. If they had considered this a natural 
product of transhumance, there would probably have been less cause for concern. 
Instead, they blamed mistakes made by Siberian bureaucrats in the management of 
food supplies.123 This first assumption hints at common trends in the thinking of 
Communist Party leaders: as nomadism was the lifestyle of the desperate, it would only 
be pursued under duress. When the Soviet of Labour and Defence looked for duress, 
they found it in the actions of non-Kazakh officials. 
The Turkestan Republic’s own Sovnarkom was also in no doubt as to why China 
had gained so many more Kazakhs. The Zhetysu region, which was then part of 
Turkestan but would join the KASSR in 1925, had also seen huge demographic decline 
as its population headed east, and the Turkestan Sovnarkom blamed the severe and 
destructive policies of the Tsar.124  On 14th June 1923 it sent a letter to VTsIK which 
criticized the former imperial government in strident terms and alleged that up to 
100,000 Kazakhs had emigrated before the October revolution. The communiqué was 
intended to acquire sympathy and subsidy for these migrants. As the thousands of 
Kazakhs had entered Xinjiang, it went on, they were met by several regiments of 
Chinese soldiers, who unleashed an ‘avalanche of fire’. Up to 1,000 Kazakhs were killed. 
Notably, the letter insists that this experience was not so horrific as the treatment 
these communities had suffered under the Tsar in 1916, and so they carried on east.125 
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By 1923, so it was claimed, around 15,000 members of these very same 
communities had arrived back in the Zhetysu area, and a further 15,000 were on their 
return journeys. Certainly a census of the rural population in the Zhetysu Oblast in 
1920 recorded a slight increase in numbers, made up of returnees from China.126 
Chinese authorities had again placed a myriad of obstacles in the path of those 
migrating. What called them home? The Turkestan Sovnarkom listed the October 
revolution, the land reforms of 1921 and 1922, the reversal of colonial trends and the 
involvement of the Kazakh masses in socialist construction as reasons for the retreat, 
which is somewhat credible given the diametric distinction between these policies and 
those associated with the Tsar, though hardship in Xinjiang and the usual patterns of 
migratory practice are also tenable explanations. In any case, these 30,000 new Soviet 
citizens were appearing without shoes, without outer clothing or any of the resources 
necessary for survival. The Sovnarkom therefore requested six million rubles to 
provide for fodder and materials so that these Kazakhs could feed their livestock and 
build new homes, and asked that the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs 
(Narkominodel) ensure the unimpeded progress of Kazakh returnees into Soviet 
territory.127 
The content of the Turkestan Sovnarkom’s request is remarkable for a number of 
reasons, but most important is the sense of inevitability with which it describes the 
arrival of around 30,000 Kazakhs into Soviet territory. Clearly it was understood that 
these new citizens would present a huge logistical challenge and would demand a 
substantial amount of extra resources. Closing the border entirely would likely have 
alienated Soviet power from much of its internal Kazakh populace, but the option of 
controlling, directing or slowing the infux is never mentioned. Probably no such option 
existed, as the state infrastructure along the periphery of Soviet Central Asia was 
deficient in this as in so many other respects during the decade.  There is also a sense of 
opportunism in the proposals. If 30,000 were coming, they would at least increase a 
population in the Zhetysu Oblast which had declined dramatically from 1916 to 
1920.128 The Turkestan Sovnarkom also saw that the wretched state of returning 
Kazakhs was a chance to provide them with the materials they needed to build 
permanent residences and settle them for good, making another emigration less likely. 
The strategy of helping nomads to settle when they were at their most vulnerable 
would be used repeatedly on Kazakh nomads, with varying levels of success. 
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In accordance with the wishes of the Turkestan authorities, Georgy Chicherin, 
head of Narkominodel, bid his commissariat facilitate the reintegration of the 
30,000.129 The Presidium VTsIK also commissioned the People’s Commissariat for 
Nationalities (Narkomnats RSFSR) and Narkomzem RSFSR to produce a plan for aid 
and economic support for these Kazakhs.130 The subsequent plan included the 
establishment of control points, at which incomers received medical inspection and 
veterinary care for their livestock; the transference of Kazakhs to particular locations; 
the provision of food, clothing and rubles at the state’s expense, and the distribution of 
loans, seeds and timber for the construction of new arable farms or mixed arable-
livestock farms.131 The final stipulations of the plan are clear evidence that state organs 
in Moscow were complicit in the Turkestan Sovnarkom’s plan to settle returning 
Kazakhs as soon as possible after they crossed the border. 
The formal intentions of the Soviet state contrast favourably with the actions of 
Chinese armed forces. But the extent to which Soviet aims were realized is difficult to 
ascertain. If local bodies could barely identify and maintain a Sino-Soviet border, let 
alone police it, it is unlikely that they would have been able to establish a 
comprehensive relief effort for incoming refugees, replete with a transport network, 
seeds, timber, food and medical aid.132 Though ambitious, this would not be the last 
time the state offered aid to emigrants. On 10th May 1926 VTsIK pledged similar help to 
225 families Kazakh families who had arrived in Kirgiziia, the name used at the time for 
Kyrgyz territory.133 In either case, the willingness of the eastern Kazakh population 
again to emigrate in the latter half of the decade suggests that returnees were not tied 
to the land in the way Tashkent and Moscow preferred. 
At a closed meeting of the Kazakh Communist Party’s Krai Committee on 8th 
August 1928, members considered a report from the Joint State Political Directorate 
(OGPU) about the ‘significant number’ of Kazakh households emigrating to China. 
Committee members were deaf to the echoes of 1916. The meeting concluded that 
these Kazakhs, which it described as generally of average prosperity, were evacuating 
the steppe due to widespread misunderstanding about plans for the impending 
confiscation campaign. As in the negotiations over Siberian land, 1928 was a crucial 
year for the state’s relationship with nomads and nomadism. The committee’s raft of 
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solutions included a recommendation that Krai-level and local newspapers make fresh 
efforts to explain what confiscation would entail, and to emphasize plans for the return 
of all illegally confiscated cattle.134 
Later that year, in October 1928, violence along the republic’s eastern border 
was related to the Presidium VTsIK in a secret telegram.135 Some kind of functional 
border-guard was by then in place, and meaningful attempts at stopping emigration 
were resulting in armed conflict. The fatalism of the Turkestan Sovnarkom had gone. 
But control was hardly in the hands of the state. The border-crossing, described in 
Russian as either perekhod or the more specifically nomadic perekochevka, continued 
in spite of the violence. Sometimes Kazakhs native to Xinjiang joined the fighting to 
help Soviet Kazakhs escape. On 16th August 1928 150 Chinese Kazakhs attacked the 
border militia with rifles and forced Soviet soldiers to retreat. The OGPU had 
reinforced the regiments on the border, and VTsIK dispatched a diplomatic mission to 
Xinjiang to find out more about the lives of Soviet Kazakhs beyond the border.136 
Flight to China remained a key means of resistance for Kazakhs during the 
collectivisation and sedentarisation campaigns which really got underway in the early 
1930s.137 Kazakhs at war with state organs within the USSR even sought to develop and 
maintain links with those who had already emigrated, as part of a wider struggle 
against Soviet power.138 This is another example of how the battle to draw and police 
borders in eastern Kazakhstan exacerbated political tension in the region, as a long-
standing nomadic tendency was criminalized. But the porous Sino-Soviet border also 
informed prevailing economic understandings of Kazakh nomads, as they returned 
from China destitute and requiring subsidy. As in the poverty-stricken Adai Uezd, the 
decreasing pasture lands beyond the Ural River and the Cossack-dominated 
Semipalatinsk Okrug, the nomads appearing on the Soviet side of the border in Zhetysu 
looked economically useless and burdensome. 
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Conclusion 
Each of the four case studies described above reveal an early-Soviet state ill-
equipped to overcome some of the emerging inconsistencies between orderly bordered 
Central Asian nations and the non-national tribal affiliations which roamed the steppe. 
By the beginning of the 1930s eastern Kazakh authorities had to contend with a kind of 
international Kazakh armed resistance that refused to recognise the Sino-Soviet border 
which cut it in half. A decade earlier, Iomud and Adai people were having peace 
agreements signed on their behalf as if they were warring nations, but both peoples 
still found themselves cut off from the vital resources which they unhappily shared. 
Post-imperial Kazakh anger had been formally recognised and legitimised by the 
creation of the KSSR, and the organs of the KSSR set about targeting the famers of 
Astrakhan and the land-owners of Siberia, but as the decade wore on central organs 
came to recognise that viable borders reflected not just national discrepancies, but 
ones associated with agricultural practice. 
The creation of the national republics was based on a political judgement: that 
each nation of the former Tsarist Empire should have its own (limited) territorial 
autonomy or localised representation.139 But, as most recently argued by Asal 
Khamraeva-Aubert, within these national territories political considerations gave way 
to economic ones.140 It seems that the few educated, literate, urban Kazakhs working in 
Kzyl-Orda and elsewhere could no more empathise with nomads than the Turkmen of 
Krasnovodsk, or the Russians of Astrakhan and Kupino.141 When okrugs, governates 
and uezds were built around nomadism, they were either mismanaged or, at the very 
least, ignored and allowed to stagnate. Like the nomads who arrived without food or 
outer clothing from China in the very earliest years of the decade, the populations of 
nomadic administrative regions like the Adai Uezd became the impoverished 
justification for their own sedentarisation. 
Borders were a prescription for a misdiagnosed illness. Where the battle for land 
and resources was between tribes, the Communist Party treated tribes like nations and 
accordingly sought to choreograph negotiations between central authorities which did 
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not exist. Where the battle for land and resources was between agricultural practices, 
the Communist Party saw that these practices coincided with national identities and 
assumed that national autonomy for each would solve the problem, assuming wrongly 
that sedentary Kazakh officials would better care for nomadic Kazakhs than Russians 
would. As the Soviet administration lost interest in national autonomy and turned its 
attention to economic development, it became more sensitive to agricultural practice 
and this informed the resolution of border disputes, but as will be seen elsewhere in 
the thesis, the state’s increasing sensitivity for nomadism made it no more benevolent 
a force.  
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The tax collectors of early Soviet Kazakhstan endured difficulties which were 
remarkable for their universality. When a concerned citizen of Akmola wrote to the 
Soviet of People’s Commissars in Moscow, expounding the effects of ruinous taxation 
on a figurative, enterprising baker, it is hard not to see a reference to Adam Smith’s 
famous declaration on the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, and said baker.1 In 
1923, at the Third All-Kazakh Oblast’ Conference, Comrade Kharchenko described the 
frustrations of a redistributionist at work in rural areas: ‘…if we take a cow from the bai 
and we give it to the pauper [bedniak], who was tending the cow for temporary use, 
then the pauper will eat the cow and again we must take a new cow from the bai.’2 The 
insatiate greed of the poor, and the self-perpetuating logic of a tax policy designed to 
satisfy it, are also enduring themes. 
Kharchenko was making reference to the nomadic practice of saun, whereby 
affluent Kazakhs lent livestock to their less fortunate peers for an agreed period, on the 
understanding that the poor would tend the animal and the two Kazakhs’ families 
would share any resulting foodstuffs.3 Some in the Communist Party viewed saun as 
exploitative, and sought to intervene by formally transferring ownership of the cattle to 
the poor, though not all nomads accepted their analysis.4 Note that wealth in this 
context is wholly represented by the size of a nomad’s herd.5 Taxing communities 
which shared or exchanged herding duties was not simple, and interference was placed 
in contradiction to the Kazakhs’ own tribal laws.6 At the time that Kharchenko spoke in 
March 1923, there was further argument within the Kazakh Communist Party over 
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how nomadic livestock should be viewed; as a means of production, or simply as a 
product for consumption.7 Typical administrative problems associated with taxation 
were deriving new expression from the particularities of Kazakh life. 
This chapter will discuss the development, implementation and effect of Soviet 
tax policy as it related to Kazakh nomads in the first decade of Soviet power. Here tax is 
defined broadly to include efforts at wealth redistribution, wealth procurement and 
confiscation, and wealth includes currency but more importantly domestic goods and 
livestock. As indicated, legislators in the Kazakh Republic confronted problems which 
would be typical anywhere across the Soviet space, but nomadism was an extra 
complication. The chapter will first address taxation immediately after the Civil War, 
when War Communism gave way to the New Economic Policy and post-imperial 
reparations were a foremost part of the state’s agenda. Second, a major disagreement 
over the correct application of tax exemptions in 1924 will be considered in detail. 
Third, the onset of the first Five Year Plan and the increasingly onerous taxation of the 
bais will be discussed as a prelude to the commencement of collectivisation in 1928-
1929. 
The chapter will draw various events together into decade-long trends, whilst 
also describing some contradictions and anomalies. Chronologically, the decade began 
with a period in which some attempt was made to tax nomads, as a social category of 
their own, differently from sedentary groups. This was both attacked and defended not 
on the basis of their nomadic identity, however, but their Kazakh identity, and this 
undermined the implementation of the system. In any case throughout this period the 
Party had hoped to ultimately induce settlement among Kazakhs, and as confidence in 
the state apparatus grew in 1924 attempts were made to go beyond simple exemptions 
for nomads and instead offer incentives for the correct behaviour.  The Agricultural Tax 
of 1924 would include specific rates for nomads moving to a sedentary way of life, for 
example. This was in keeping with the Party’s faith in taxation as a means of social 
transformation, but was ineffective and threw some major disagreements between 
state organs into relief. Eventually, amid the procurement crisis and with Party 
members losing interest in incentives and nuanced rate variation, the ongoing 
penalisation of the bais was intensified and broadened out to ever larger numbers of 
Kazakhs, heralding the beginning of the collectivisation drive in 1928. 
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Broadly, it will be argued that the development of tax policy was motivated by 
changing economic and social circumstances as time passed but that a specific, 
concerted focus on nomads as a category by which tax payers could be defined was 
often complicated by alternative social typologies; first nation, then class. This is part of 
a pattern across the decade, wherein the Soviet authorities were so often without a 
system of social categorization apposite for governing nomads. It was to the detriment 
of Bolshevik and nomad alike, and may have contributed to the fact that War 
Communism, as a means of extracting resources from nomadic society, had effectively 
returned to the republic by 1930. The profound inadequacy of the state’s tax-collecting 
apparatus would also have played a role in this process, as did events in Moscow, 
though the centre-periphery paradigm appears less helpful here than the other factors 
cited. 
Section One: Tax-in-Kind, 1920-1922 
For the Kazakh Republic, the first major reform to Soviet tax practices came on 
21st March 1921, when the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) made a 
declaration ‘on the replacement of the requisitioning of food and raw materials with a 
tax-in-kind.’8 As the title suggests, the tax-in-kind (alternatively described as a ‘produce 
tax’) was formally disassociated from the haphazard requisitioning of domestic goods 
which was practised during the Civil War, after an earlier version of the tax had been 
rejected in January 1919.9 The legislation applied across the Soviet polity, but could be 
and was adapted by regional administrations such as that now established in Orenburg 
to govern the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR). The economic conditions of the 
KSSR, newly subject to the tax-in-kind, could barely have been less auspicious. 
When the revolution had come in 1917, Kazakh communities were still suffering 
from their punitive treatment by imperial authorities after the uprisings of the 
previous year, provoked by ongoing economic discrimination and the Tsar’s notorious 
attempt to conscript his Islamic subjects for the battle in Europe.10 The further violence, 
confiscation and disorder of the Civil War crippled the agricultural productivity of both 
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settled and nomadic communities, and families from both began emigrating or 
succumbing to starvation.11 Estimates for the scale of population decline in each 
governate (guberniia) of Kazakhstan during the Civil War are as follows: Ural’sk 21.5%, 
Semipalatinsk 20.1%, Turgai 17.6%, Akmolinsk 14.7%, Orenburg 8.5%, Bukey 8.3%, 
Aktiubinsk 7.7%. The Kustanai Governate saw a modest increase of 0.6%. 12 Post-war 
hardships were compounded by lamentable weather (dzhut), which reduced the yield 
of the 1920 harvest and perpetuated famine.13 Approximately 414,000 Kazakhs died of 
malnutrition and, by 1923, there were 19.4% fewer families republic-wide than there 
had been in 1920.14 The remaining peoples of the former Tsarist Empire had fared little 
better, and food shortages were legion from European Russia down to Turkestan.15 
Part of the Bolsheviks’ response to this crisis was the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), formally introduced in March 1921 and encompassing the tax-in-kind.16 Political 
pressure both from within the Party and outside it had been contending for such an 
approach which was intended to stabilize prices and hasten economic recovery.17 To a 
large extent, the NEP meant an overall reduction of state intervention in the rural 
economy, and the reconfiguration of what intervention continued.18 Kazakhstan 
exemplified this trend. So in the early years of NEP, the influence of state policy on 
migrations amongst the Kazakhs was brought to a minimum.19 By 1923, livestock 
numbers had seen modest increases, and the number of families without the means to 
feed themselves receded.20 Given the simultaneous decrease in the population of the 
republic, and the view that the NEP contributed to the creation of a ‘budgetary shortfall’ 
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there, it is not easy to judge whether the policy was a success or failure, but it was 
certainly of significance.21 As well as prompting a period of diminished economic 
regulation and the discouragement of arbitrary requisition, the NEP allowed political 
concerns about class stratification in the countryside to intensify. 22 The question of 
class will be raised again later. The following section will discuss the economic 
implications of the tax agenda for Kazakh nomads, framed within the early NEP years, 
and introduce another important political dimension: nationhood. 
Nomadism in early Soviet tax policy 
The tax-in-kind was first adapted for the peculiarities of the Kazakh Republic on 
11th May 1921, less than two months after the initial declaration from VTsIK. The 
Soviet of People’s Commissars in Orenburg (Sovnarkom KSSR) produced a kind of 
explanatory decree, outlining new levels of taxation on dairy products for the 
republic.23 First, the western territories of the KSSR were made subject to a relatively 
lower rate of taxation on dairy, including the Ural Governate, Orenburg-Turgai 
Governate (including the former Kustanaiskii Uezd), the Bukey Governate and the 
Mangïshlak Uezd.24 Western Kazakh governates collectively owed 17.4 million pood of 
grain in tax at this time, and were considered some of the most imperilled by famine.25 
Any household with one animal in these regions would thus pay 3 pounds of purified 
butter.26 Households owning two animals would pay four pounds, households with 
three to five animals paid five pounds, and households owning six animals paid six 
pounds. In contrast, households in the eastern Semipalatinsk and Akmolinsk 
Governates paid an additional two pounds of purified butter each, starting with 
households owning one animal being taxed at a rate of 5 pounds, and so on. Regional 
variations were not unusual for the time, it should be said. Some of the most 
impoverished areas of European Russia were also granted tax concessions, for 
example.27 Yet most instructively, article 5 of the decree from Sovnarkom KSSR further 
specified that ‘Nomadic households in all governates of the KSSR [emphasis added], 
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owning up to two cows, are exempt from the tax on butter’.28 Nomads of modest means 
were thus to pay up to four pounds of butter less than their sedentary compatriots in 
the west, and six pounds less in the east. 
All these alterations to Moscow’s original decree reveal a Kazakh administration 
ready to adapt the tax regime of the KSSR to match variations in wealth: variations 
between regions, between households, but also between agricultural practices or 
lifestyles. In doing so, the administration continued a process dating from pre-
revolutionary times, identified by Yanni Kotsonis. Kotsonis argues that, in common 
with trends in the USA and Western Europe, late-Tsarist and early-Soviet tax levels 
were based more on what individuals could pay, and less on what the state needed.29 
The state requisitioning of 1919 to 1921 was therefore ‘in many ways a regression’, 
whereas the tax-in-kind was a sign of progress, albeit mitigated by the Soviet state’s 
desperate urge to strengthen itself by acquiring greater resources.30 Both Orenburg 
and Moscow extracted less produce from famine-struck regions, and to some extent 
moderated their demands on poorer families, to allow the most impoverished parts of 
the economy to recover. Orenburg took the further step of extending exemptions to 
nomads, as the vulnerable practitioners of a lifestyle believed to be particularly 
unproductive.31 
The unfortunate position of many nomads served as justification for the next 
significant alteration to the tax-in-kind on 28th June 1921. The second session of the 
Kazakh Central Executive Committee (KTsIK) placed emphasis on the hunger and 
hardship faced by nomadic cattle-herders before declaring an overall exemption for 
nomads and semi-nomads from taxes on meat, leather, dairy produce and wool until 
the end of that year.32 As was typical of the NEP period, KTsIK further announced that 
nomads and semi-nomads were free to sell any surplus produce. Comparable official 
sanctions of localised market trading were being granted across the former Russian 
Empire at this time.33 In the Kazakh case, no levy would be imposed on barter at 
trading fairs, where nomads traditionally sold their goods for other commodities. In 
fact, KTsIK recommended that the Kazakh People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies 
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(Narkomprod KSSR) utilise these fairs to distribute products otherwise unavailable to 
nomads by means of free exchange.34 The declaration made no attempt to distinguish 
between poor and rich nomads. Within two months of the first intervention by 
Sovnarkom KSSR, all nomads and semi-nomads had come to be understood as a single 
entity for the purposes of taxation, at least until January 1922. Alongside regional and 
wealth-based variations in the new regime’s proportionate taxation system, a nomadic-
sedentary distinction was assertively recognised, perhaps because the subtler system 
of the previous year in which nomads were simply taxed less was harder to implement. 
Now nomads would not be taxed at all for these resources. 
Describing the nomads’ economy as uniquely fragile was straightforward, and 
led to an appealingly straightforward solution; do not tax them. But the reforms of the 
NEP era sought to create a tax policy which was more than just proportionate.  Tax-in-
kind was a temporary solution, installed only until monetary taxation could feasibly be 
enforced Union-wide.35 It would undergo a range of changes throughout the decade, 
particularly as industrialisation, in the KSSR as elsewhere, became a foremost 
priority.36 The tax-in-kind thus exemplified further trends drawn from the Tsarist 
period through to the 1920s by Yanni Kotsonis. These include the use of tax as a tool 
for the state to learn about and transform society.37 Proportionate tax levels could not 
be established unless legislators understood the economy intimately, and a nuanced 
application of levies further empowered the state to alter economic and social 
behaviour.38 
The ways KTsIK, Sovnarkom KSSR and others understood and wished to change 
the population of the Kazakh Republic are neatly exemplified in a report submitted to 
the first All-Kazakh Oblast’ Conference by Mukhtar Samatov in June 1921.39 Samatov, a 
former member of the Alash Party, was soon to be appointed to Narkomprod KSSR, and 
his views are revealing.40  First, he singled out nomads as a particularly needy group, 
arguing that they suffered most from pre-Revolutionary urbanization, when the wealth 
of the rural economy was transferred to and concentrated in the cities.41 He therefore 
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suggested that any taxation of nomads should be accompanied with the state provision 
of bread to nomads, amounting to another system of exchange.42 Second, Samatov 
referred to the issue of class. His warnings about class stratification under the NEP 
echoed debates underway in Moscow, where the figure of the kulak was of increasing 
prominence.43 To address fears of a less equal society, Samatov called for a phalanx of 
highly-trained tax collectors, recruited from the Party’s most conscientious members. 
These collectors would assertively but tactfully identify bai and kulak elements in the 
Kazakh countryside, and take their resources for the subsidy of heavy industry.44 Third, 
Samatov compared the old system of war-time requisitioning to Tsarist exploitation of 
the steppe and claimed that Sovnarkom KSSR had lowered tax rates in the previous 
month to compensate Kazakhs for years of imperial oppression. Exemptions would 
blunt the differences between Kazakhs and European settlers.45 
For elements of the Kazakh Communist Party, it was not enough simply to 
recognise nomadism in the tax system. Rates immediately following the Civil War were 
necessarily more permissive than many administrators were comfortable with, but the 
ultimate ambition of the Party was to use every tool at its disposal, including taxation, 
to transform society and its economic relations. In Samatov’s proposals we see the 
foremost preoccupations of the new administration, and an indication that variable 
rates would be repeatedly adapted in response to those preoccupations, though not 
always in the manner Samatov intended, in the coming years. 
Nationhood in early Soviet tax policy 
As discussed in previous chapters, when the Communist Party looked at the 
population of Central Asia, it saw a collection of nations. The distinguishing features – 
even the names – of some of these nations were yet to be formalised, but reparations 
for past misdemeanours were a major part of the Bolsheviks’ agenda during and after 
the Civil War, and reparations were not possible without some conception of 
nationhood.46 Russians and other European nationalities were presented as the 
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beneficiaries and the perpetrators of imperialism, and were penalized in the KSSR. 
Kazakhs, Uzbeks and others were seen as victims, and received subsidy.47 Land-
ownership rights and access to water were reformed in the Kazakhs’ favour during the 
first years of the NEP.48 Some land was actually taken from Europeans and given to 
Kazakhs for their use, and the Politburo VTsIK in Moscow would take another year to 
revoke its tacit support for the expulsion of European settlers from the Semirech’e 
region, which joined the Kazakh Republic in 1925.49 Kazakh administrators could draw 
on other precedents set in Turkestan, such as the confiscation of surplus agricultural 
produce from Russian farmsteads.50 Samatov placed the first tax exemptions granted in 
the KSSR within this broader effort to penalise or reward certain nations, and thereby 
transform Central Asian society. It is clear that he was not the only one to do so. 
On 19th September 1921, the People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies in Moscow 
(Narkomprod RSFSR) submitted a formal request that VTsIK overturn the decision of 
its Kazakh counterpart and cancel the tax exemptions installed for nomads in June of 
that year.51 This cancellation would apply to dairy products and leather, both of which 
would again be taxed in areas struggling with shortages. The Presidium VTsIK took the 
request seriously enough to call for further information to justify the repeal.52 
Narkomprod RSFSR argued that tax exemptions on nomads would curtail the state’s 
resources too greatly, meaning that supplies could not be delivered to other 
communities in need. More strikingly, the institution called on VTsIK to take measures 
to preclude ‘similar separatist demonstrations.’53 At a time of economic crisis, when 
suspicion of pan-Turkic separatism in Central Asia was still potent, this association of 
economic concessions for nomads with a dangerous, bourgeois nationalism would have 
carried major political significance.54 Unlike the decolonisation paradigm, which 
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engendered concessions to formerly-colonised peoples within the Soviet system, it 
spoke of a desire to separate from Soviet power and thereby undermine it. It 
represents an entirely different use of the same nationality-based understanding of the 
people of the KSSR endorsed by Samatov and others.55 
Indeed, Narkomprod RSFSR cited a notion of separatist nationalism which would 
become increasingly prominent later in the Soviet period when regional elites were 
arrested and shot for nationalist tendencies. Contrasting conceptions of nationalism in 
competition here are redolent of a more significant disagreement between Stalin and 
Lenin dating from before the revolution. In broad terms, Lenin was sceptical about the 
existence of distinct national groups, but acknowledged and made concessions to 
nationalism in the former Russian Empire in a pragmatic effort to control Russian 
imperialism and earn the support of non-Russians. Perhaps less than a rigid theoretical 
correspondence, which may not have been possible given Lenin’s preference for 
functional pragmatism regarding the National Question, what Samatov shared with 
Lenin was a particular disposition, a tendency or preference for supporting the non-
Russian former subjects of the Tsar in a post-colonial context.56 Stalin’s tendencies 
were different. He unambiguously accepted that nations existed, but on this basis 
would become more fearful of their counter-revolutionary potential and eventually 
sought to strengthen Union-wide institutions at the expense of national organs of 
power.57 The disquiet in Nakomprod RSFSR about the concessionary nature of the 
Kazakh tax system constitutes precisely the kind of suspicion Stalin also harboured. 
Soon after Narkomprod RSFSR made its request, a representative of the Kazakh 
Republic at the Presidium VTsIK wrote back to KTsIK in Orenburg.58 He claimed to 
have witnessed earlier meetings of Narkomprod RSFSR which concluded that all 
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resources must be taken from nomads on the basis of exchange, a position not 
dissimilar to Samatov’s. At the latest negotiations taking place in Moscow, however, 
Comrade Kotliarenko of Narkomprod RSFSR argued instead that the contentious tax 
exemptions contravened the constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR, to which the Kazakh Republic then belonged), and would precipitate 
terrible economic problems. According to his communiqué, the Kazakh representative 
had countered that Kotliarenko and his peers lacked a full appreciation for the nomadic 
way of life. Their earlier insistence on requisitioning of pork fat and eggs had driven 
around a thousand Kazakh families over the border into Mongolia. 59 Besides, he had 
said, the declaration which introduced these tax concessions was already translated 
into Kazakh and was in force; any annulment would cause yet more administrative 
instability and undermine the authority of the Kazakh government. Then, after the 
Presidium had deferred judgement and adjourned, a member of VTsIK had apparently 
told the Kazakh representative that the idea of a cancellation originated not from 
Narkomprod RSFSR, but from the Orenburg Governate Executive Committee 
(gubispolkom), officially under the jurisdiction of KTsIK and based in the same city. 
The gubispolkom governed a region of the KSSR with a high proportion of European 
settlers and would soon leave the jurisdiction of the Kazakh Republic. It had 
complained that tax concessions for nomads were exacerbating tensions between 
Kazakhs and Russians, whereupon Narkomprod RSFSR took up the case.60 
The Orenburg Governate Executive Committee was not the only regional 
authority to complain about tax exemptions for nomads. The Governate Executive 
Committee in Astrakhan also governed a Russian-dominated area on the border of the 
Kazakh Republic, and had raised similar concerns on 16th July 1921. Though it accepted 
the tax concessions in full, it warned the Kazakh central authorities against policy 
which ‘relates to one nation alone and clearly shows allocation based on nationality.’61 
To those of Lenin’s disposition, this would most likely have looked like an expression of 
Great Power chauvinism, an objection on the part of the imperial power to its 
perceived demotion similar to widespread reaction against korenizatsiia.62 
Perhaps to preclude any such characterisation, Narkomprod RSFSR often 
reworded these arguments in economic terms. In October 1921 it emphasised to KTsIK 
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that nomads, rather than Kazakhs as a whole, already enjoyed exemptions from the 
taxation of eggs and meat.63 By eschewing a national category in favour of one based on 
agricultural activity, it perhaps sought to de-politicise the negotiations (having done 
the opposite in the preceding month). But subsidiary authorities more commonly 
understood the matter as a national one because Europeans were considered 
exclusively sedentary, and so the tax exemptions were exclusively for Kazakhs. 
Administrators of a particular nationality tended to protect their own, and 
documentation from central organs gives only a partial picture of the tax system at this 
time because local bodies retained considerable powers to enforce their own levies.64 
Thus Party members complained that free trade went on in some regions, whilst 
requisitioning continued unabated elsewhere.65 In summer 1922 a member of the 
Kazakh Ministry for Internal Affairs registered a series of complaints about the 
collection of taxes from nomads in the north west of the republic. He claimed that 
nomads were paying above the legal rate, and connected this with the predominance of 
Russians in the administrative apparatus.66 He accused corrupt officials, likely to be 
Russian, of enforcing local monetary taxes unfairly.67 Similar complaints about the 
taxation of Kazakhs were made in the Kustanai Governate nearby.68 This was localised 
corruption, but it was not simply inconsistent with government policy; it was an 
inversion of government policy. Whilst central organs gave tacit or explicit support for 
post-imperial reparations to certain nations, Russian bureaucrats utilised the same 
typology of tax payers based on nationality to ignore the nomadic-sedentary divide. 
Other regional organs appear to have made provisional agreements wherein Russians 
and Kazakhs were taxed differently, simply for ease of administration.69 
The point is, first, that tax was seen by the Party as a means of social change. 
Second, for members like Samatov, the social phenomenon most in need of change was 
the post-colonial disparities between Kazakhs and Russians, an aspect of the National 
Question and an agenda which plainly necessitated some distinction between national 
groups. Third, therefore, governing bodies from the largest and most central to the 
smallest and most local understood lower tax rates for nomads as a matter of national 
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identity. These tax rates were both defended and attacked in national terms, depending 
on an administrator’s attitude towards the agenda of post-colonial reparations. 
Russians were less likely to be amenable, Kazakhs more so. This was true whether they 
worked inside or outside the KSSR, as the manoeuvres of the Russian-dominated 
Orenburg Governate Executive Committee show.70 
This whole dynamic was further in evidence when tax policy was drawn into 
ongoing arguments about national jurisdiction. Like Narkomprod RSFSR, local 
departments run by non-Kazakhs were also held accountable for the mass migration of 
Kazakhs into Mongolia and China from the Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk Governates. 
In March 1922, Kazakh authorities suggested that the tax-in-kind had been improperly 
levied by Siberian tax-collectors upon nomads in the borderland region between the 
Kazakh Republic and Siberian territories.71 Kazakhs responded to the economic 
pressure by moving eastwards and out of Soviet control, and it was claimed that 
memories of belligerent treatment were keeping them there.72 This was a border 
dispute between regional powers which would erupt again later in the decade.73 In this 
case, Kazakh authorities connected the onerous taxation of migrating nomads by non-
Kazakhs with the encroachment of Russian authority into the Kazakh Republic. The 
importance of taxing nomads properly was used to defend the republic’s territorial 
integrity, and tax rates based on lifestyle or agricultural preference again became 
conflated with the National Question. 
Nomadism and Nationalism in Competition 
The extreme difficulty of developing, and then implementing, a coherent tax 
policy at this time may explain why initial disagreements over tax exemptions appear 
to have been left formally unresolved. The nomads’ right to keep all their dairy produce 
and leather was always due for expiry at the end of 1921 anyway, and on 8th January 
1922 Sovnarkom KSSR ratified the Work and Cartage Tax. Instructively, a poster-sized 
publication printed to inform citizens of the KSSR about the implications of this new 
tax specified that settled Kazakhs would be treated as Russians in terms of tax levies.74 
The document thereby emphasised that the difference between Kazakhs and Russians 
was nil unless lifestyle intervened; between the lines the poster was disavowing any 
‘separatist demonstrations’. But the problems of 1921 looked set to continue. The 
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document further declared that tax rates for the semi-nomadic and nomadic 
population would be decided by governate-level organisations, with the single 
limitation that these rates not exceed those specified in other legislation.75 
Some efforts were made in 1921 to tax nomads in a manner proportionate to 
their wealth. As foreseen in May by Sovnarkom KSSR, the variable rates of the tax-in-
kind would apply to nomads owning more than two animals. Party members worried 
about rich nomads, the dangerous bai class, from the very beginning of NEP; we see 
this in Samatov’s report. But it was his other principal concerns, nomadism and 
nationality, which caused the greatest contradiction in the tax-in-kind. Nomads were 
recognised as an impoverished group, crippled by violence and drought, and the state 
made some attempt to moderate tax policy for them just as it had done geographically 
for the western regions of the KSSR. But the state apparatus lacked the sophistication 
necessary to tax a little less, and within months tax collectors were told not to tax at all. 
As no Europeans were considered to be nomadic, Russian and Ukrainian settlers 
around Astrakhan and Orenburg took this to be a sign of national favouritism. This is 
not surprising given the Party’s rhetoric about post-colonial reparations. Tax-collectors, 
legislators and ordinary citizens conflated nationality and lifestyle, and the former won 
out in the way the debate unfolded. This seems to have advantaged financial organs 
concerned about the loss of revenue engendered by such blanket exemptions. 
Section Two: The Agricultural Tax, 1924 
Taxation in kind formally ceased in 1924. The single Agricultural Tax had been 
introduced in 1923, and by the end of the following year it was officially collected only 
in currency.76 Taxation in currency allowed for greater precision and control, but the 
Agricultural Tax itself coincided with a period of 3-4 years during which the state had 
to procure most of its agricultural produce at market rates, which were often 
prohibitive.77 While the procurement apparatus developed, nomadism would again 
find expression in the tax disagreements of the time. Though tensions between 
nationalities on the steppe would not dissipate (they were particularly resurgent after 
1929), heightened post-colonial disagreements gave way to more practical debates 
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over the taxation of nomads as the administration became more bureaucratic and more 
ambitious.78 
Forms of farming; forms of settlement 
The Agricultural Tax was adapted for the needs and capabilities of the KSSR, 
much as the tax-in-kind had been, on 7th June 1924. The alterations produced a 
document, the ‘Instructions for the implementation of the single Agricultural Tax’, and 
sections 112-118 of this document outlined new tax exemptions for nomads. This time, 
however, nomads had to be moving to a sedentary way of life to qualify.79 The kind of 
social transformation the Party felt able to achieve had developed from the relatively 
simple aim of allowing the nomadic economy to stabilise and the more demanding task 
of helping the Kazakh economy recover from years of colonial exploitation. Now the 
state sought to bring an end to seasonal migration, as relieving the tax burden on 
settling nomads was surely designed to do. This was not a new aspiration but it may be 
one of the Kazakh Party branch’s earliest republic-wide efforts to systematically 
incentivise settlement through one of the state’s foremost policy tools: taxation. The 
decision to publish instructions also implies an attempt by central authorities to gather 
tax yields more evenly, with less corruption and fewer anomalies than before. 
This all seems less a change of direction than a way of making tax collectors more 
receptive to the specific demands of the Party after a period defined by wayward 
regional governors. The Soviet state of the 1920s suffered from a kind of weakness or 
disorder from which it was constantly seeking to escape, and given complaints in 
previous years about the lack of direction from central authorities in the 
implementation of the tax-in-kind, clearer instructions for local committees was one 
way of doing this.80 Difficulties would continue to arise, however, and instructions 
could be anything but clear. Nomadism, as a practice and a social category, would 
perpetuate problems for poorly-organised republic-level organs and legislators who 
had no shared view about how nomads should be treated or what they should become. 
The initial source of confusion and obstruction would be sections 112-118 of the 
‘Instructions…’ which were published when the Agricultural Tax was adapted for the 
Kazakh Republic in June 1924. In the first two months after their publication, they 
seem to have been ignored entirely. On 5th August 1924, the People’s Commissariat of 
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Finances for the RSFSR (Narkomfin RSFSR) wrote to its Kazakh counterpart 
(Narkomfin KSSR), instructing it finally to implement sections 112-118, meaning the 
granting of tax privileges to cattle-herding nomads and semi-nomads who were in the 
process of settling and taking up arable farming.81 Thirteen days later, Narkomfin KSSR 
sent a circular letter out to all governate financial departments. In accordance with a 
request from Narkomfin RSFSR and sections 112-118 of the ‘Instructions…’, the letter 
said, nomads judged legally to be transferring to a life of arable farming should now be 
granted exemptions from the collection of the Agricultural Tax.82 
It is not wholly clear how official this directive was, since it was delivered by 
circular letter rather than by decree or declaration. This ambiguity may help to explain 
the contradiction created between the letter and another major piece of legislation 
which had been introduced on 17th April 1924. The declaration ‘On the land-
development of the nomadic, semi-nomadic, and settling population of the Kazakh 
Socialist Soviet Republic’ was a long, comprehensive document which principally 
applied to land-ownership rights, but its 52nd article concerned the provision of tax 
privileges for the settling nomads.83 As with the ‘Instructions…’, the wording of this 
article was pivotal. Aid was promised to the ‘working nomadic and semi-nomadic 
population of the Kazakh Republic, transitioning to a sedentary position’; this aid was 
‘for the pursuit of arable and arable-livestock-raising activity.’84 Aid included loans of 
farming equipment and livestock, for repayment within 10 years; grain, for repayment 
within 5 years; timber for the construction of housing and farm buildings; agronomic 
assistance; and, crucially, exemptions from state-wide and local taxes for up to five 
years.85 
Already by 1924 the significance in Soviet tax law of the figure of the settling 
nomad was evident. But there was no consensus about how he or she should settle. The 
trouble experienced by the Soviet state in acquiring grain, and the wish of some in the 
administration to vastly extend the amount of Kazakh land under cultivation, had 
helped place sedentary farming high on the agenda, but what kind of sedentary 
farming?86 When enforcing the Agricultural Tax’s ‘Instructions…’ in August 1924, 
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Narkomfin KSSR had specified that only nomads transitioning to settled arable farming 
would benefit from tax exemptions. Article 52 of the declaration ‘On the land 
development…’, introduced two months before the Agricultural Tax, more generously 
granted exemptions to nomads transitioning to arable farming or arable-livestock 
farming. So how many new farmers would be granted exemptions? 
The circular letter from Narkomfin KSSR caused consternation in regional offices 
across the republic, particularly in the east. Complaints began flooding in from 
September 1924.87 The distinction between purely arable and arable-livestock farming, 
like the taxation of dairy and leather, might seem mundane, but in a place like Soviet 
Kazakhstan at a time like the 1920s, these were questions of huge significance to the 
everyday life of the population. Often it could mean the difference between survival 
and extinction. The Akmolinsk Governate Executive Committee discussed the letter on 
11-12th September, and resolved to petition KTsIK immediately for the preservation of 
tax exemptions as foreseen in article 52.88 It went on to argue that any reversal in these 
exemptions would bring the settlement of nomads to a complete halt. The tenor of its 
correspondence indicates the alarm caused by the change; the Committee concluded 
one telegram by saying that it would take any lack of reply as a sign of the centre’s 
acquiescence.89 The Semipalatinsk Governate Executive Committee demanded urgent 
clarification from Narkomfin KSSR on the proper implementation of tax policy.90 
Describing the pressures placed upon the settling population by the Agricultural Tax, it 
too complained that the effect of the circular letter would be to suspend further 
settlement.91 Antagonism between new Soviet institutions was far from uncommon in 
the USSR as a whole, and became associated with vedomstvennost’, the tendency of 
those in charge of certain organs to protect the interests of themselves and their staff, 
much as members of the same nationality also acted favourably towards each other.92 
The Kazakh People’s Commissariat for Agriculture (Narkomzem KSSR) began its 
own campaign against the change on 4th September 1924, when it raised the matter at 
the Federal Committee.93 Eleven days later it wrote to KTsIK, making its case in clear 
                                                          
87 A sense of resistance from the regions is communicated in various reports from the time, as 
well as in the examples cited: TsGARK 30/1/306: 367-367 ob., 390-390 ob., 404-405. 
88 TsGARK 30/1/306: 416. 
89 The same telegram begins with the statement: ‘It is essential in the most urgent fashion to 
liquidate misunderstanding’ (neobkhodimo samom srochnym poriadke likvidirovat’ 
nedorazumenie): TsGARK 30/1/306: 388. 
90 TsGARK 30/1/306: 397-397 ob.. 
91 TsGARK 30/1/306: 371. 
92 Heinzen, '"Alien" Personnel in the Soviet State,' p. 75. 
93 TsGARK 30/1/306: 404 ob.. 
147 
 
Chapter Six: Taxing Nomads 
 
and forceful terms. According to the latest position taken by Narkomfin KSSR, settling 
nomads were only subject to tax exemptions if they intended to take up purely arable 
farming. This was in breach of Article 52 from the declaration ‘On the land 
development…’ and was, according to Narkomzem KSSR, an absurdity, as purely arable 
farming was extremely rare within the KSSR. The economy of the republic was 
dominated by livestock; Article 52 was supposed to reflect this fact. That is why 
Narkomzem KSSR had received various requests for clarification from regional organs, 
because nomads would not settle if the promised tax exemptions applied only to 
unfamiliar agricultural practices. Narkomzem KSSR stated that its complaints at the 
Federal Committee had been ineffectual, and that KTsIK should take the matter 
forward and annul the letter sent out in August by Narkomfin KSSR. Without an 
annulment, hardly any exemptions would be applied. 94  On 18th October 1924 
Narkomzem KSSR contacted Sovnarkom KSSR, asking it to publish the declaration 
which had introduced the Agricultural Tax to the Kazakh Republic, so that any 
misunderstandings could be resolved. At this point Narkomzem RSFSR also suggested 
that tax exemptions should be extended to the working poor (batraks) and the 
homeless.95 
KTsIK had been in contact with Narkomfin KSSR since 25th September, making 
enquiries into the contradiction in tax policy which had emerged.96 The defence, when 
it came in early October, served to complicate the disagreement. In implementing the 
‘Instructions…’ to the Agricultural Tax, Narkomfin KSSR had simply been equalising the 
tax exemptions enjoyed by nomads with those granted to migrants, that is, settlers 
mainly from Eastern Europe and Russia. Migrants, it was argued, also paid tax when 
they settled if they did not establish the right kind of farming (that is, solely arable). 
The institution flatly denied that regional organs were having trouble understanding 
and imposing these tax policies.97 The dispute was shifting. It had begun about the 
importance of arable farming, but was turning to the significance or otherwise of the 
nomadic identity. Why should nomads be granted more generous and sympathetic 
exemptions than other itinerant groups? For a financial body interested in simplifying 
the tax system this may have seemed a good question, whereas for an agricultural body 
like Narkomzem KSSR the difference between habitual nomads and migrants of 
farming heritage would have been pivotal. 
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In a further letter to Sovnarkom KSSR, this time on 31st October, the financial 
commissariat became more combative.98 It accused its agricultural counterpart of 
lacking clarity in its definitions of those groups who should be granted tax exemptions. 
Sometimes, Narkomzem KSSR distinguished between tax payers ‘by lifestyle criteria’, 
that is, as nomadic, semi-nomadic and so on.99 At other times, it used criteria based on 
economic behaviour or output, such as cattle-herding and semi-cattle-herding. 
Narkomfin KSSR described further references to the homeless and to batraks as 
completely incomprehensible; if it was decreed that all batraks settling on virgin lands 
were to be treated as migrants, there would not be a Kazakh in the republic who had to 
pay the Agricultural Tax.100 Narkomfin KSSR suggested that it would be enough for tax 
exemptions to be granted on the basis of a change of agricultural activity, from cattle-
herding to arable farming, and a change of living space. Under these principles, the 
additional social categories of nomadic and semi-nomadic were superfluous; anyone 
setting up a new farm in a new place is basically a migrant. A new category, 
encapsulating nomads and semi-nomads as well as homeless migrants who were 
habitually sedentary, would be sufficient.101 If the nomadic-sedentary divide was 
replaced with a migrant-settled one, the provisions made in Article 52 of the 
declaration ‘On the land development’ specifically for settling nomads would become 
void. But the administration of tax exemptions would become much simpler if all 
eligible people were grouped into a single, elementary category. 
Again, nomadism was being pushed out of the tax system in favour of alternative 
methods for distinguishing between tax-payers. As well as administrative expediency, 
nationalism lay in the background just as it had done in debates over the tax-in-kind.  
Migrants, rather than nomads, were likely to be European settlers with a well-
established culture of arable farming. Both were wandering populations the state 
sought to pin down, but in applying the same strict incentive for arable farming alone 
to both groups, Narkomfin KSSR was hugely advantaging Russians and others over 
Kazakhs, many of whom lacked expertise in extensive crop-farming. 
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Understanding 1924 
Before continuing to discuss the disagreements of 1924, it is worth briefly asking 
what, or who, produced these difficulties in tax policy. At heart, the conflict sat between 
two contradictory pieces of legislation: the adaptations made to the Agricultural Tax, 
and a declaration on land-use. Both were ratified within two months of each other. 
Neither were minor reforms, but major statements of Soviet law. Earlier in the decade 
contradictions in the tax-in-kind had been between nationality and nomadism and 
were the product of inadequate implementation. In contrast, contradictions in the 
Agricultural Tax were written into the legislative texts, implying a certain 
administrative incoherence or incompetence. But a conflict accidentally created by 
incautious bureaucrats would surely have been more easily resolved, whereas 
Narkomfin KSSR soon found itself in a competition, mediated by Sovnarkom KSSR and 
KTsIK, with regional organs and Narkomzem KSSR. 
Institutionally, the Agricultural Tax pitted financial organs against agricultural 
ones. Narkomfin KSSR was potentially more concerned with the preservation of state 
revenues, and wanted to reduce the number of citizens eligible for tax exemptions as 
far as possible, whereas Narkomzem KSSR was most sensitive to the fragilities of the 
rural economy and wanted to safeguard future harvests. Their respective positions 
placed them at either ends of the dichotomy described by Kotsonis: Narkomzem KSSR 
argued for proportionate taxation, measured against the population’s ability to pay, 
whereas Narkomfin KSSR felt the state’s need to extract what it required.102 In Moscow 
Narkomzem RSFSR, by far the largest of the capital’s commissariats, resisted the use of 
class-based categories for the peasant population because, according to James W. 
Heinzen, it hoped to avoid alienating the ‘most progressive stratum’ of the rural 
population and thereby confounding its own efforts to educate and modernise the 
countryside.103 It was widely accused of being ‘pro-peasant’.104 Possibly Narkomzem 
KSSR was similarly motivated by its more acute understanding of the agricultural 
situation in the Kazakh Republic. Vedomstvennost’, institutional defensiveness, may 
also have been at work. 
Whether as a product or cause of these countervailing bureaucratic interests, 
different conceptions of the taxable population also came into competition. Nomads 
were understood as comparable to migrants by Narkomfin KSSR; both were being 
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encouraged to settle, so both should be granted tax exemptions on the same terms. 
Narkomzem KSSR thought tax exemptions for nomads should be equal to that of 
batraks, and thereby put emphasis on their general destitution, and wished to preserve 
nomads as a special category of tax payer with special privileges. In the latter case, they 
would be defined by their agricultural capacities, which no longer included only their 
transhumance, but also their lack of experience in purely arable farming. It is perhaps 
not surprising that this aspect of their identity should be emphasised by the republic’s 
foremost agricultural body. 
One trend discussed often in histories of the USSR is notably absent from the 
1924 debates: the centre-periphery dynamic. Though many regional organs 
complained about the imposition of the ‘Instructions…’, Narkomzem KSSR did as well. 
Rather than oppressive zeal, other inhabitants of the Kazakh centre: Narkomiust, 
Narkomnats KSSR, Gosplan and Sovnarkom KSSR, approached the question with 
detached ambivalence, as will be described. Narkomfin KSSR was only the centre of the 
periphery, of course, and may have been under pressure from Narkomfin RSFSR in the 
supreme centre of Soviet power. Yet, given Moscow’s complicity with the contradictory 
policy embedded in Article 52 of the declaration ‘On the land development’, such a 
conflict cannot be taken for granted.105 As has and will be seen, disagreements in the 
centre combined with complaint and confusion in the regions. James Hughes notes a 
similar situation in his analysis of procurement practices in the late 1920s and argues 
that policy was produced in a ‘centre-local dialogue’ between Moscow-based and 
Siberian officials. 106   This seems an appropriate model for many of the 
contemporaneous trends witnessed on the Kazakh Steppe. 
The resolution and its legacy  
By late October 1924, Sovnarkom KSSR was already considering a new 
declaration to resolve the contradiction in tax policy, an idea to which Narkomfin KSSR 
was openly opposed. 107  Various bodies were consulted on this change. The 
Inspectorate of Workers and Peasants (Narkomrabkri KSSR) said that it did not object 
to the reinstatement of tax exemptions for newly-created arable or arable-livestock 
farmsteads, but avoided direct comment on the matter of migrants and nomads.108 
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Gosplan KSSR was also measured. It did argue that there was ambiguity over how long 
the exemptions should be granted, either three or five years, and recommended the 
latter figure. 109 The People’s Commissariat for Justice (Narkomiust KSSR) had more 
specific advice about the wording of the new declaration. It suggested that exemptions 
in the Agricultural Tax should be applied to new farmsteads which could be said to 
have undergone one of the following transformations: 
a) from cattle-herding (nomadic) forms of economic activity to arable. 
b) from semi-cattle-herding (semi-nomadic) to arable. 
c) from cattle-herding (nomadic) to an arable-cattle-herding form of 
farmstead.110 
Interestingly, the decision to include ‘nomadic’ or ‘semi-nomadic’ in brackets 
appears to have come from a joint meeting of the People’s Commissariat for the 
Nationalities (Narkomnats KSSR) and Sovnarkom KSSR on 17th November. Whether or 
not this had been justified in nationalistic terms is not clear.111 
Word-for-word, however, Sovnarkom KSSR adopted the formulation quoted 
from Narkomiust KSSR above. In mid-November 1924 it resolved to extend the 
exemptions outlined in the ‘Instructions…’ to nomads transitioning to an arable-
livestock-herding farmstead, in accordance with Article 52. Although semi-nomadic 
Kazakhs officially had to take up purely arable farming to qualify for exemptions, 
Sovnarkom KSSR included a further clause which dictated that semi-nomads engaged 
in arable-livestock-herding enterprises would be granted exemptions if they had 
changed their place of residence. This measure was presumably intended to prevent 
sedentary communities from claiming to be recently-settled semi-nomads, but in 
practice it was another concession to Narkomzem KSSR. In a further coup for the 
agricultural commissariat, exemptions were also offered to batraks, as suggested, 
regardless of their agricultural behaviour.112 The whole struggle had lasted less than 
four months. Article 52 and its proponents were vindicated. 
The eventual cost of this decision became evident the following year, after the 
national delimitation when the KSSR had become the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (KASSR). The new Kazakh Republic was considerably larger, though 
old legislative arrangements remained in place. So in October 1925 the Kazakh 
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government generated forecasts for the financial requirements of Article 52, as it was 
to be implemented, during 1926. The republic would need 1.900.000 roubles of Union 
funds, non-repayable, to cover the cost of tax exemptions and aid. It also required 
4.673.827 roubles of Union funds to be dispensed as loans to help the Kazakh and 
Kyrgyz rural populations.113 Precisely these funds were granted to the Kazakh Republic 
on 8th October 1925 by the Economic Council of the RSFSR, albeit after some delay.114 
In the beginning of 1926 the specifications of tax policy generated and endorsed 
by Union-wide and Kazakh organs were again questioned, this time by a member of 
Narkomzem KASSR, the organisation which had fought so vehemently for the 
arrangement. Aliaskar Alibekov, a member of Narkomzem KASSR and formerly of 
Alash-Orda, expressed his personal view that the ‘moment of settlement’ (moment 
osedaniia) was extremely difficult to identify.115 Nomads themselves did occasionally 
sow crops to provide fodder and sustenance at different stages of their migratory 
journeys.116 Given this, how was it possible to distinguish between a long-established 
nomadic camp harvesting crops before embarking on its winter migration, and a 
newly-created sedentary farm, made up of former nomads who were in the first stages 
of growing crops? Both enterprises could be defined as arable-livestock-herding, both 
could contain batraks.117 
The anxiety from Narkomfin KSSR the previous year appears to have had some 
legitimacy. Purely arable farms would have looked much more distinct from nomadic 
camps. The migrant category would have placed less emphasis on a specific moment of 
transformation from habitually nomadic to habitually settled, as migrants could have 
settled and then re-settled without having to change their status in the eyes of the state. 
But Alibekov’s position does not necessarily represent a volte-face. His complaint 
ranged further; what the government needed at the time was reliable, stable 
agricultural production, but it had legislated to induce tumult in the rural economy. 
Nothing could cause greater disturbance than mass settlement, which would create a 
multitude of new, fragile farming enterprises needing support and initially producing 
little.118 Failure to determine the moment osedaniia and tax accordingly was not a 
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reason to extend and rationalise tax rates, but maybe to cancel them altogether. Rather 
than acknowledge the validity of the approach defended by Narkomfin KSSR, Alibekov 
may have preferred to return to the exemptions enjoyed by nomads under the tax-in-
kind. Possibly this is what Narkomzem KSSR had also wanted in its dispute with 
Nakromfin KSSR, but it compromised and accepted instead the special treatment of 
settling nomads and batraks, categories which, when taken together, could be applied 
to most nomads if not most Kazakhs. 
The principle of tax exemptions for both newly-settled and still-migrating 
nomads remained embedded in the tax system. The sixth All-Kazakh Conference in 
November 1927 heard that around a third of all livestock-herding groups were exempt 
from the Agricultural Tax.119 But the ambiguities of tax-payer categories continued to 
obstruct. In the Akmolinsk Governate at the end of 1926, for example, the Agricultural 
Tax had barely been collected. Governate organs listed how much of tax owed had been 
amassed in percentage terms, by region and by the agricultural activity of the tax-
payers. The highest proportion paid was 39%, in the Atbasar uezd from arable farmers. 
Most regions did not surpass 20%. Only 21% of arrears for previous years had been 
secured.120 A key reason for the delay was the myriad of petitions submitted over the 
incorrect calculation of tax rates, with communities refusing to pay anything until their 
complaints had been addressed.121 Many such complaints were likely to be over the 
definition of the community: nomadic or semi-nomadic, habitually settled or newly 
settled. The Gur′ev Okrug Committee noted some success in the collection of the 
Agricultural Tax from sedentary groups, but was struggling with levies on nomads.122 
1924 was a key moment for the decade, during which the identity of the nomad 
within the tax system was elaborated, attacked and defended. Whereas the special 
treatment of nomads under the tax-in-kind was confounded by the politics of 
nationality, hard-won exemptions for nomads under the Agricultural Tax looked 
unviable to some because of bureaucratic inadequacies and the pressing needs of state 
procurement. An agenda for incentivising settlement had entered the tax system from a 
well-established political consensus, as discussed in previous chapters, but tax 
collectors were poorly equipped to recognise this social transformation when they saw 
it. Financial organs sought to promulgate arable farming so that collectors could more 
easily identify settlement in practice, and gather larger grain yields. Agricultural organs 
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sought to utilise the nomadic and batrak categories of tax payer to exempt a rural 
population which could not take advantage of subsidies for purely arable farming. The 
Kazakh government sided with agricultural organs, but the result was a prohibitively 
complicated tax policy with extensive exemptions and low yields. Party members, 
frustrated with this situation, would eventually give up on proper, systematic, gradated 
tax demands for different nomadic groups, whilst laying the blame squarely on one 
stratum of Kazakh society. 
Section Three: Taxing the Bais, 1920-1930 
Comrade Iaroslavskii arrived at the third All-Kazakh Oblast’ Conference in March 
1923 with issue eleven of ‘Red-Kazak-Stan’, a Soviet periodical published the previous 
year. To laughter from the floor, he mockingly read aloud the following passage: 
That country is considered wealthy, in which a wealthy population 
predominates. Where the poor are a majority, there all the population is 
considered poor … In Russia, 80% of the population is made up of peasants; 
they are a poor people, therefore the Russian state, taken as a whole, must be 
considered poor.123 
Perhaps sarcastically, Iaroslavskii admonished his audience for sniggering, 
suggesting instead that such misunderstanding was saddening.124 This was absolutely 
not a Marxist point of view, he said, but the analysis of a person who ‘hadn’t yet 
escaped the nomadic domestic economy.’125 This final section will consider the 
implications of class politics for the taxation of nomads. In roughly chronological order, 
it will first address the treatment of the bais in the tax system during the NEP years, 
before observing a turn towards more repressive measures which led up to and 
connected with collectivisation and sedentarisation from 1928 onwards. 
  Early attempts at taxing the bais 
The conviction that rich could be distinguished from poor in any community, 
sedentary or nomadic, was deeply held by many Kazakh Party members from the 
foremost days of the NEP.126 Consequentially, gradation in tax policy depending on 
wealth quickly climbed the agenda. As mentioned in section one, class was one of the 
three key issues associated with taxation in Mukhtar Samatov’s report to the first All-
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Kazakh Conference, in which he said that imprecise acts of wealth redistribution would 
unite poor and rich against the Party.127 Accordingly, the very first adaptations to the 
tax-in-kind entailed lower rates for poorer nomadic families, as well as poorer 
regions.128 
Much like the tax-in-kind, however, these early efforts at gradation were shaped 
by the desperate economic circumstances of the time. Reports from the Red Caravan 
expedition emphasise this point.129 Famine-relief policies in western Kazakhstan in 
1922 involved acquiring and distributing cattle so that for every three people in a 
family, that family owned just one cow. Horses, camels and sheep were ignored to 
expedite the redistribution of dairy cattle, which would provide the most long-term 
sustenance.130 Whatever the Party’s attitude towards the bais, the exigencies of 
starvation allowed for nothing more sophisticated than making sure everyone had 
enough. The desire for social transformation gave way to the demands of survival. 
Soon after the worst of the crisis was over it was argued that tax should be 
especially punitive for the wealthy, and all the while Party members were aware that 
nomadic wealth at the time was primarily measured in livestock.131 At the third All-
Kazakh Conference in 1923, Iaroslavskii was joined by Aron Vainshtein, newly arrived 
from Belorussia to run the Kazakh Party.132 Vainshtein would prove to be an astringent 
critic of the bais, whom he accused of deliberately hindering the processes of 
settlement for which poor nomads yearned. He drew on the well-established view that 
the bais sought to isolate and preserve the nomadic lifestyle because it facilitated their 
exploitation of the batraks.133 Part of his solution to this problem was a direct tax on 
the bais, the results of which would be used to subsidise the settlement of the poor.134 
His proposal looks much like an incipient form of the Agricultural Tax as it was 
implemented in the KSSR the following year. 
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His idea did not pass without criticism at the conference. One attendee cited a 
region of the Ural Governate where livestock numbers were still so low that to 
distinguish between levels of wealth would be an absurdity. He went on to reprimand 
Vainshtein for misunderstanding the Kazakh way of life.135 Seitkali Mendeshev was 
similarly hostile, and his perspective perhaps had something in common with the 
article ridiculed by Iaroslavskii. Mendeshev argued that the taxation of rich Kazakhs 
must remain secondary to the subsidy of Kazakhs overall; that Central Asia’s colonial 
past meant that no Kazakh was yet rich enough to endure Vainshtein’s treatment.136 
For a brief moment here national categories of tax payer were being used to squeeze 
out class-based categories of tax payer, just as they were confounding nomadic-
sedentary categories under tax-in-kind. 
Nevertheless, the Agricultural tax came to be seen as an instrument for the 
eradication of the bais. The debates of 1924 were principally about who was not taxed, 
but it is worth emphasising that only settling nomads were granted exemptions under 
the system, and migrating nomads were being assessed and levied at this time. Though 
the financial commissariat had been sceptical, the Kazakhs’ agricultural commissariat 
had persuaded Sovnarkom KSSR to include exemptions for batraks into the 
Agricultural Tax. Yet whoever was included in the exemptions, it plainly did not protect 
the bais. In 1926 the Kazakh Party committee explicitly encouraged the use of variable 
tax levels to weaken bai families.137 
All of this clearly has parallels across the Soviet polity. The decision of 
Narkomzem KSSR to specify who should not be taxed (the batraks), rather than come 
to an agreement on who should be taxed (certain of members the bai class), bears 
comparison with similar debates in Moscow. Narkomzem RSFSR had also experienced 
problems identifying members of the rural population who should be taxed or 
penalised, preferring similarly to focus on those who should not. Its early agricultural 
strategies relied upon the survival and cooperation of affluent peasants, and so it 
resisted efforts to target the top strata of peasant farmers and expressed doubts over 
the kulak threat.138 This was difficult to articulate openly in the political atmosphere of 
the late 1920s, however, as it became less admissible to treat the Russian peasantry as 
a single group with whom the state must cooperate (the smychka).139 Other organs 
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would go on to accuse Narkomzem RSFSR of a ‘wager on the strong’, an echo of 
Stolypin and Tsarism.140 Perhaps Narkomzem KSSR had also found itself reliant on 
wealthier rural communities but, unable or unwilling to defend the bais, it instead had 
opted to advocate tax exemptions for the politically acceptable category of batrak and 
extend this group to include as many families as possible who might otherwise have 
been deemed bai. 
This indirect approach could only have had limited success given the overall 
direction of Party policy. In European Russia, in spite of Narkomzem RSFSR, concerns 
were growing about the power of the kulak. It was argued that the permissive 
economic conditions of the NEP had allowed wealthy peasants to exploit their poorer 
neighbours.141 These same peasants were accused of withholding food reserves to 
extract the best price from a state equipped with a poorly-conceived system of grain 
procurement.142 As Stalin’s grip over Party policy strengthened, his language regarding 
the kulak became more severe, as during his trip to Siberia when he set about 
criminalising any peasant’s resistance to or obstruction of procurement.143 In 1927-
1928, state reserves of grain and other goods dropped to crisis levels, and the 
principles of proportionate taxation began giving way to the violent, arbitrary 
requisitioning reminiscent of War Communism. On 21st April 1928 the Agricultural Tax 
system for the RSFSR was reformed to increase demands on kulak peasants, just as in 
the KSSR the bais were becoming targets. 144 Emphasis increasingly moved from who 
should not be taxed to who should be taxed. A second crisis in grain procurement 
followed another poor harvest in 1928-1929, and the Party’s commitment to 
repressive measures hardened.145 
Nomadism on the steppe gave these procurement crises a specific character.146 If 
in Russia the kulak hoarded grain, in Kazakhstan the bai stopped any grain from being 
grown. Party members repeatedly suggested that this contributed to the profound 
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underdevelopment of the republic, and then went on to compare the nomadic economy 
unfavourably with the republic’s economy overall. Fedor Goloshchekin was a key 
proponent of this view. 147  Nomadic cattle-herding techniques were considered 
unproductive and backward, associated with ‘semi-feudalists’ and their exploitative 
labour relations.148 But nomads were also more mobile than settled peasants and the 
bais were harder to catch. As rumours of violent confiscation began to spread, hosts of 
nomadic families passed over the eastern border into China, and Party newspapers 
tried to alleviate the fears of those who remained.149 Locating the taxable wealth of the 
nomads within Soviet territory was problematic too, as a working knowledge of 
nomadic migratory routes was still in the developmental stages in 1928.150 In 1927 the 
Party considered strengthening democracy in the aul so that poor nomads could 
themselves elect the bais for oppressive levels of taxation.151 This idea is obviously 
comparable to the method of ‘social influence’ practised particularly by Siberian 
officials a little later.152 Yet, whereas Russian peasants could and did join the 
Communist Party, bringing with them a modicum of empathy with rural Russians, 
cooperation between Party and nomad was tenuous and rare.153 
Because nomadism was such a problem for state procurement, another 
perceived, nomad-specific aspect to the crisis of 1927 was the slow rate of settlement. 
The various subsidies and tax exemptions designed to hurry the pace of settlement 
were having only modest effects, and in just three years they would be dismissed as 
having been largely ineffectual by the congress of workers for sedentarisation.154 In 
1924 administrators across the republic had expended considerable time and effort 
negotiating niche tax exemptions for settling nomads, only to see those exemptions 
cause further confusion. A new way of discouraging migration and procuring resources 
was needed, and it is easy to see how heavy taxation of the bais became associated with 
settlement. The bais kept nomads migrating, so reducing their economic strength could 
induce settlement and development. Equally, settlement and development would ease 
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communication between the Party and nomads, improve the productivity of the 
batraks, and thereby further undermine the power of the bais.155  All this was 
conducive to the Party’s aims. Nomadic bais were already vulnerable to heavy taxation, 
and the bai category was in effect about to be rolled out to include settling and newly-
settled nomads of almost any description. 
Echoes of War Communism 
The stage was set for the final phase in the taxation of nomadic communities 
from 1920-1930: confiscation from the bais. All Kazakhs, nomadic and settled alike, 
would suffer the full force of this policy agenda. The logic of the Party justified the 
heavy-handed treatment of communities which, earlier in the decade, had been 
identified as vulnerable and in need of special sensitivity. Tax revenues were falling, 
and this was blamed on the persistence of nomadism. Nomadism, in turn, was blamed 
on the bais, rich Kazakhs located at the heart of nomadic society. The idea of taxing the 
bais into non-existence was well-established intellectually, and had clear parallels in 
policy elsewhere in the USSR. Tax was intended to transform society, and so it would, 
though the principle of proportionate taxation would dissolve. Paradoxically, as the 
state turned its full attention to the problem of nomadism and looked for a solution, the 
nomadic-sedentary categories of tax payer were again ignored. In their place, where 
nationality had been the obstructive preoccupation under the tax-in-kind, there came 
more pronounced class-based categories. In practice however confiscation would look 
largely arbitrary, just as in Siberia where quotas for the number of repressed kulaks 
were introduced specifically to increase levies and yields.156 
On 11th September 1928 the Petropavolvsk Okrug Committee (okruzhkom) 
dispatched a secret communiqué to all the regional Party committees under its 
jurisdiction.157  Under the popular slogan ‘the Sovietisation of the aul’ the letter 
declared a new direction for state action. Since the 5th Kazakh Party Conference, policy 
would now seek to foster the political consciousness of the poor and its emancipation 
from the bai cabal.158 To achieve these two aims, the okruzhkom sanctioned the 
confiscation of livestock from the bais. Bai families in nomadic regions with a herd of 
over 400 were to be evicted and their property seized; bais in semi-nomadic regions 
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with herds of over 300 livestock would be treated similarly.159 To intensify this process, 
the okruzhkom also devoted more energy to identifying and distinguishing bais from 
among other nomads.160  Later in the year, it would gather in further resources from 
the rural economy by escalating efforts at retrieving debts owed under the Agricultural 
Tax.161 In November 1928 the Alma-Ata okrug Party conference discussed the 
escalation of its campaign against what one delegate called the ‘semi-feudalists’, 
including the further confiscation of cattle.162 As late as March 1929, regional 
committees complained that too few resources were being extracted from the 
Kazakhs.163 
In 1928 the NEP was discontinued and the first Five Year Plan came into effect. 
Between then and March 1930 up to half of all Kazakh families were collectivised, a 
figure which was by this latter date matched in most regions of the USSR.164  The scale 
of the confiscation in these years was greater even than official documents of the time 
declared, and despite Party rhetoric the nomads who yielded most livestock were of 
average wealth within their communities.165  Categories of tax payer based on 
nomadism and on nationality had been disregarded in favour of a class-based approach, 
and now this system too was forgotten as all tax obligations became ruinously high.166 
Many more Kazakh nomads would emigrate to China in an effort to retain their herds, 
similar perhaps to the decision of many Russian peasants to move to urban centres.167 
Other nationalities, such as the Cossacks, would protest against crippling requisitions 
too.168 Sarah Cameron argues that the early confiscations of 1928 were characterised 
by a high level of violence in which regional Kazakh bureaucrats took the opportunity 
to misapply the law and enrich themselves.169 The combination of confiscation, 
sedentarisation and collectivisation would precipitate a collapse in the number of 
livestock and massive demographic decline on the steppe.170 
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Around 1928, the Soviet state relinquished all efforts at creating a proportionate 
tax system designed to accommodate the differences between the sedentary and 
nomadic peoples of the Kazakh Republic. The lawlessness with which local organs 
began requisitioning livestock, the scale of the confiscation campaign, and the 
widespread dismissal of any strict categorisation of tax-payer all mark the regression 
of tax policy to something reminiscent of War Communism.171 If the government had 
successfully conceived a system in which nomads could be precisely identified and 
appropriately taxed, it is tempting to speculate that nomadic tax revenues and 
economic performance would have been less alarming for the administrators in place 
during the 1927 procurement crisis. But this would be to disregard the fact that a class-
based categorisation of nomadic tax payers had been on the agenda from the beginning 
of the decade, as had coruscating rhetoric about semi-feudalists and the bai element. 
Conclusion 
As is the case for many other aspects of early-Soviet Kazakh history, the brutality 
of the 1928 confiscation campaign might be used to characterise the tax policies of the 
whole decade. There is justification for this approach. Hostility towards the bais was a 
feature of Party rhetoric at least from the end of the Civil War. Differentiation between 
rich and poor nomads was written into the earliest tax reforms. Despite the difficulties 
of assessing nomadic wealth in practice, the Party was determined to settle nomads 
and convinced that this could only be done if the bais were undermined. Although they 
came together with lethal effect at the end of the NEP period, none of these trends were 
new. The Soviet state of the 1920s was arbitrary, punitive and disproportionate in its 
taxation of Kazakh nomads. 
If this was the whole story, however, the variations in tax policy during the NEP 
era would have been dominated by a class-based system for categorising nomadic tax-
payers. Instead, the most important bases of categorisation in 1921-1922 were the 
nomadic-sedentary divide and nationality. These two priorities for Soviet legislators 
came into conflict both in the development and implementation of tax policy, as when 
Russian tax collectors and bureaucrats ignored the special exemptions laid out for 
nomads by the Kazakh administration. 
The nomadic-sedentary divide again came under attack in 1924, and again the 
figure of the bai was not the matter of central dispute. This time, financial and 
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agricultural commissariats clashed over contradictory pieces of legislation because 
they had different priorities and different levels of belief in the ability of the state 
apparatus to deliver. In its battle for a more complicated but more nuanced approach 
to taxing nomads, Narkomzem KSSR was victorious, but at least one of its members 
came to appreciate the difficulty of implementing what had by then been decreed. 
At that point the state was already trying to make nomads settle through taxation. 
After the hiatus of War Communism, the government was continuing to create a more 
modern, more sophisticated tax system with some elements of proportionality, which 
could be used to create a settled, egalitarian society out of a nomadic one. Failures of 
practical administration, and the difficulty of manifesting the nomadic identity in 
gradated tax rates, hindered tax reform, and by 1927 had helped to create the view that 
nomads would never produce sufficient tax yields and could not be settled through 
incentives alone. The Party had made limited attempts to bring nomads into a modern 
tax system but also faced major economic crises and was deeply suspicious of the bais. 
Policy here was straddling two of the Party’s larger, ‘often conflicting, goals: 
modernization and class politics’, goals shared by both central and peripheral state 
organs 172 By 1928, systematic and proportionate taxation had been abandoned. 
The 1920s might therefore usefully be divided up into three stages. The first lasts 
from 1920 to 1923 and is dominated by imperial reparation and nationhood. The 
second starts in 1923 and ends in 1927, during which time the state had not come to 
terms with the inadequacy of its administrative apparatus. From 1927, appreciation for 
the weaknesses of prior tax reforms led the Party to utilise cruder, more disruptive 
methods of extraction. The common thread through all three periods is the persistence 
or otherwise of the nomadic-sedentary divide in tax policies. If this crucially important 
distinction had survived national distinctions, administrative blindness and a class-
based approach, in that chronological order, nomadic communities may have looked 
considerably more robust by the end of the decade. As it was, their fragility was used as 
cornerstone justification for the sedentarisation campaign. 
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Members of the Kazakh Communist Party often ascribed specific meanings to 
seemingly general terms. Their references to culture could be especially perplexing. 
The oil industry of the Emba region was said to be playing a big ‘cultural role’ for the 
Kazakh Republic because it had ordered a shipment of American grain to be sown in 
fields near its oil wells.1 Semi-nomadic and sedentary communities were credited with 
a more ‘cultured’ economy than their nomadic counterparts, and culture at times was 
used as the opposite of ‘primitive.’2 Declarations might speak of ‘cultural construction’ 
and ‘cultural forms’ of economy, whilst another document refers to the cultural work of 
the Kazakh Komsomol.3 So what did members of the Zhetysu Governate Executive 
Committee mean when, on 11th April 1928, they wrote of the lack of ‘cultural-economic 
points’ in the region?4 
‘Culturedness’ (kul′turnost′) was a prominent aspect of political discourse and 
social policy from early in the Soviet period. As the quotations above confirm, the 
concepts of kul′tura and kul′turnost′ were already a conspicuous feature of the Party’s 
agenda in the 1920s.5 Kul′turnost′ in fact emerged as a common objective in European 
Russia in the late nineteenth century, and represented ‘the aspirations of workers who 
wished to rise above their poverty and degradation ... By the Soviet period, the 
discourse on culteredness emphasized proper conduct in everyday life, including 
bodily hygiene, domestic order and labor efficiency, as well as a demonstrative 
appreciation of high culture.’6 But these things would not be achieved through personal 
commitment and an anaemic public-information campaign. The politicisation of 
domestic life under Bolshevik rule drew politeness and sanitation into a schema along 
with macroeconomics, (counter-)revolutionary politics and, in the Kazakh case, 
agricultural practice. Each interacted with and affected the other. 7  With some 
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reservations, Vadim Volkov argues that all this might be thought of as a ‘civilising 
process’, and connected with ideas of civilisation.8 
Comparable to but distinct from kul′turnost′ was the concept of byt, typically 
translated into English as ‘everyday life’.9 During the NEP period the Communist Party 
choreographed campaigns for a novyi byt or ‘new way of life’. As broad as kul′turnost′, 
byt had a more domestic, menial series of associations such as with health and 
consumption, sanitation and again hygiene.10 In other words, from early in the 1920s 
the Soviet state involved itself with the minutiae of its citizens’ activities, norms and 
customs of personal behaviour which in an earlier era might have been thought of as 
private, intimate and a matter of individual discretion. This chapter will address the 
nomadic iteration of this trend. 
In European Russia questions of kul′turnost′ and byt were made contentious by 
the additional factor of class. Debate centred, at the time and long since, on whether the 
official endorsement of certain cultural values or domestic practices was the 
imposition of middle class predilections on working class peoples.11 In Soviet Central 
Asia, as was so often the case, nationality took the place of class, at least in later 
historiographical debate. For some historians the Communist Party’s policies relating 
to kul′turnost′ and byt were examples of cultural imperialism, in which a set of Russian 
or European domestic norms was forced upon non-European, non-Christian, non-
urban peoples.12 But, in comparison with arguments over class taking place in Moscow, 
this anti-imperial critique of social policy was less fiercely debated within the Kazakh 
Party branch at the time. As a result of processes described in Chapter Three regarding 
the profound disconnection between nomads and Party members, there was a 
consensus in the Party, close to absolute, about the correct role of kul′turnost′ and byt 
in nomadic communities throughout the 1920s. 
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The consensus was as follows: nomads were some of the least cultured people in 
existence and their lifestyle was to blame.13 This explains the diverse uses of the 
concept of culture cited above. Terry Martin’s list of means for achieving culturedness 
encompasses ‘industrialization, urbanization, secularization, education, universal 
literacy, and territorial nationhood’, but may well have also included settlement, the 
process by which all relevant features of the nomadic lifestyle were extinguished.14 The 
grain sowing near the Emba oil fields encouraged settlement, and therefore greater 
culturedness. The Kazakh Komsomol taught its members literacy, and therefore 
culturedness. ‘Cultural-economic points’ indicate the close alignment in Bolshevik 
thinking between economics and culture. 
In the Kazakh Republic ‘high culture’, which David L. Hoffmann associates with 
kul′turnost′, would have to wait.15 The Bolsheviks, finding formerly Tsarist Central Asia 
in a parlous, poorly developed state, had more pressing cultural concerns.16 In the 
1880s the governing institutions of rural Russia had undergone significant reform and 
the empire’s economy began to modernise.17 Tsarist Central Asia did witness some 
experiments in state-led social policy at around this time too, including the creation of 
a limited educational infrastructure, and education was a critical element of changing 
culture. Nascent as it was, though, this infrastructure’s purposes and aims differed 
depending on the personnel in charge. Some enterprises taught the Russian language, 
but also aimed to ‘preserve in students their love of the steppe and the nomadic way of 
life’, contrary to official policy which was to encourage settlement.18 The provision of 
education varied enormously by region of the steppe, and many aul schools were only 
open in spring and early summer, when the exigencies of nomadic life could 
accommodate them. 19  Generally speaking, ‘In pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan the 
network of [imperial] cultural-educational institutions was extremely weak.’20 
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Rectifying this weakness was one of the Soviet administration’s first priorities for 
the republic.21 The Kazakhs were targeted by various ‘cultural outreach policies’ 
emerging from various political agendas and cultural misunderstanding ensued.22 As 
self-declared anti-imperialists, Bolsheviks in Moscow sought to demonstrate that they 
would not treat Central Asian territories like colonies. But cultural policies in Central 
Asia and among nomads did take on their own dynamic which are connected by some 
with the Party’s sense of a civilising mission. In her lucid discussion of the USSR as an 
empire, Paula A. Michaels compares Soviet actions in Kazakhstan to imperial policies 
imposed on the Belgian Congo. She argues that the education, health and artistic 
funding which flowed from the centre to the Kazakh periphery mitigated Soviet crimes 
but it did not negate them.23 Cultural work was intended to overcome the primordial 
conditions of the nomads, whose ‘very existence attested to everything the Bolshevik 
activists despised as primitive, antimodern, and backward.’24  There is barely any 
evidence in Party documentation of emotional antipathy, but certainly nomadic culture, 
while it existed, was not respected. Its backwardness was seen as the antithesis of 
Soviet kul′turnost′.25 
This chapter will chart various attempts at changing the Kazakh nomads’ culture 
but also add commentary on further social policies and general attempts at managing 
the life of the nomad. This includes some issues discussed in earlier chapters, but the 
distinctive theme here is the focus on effecting personal behavioural change in nomads 
and in altering their byt. Some of the policies or objectives under discussion might at 
first appear disparate, but together they made an orchestral composition which Party 
figures heard as a discordant but complete whole, unable or unwilling to disassemble. 
Why the administration associated so many of these different policies together is 
partially explained by culturedness’ great breadth of definition, but there are other 
credible reasons. For example, the immaturity of Kazakhstan’s governing institutions 
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meant that each body’s administrative jurisdiction was poorly defined, causing social 
objectives to bleed into one another. Alternatively, the sheer novelty of such a 
comprehensive, amorphous and ambitious set of social agendas may have caused those 
charged with implementation to conflate and confuse. The variety of policies under 
discussion involved a large band of different institutions, the structures of which often 
played a significant role. All this will be discussed in the present chapter. 
It is not easy, nor necessarily desirable, to disentangle Soviet Kazakhstan’s 
earliest social policies into neatly delineated agendas. Their messy interconnectedness 
was one of their most important characteristics. Agricultural practice will again be 
discussed here, for example, but is relevant only in relation to the everyday life and 
cultural level of practitioners. As a result this chapter is best structured not by 
chronology, institution or policy, but by clusters of all three combined. To summarise: 
the chapter will first address the structures of the state, its engagement with nomads, 
and efforts at creating the kind of effective, representative administration necessary to 
command an unprecedented level of interference in nomadic lives. Second, it will 
consider agriculture and economics, then education. The chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of nomadic women and the Red Yurts campaign. Whereas earlier sections 
concentrate on the state and Party’s gradual encroachment into nomadic life, later 
sections focus more on the aims and effects of this encroachment. 
The chapter will argue that effecting behavioural change among nomads proved 
particularly difficult without a strong and well-organised administration, but that a 
strong and well-organised administration was hard to achieve without certain 
behavioural changes. In a sense, raising one’s cultural level was the same as 
cooperating with the Soviet state and reinforcing the Soviet economy. The Party had 
some successes in some areas, such as literacy, when it itself became migratory, 
allowing its institutions to become mobile and pursue the nomads around the steppe. 
Nomadic statehood was not conducive to fast, standardised and comprehensive policy 
outcomes, however, and those in the Kazakh Party leadership who lacked patience – a 
clear majority – were likely left unsatisfied by the results. If they were hoping to 
culturally colonise the steppe, they were frustrated. 
Section One: Building an Effective and Representative Administration 
The deficiencies of the early Soviet administration in Kazakhstan deserve 
repeated emphasis. They contextualise much of the Bolsheviks’ efforts in the realm of 
social and domestic policy. To achieve something as nuanced as change in kul′turnost′ 
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or byt, the Party hoped to build an administration which was effective and 
representative. An effective and representative administration would not only be a 
conduit for social transformation, but an incident of social transformation in itself. Yet 
building such an administration would prove to be a profoundly ambitious objective. 
This objective will be here addressed in regard to the two halves of the Soviet 
administration; first the state, then the Party. 
Tsarist Russia bequeathed a meagre state institutional inheritance to the 
Bolsheviks, who had to reconcile the ambitiousness of their aims with the poverty of 
their governing structures. This matter arose at the first All-Kazakh Party Conference 
in Orenburg in June 1921 amid complaints about the lack of central direction, the 
amateurishness of leading institutions and the disarray of their regional 
counterparts.26 For months after the Civil War the governors of some administrative 
zones were unaware of which national republic they had joined, making it impossible 
to build a chain of command.27 As acknowledged by the Central Asian Bureau in 1926, 
the extreme heterogeneity of agricultural activity in the Kazakh Republic, in 
comparison to neighbouring Uzbekistan, made reform in rural areas very difficult.28 
Managing nomads wherever they were to be found was a challenge for the Bureau. 
Their erratic distribution within nomadic territory, the unfamiliarity of state 
employees with the nomadic way of life, and the deficiency of Party activity in the 
nomadic aul all slowed the pace of ‘cultural-pedagogical work.’29 Even by November 
1928, one Party comrade felt able to use the evocative phrase ‘organisational 
helplessness’ to summarise the Kazakh state’s capabilities.30 
Petty corruption, bribery and incompetence hindered state action and alienated 
nomadic communities, and in the early years Party members worried that poor 
communication links meant nomads were unaware of the help which was offered to 
them.31 Later on in the decade, weak lines of communication were held to blame for 
widespread fears about new confiscation practices.32 Aul soviets were more erratic 
affairs than their village equivalents, and this complicated taxation, education and 
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recruitment.33 Concerns about banditry led the Party to postpone some of its early 
propagandising efforts and investigatory expeditions, perpetuating ignorance about 
the condition of the republic.34 Lawlessness itself was not easily overcome in this 
context; congresses held to resolve tribal disputes were hard to publicise, and so were 
hardly attended.35 Census materials from before and after the Civil War were 
incomplete and misleading, and at least some in the administration knew this.36 
Infrastructural problems were considered less acute in the Russian-dominated 
northern provinces of the early republic, as attested by a report on the Orsk uezd of the 
Orenburg Governate in 1922.37 This signifies the association between Kazakhs and 
backwardness, but also the genuine disparity between different regions in terms of 
communication and travel networks. In 1930, by which time Orsk and Orenburg had 
left the KASSR, statisticians counted just 600 cars in the entirety of the remaining 
republic.38 Party officials believed that the absence of other kinds of transport, such as 
canals and railroads, had inhibited the productive capacity of arable farming in Central 
Asia and would continue to do so under Communist rule without major construction 
works.39 
State employees were as green as the organisations they populated. Rosters of 
committee members from 1925 list men as young as 22, with no higher education or 
Party membership, making rulings on issues of real consequence for the daily life of 
nomads and others.40 Decisions about the legal boundaries of nomadic migration 
routes, for example, could be a matter of starvation or success for both nomads and the 
farmers they bypassed.41 Important regional organs were critically underfunded.42 On 
10th November 1928, VTsIK noted the weakness of the Kazakh Republic’s judicial 
structures. As courts functioned very slowly, local governing organs were forced to 
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leave even the most violent crimes unpunished, and the perpetuation of blood feuds 
was a particular concern.43 A common complaint submitted to regional committees 
concerned the widespread theft of livestock. This problem had still not abated in early 
1933, and was still being blamed on administrative incompetence.44 
In this context, how could the Bolsheviks hope to effect behavioural change in 
some of the most intimate areas of nomadic life?  Democratic engagement and 
representation was conceived as one partial solution to all these problems, as well as a 
check on various kinds of malpractice, but was realised in only the most limited forms. 
Women, peasants and livestock-herders were apparently hardest to involve in the 
elections of 1926, which troubled Party leaders who believed that participation would 
empower these groups at the expense of the reactionary bais.45 At least one body 
hoped that democratic engagement could peacefully resolve conflicts over land use, but 
the Communist Party lacked the manpower to have messengers migrate across the 
steppe and properly inform nomads about Party nominations.46 Working with figures 
available to him in the mid-1950s, Romeo A. Cherot claims that Kazakhs dominated 
non-urban Soviets after the republic-wide elections of 1927.47 Late the following year, 
KTsIK was instructed to improve communication with the rural economy by VTsIK, yet 
Kazakh democratic participation appears to have again receded by 1929.48  
This decline would have worried Party leaders because they believed in the 
power of democracy to overcome the bais, but also because it was a failure of 
korenizatsiia. Korenizatsiia, translated by Terry Martin as ‘indigenization’, was the 
process of adapting the administration of a republic to have it reflect that republic’s 
titular nationality.49 In Central Asia this policy began to have meaningful impact 
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between April and July 1923 when ‘mechanical korenizatsiia’ was instituted, mainly 
involving the dismissal of Russians from senior office and their replacement with 
members of titular national groups. Kazakhstan is characterised by Martin as an 
‘aggressive republic’ in this regard, promoting Kazakhs with alacrity.50 Sarah Cameron 
suggests that the Bolsheviks’ approach to korenizatsiia was ‘profoundly divisive’, in 
that it alienated those ethnic groups who were necessarily overlooked.51 It was not 
until the arrival of Filipp Goloshchekin in 1925 that this ‘mechanical’ korenizatsiia was 
replaced by ‘functional’ korenizatsiia, when emphasis was shifted to the use of the 
Kazakh language in deliberations and publications and away from hiring and firing.52 
As such, in May 1927 the Syr-Darya Gubkom indicated that more of its administrative 
functions should take place in Kazakh, not Russian, and that more Kazakhs should be 
trained and employed in financial and accounting roles.53 This was very much 
representative of regional organs across the republic.54 Later that year Goloshchekin 
submitted a report to the eighth Aktyubinsk Governate Conference in which he accused 
both Kazakh and Russian Party members of ‘deviations’ in their implementation of 
korenizatsiia until that point, confirming the shift in policy described by Martin.55 
A major topic in its own right, what is significant about korenizatsiia for the 
purposes of this thesis is the definition of nationhood on which it was based. In an 
effort to make Soviet power native, to remedy the Tsarist Empire’s colonial legacy and 
combat cultural backwardness, the Bolsheviks strove to bring Kazakhs and their 
language into the committee room.56 The republic would then better represent the 
Kazakh nation. But as explained in Chapter Three, Soviet definitions of Kazakh 
nationhood seldom included nomadism or its cultural legacies. Thus efforts to include 
rural Kazakhs and nomads in matters of Party and state were not written into 
korenizatsiia and benefitted little from that agenda. Though the Party also worried 
about democracy’s failure to overcome the bais, this seems a complication of a more 
fundamental problem, that nomads were alienated from the state and would not 
engage, but the state could not systematically involve itself with nomads without first 
engaging and employing them. 
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Like the state, the Party was a device for the transformation of wider society. 
Communists were made well-aware of the social structures of nomadic society which 
had to be expunged, variously described as ‘patriarchal’, ‘tribal’ ‘capitalist’, or simply as 
bai.57 The power of Mullahs and other religious authorities in Kazakh society was a 
target for the atheist Communists as well, and the perceived dominance of men in 
Central Asian communities was criticised.58 At times tribal, religious and patriarchal 
divisions were equated with class divisions, at other times they were presented as 
irrelevant anachronisms which distracted poor Kazakhs from the most fundamental 
form of stratification in the aul, that of economic class.59 Ultimately, however, all these 
features of nomadic life were held to have a regressive effect on Kazakh culture.60 
Prominent Party figures such as Sultan-Galiev repeatedly made the case for the 
eradication of exploitative elements in the aul, accusing them of lending animals, 
leasing land and allowing water-access to poor Kazakhs and demanding ruinous levels 
of repayment.61 Sultan-Galiev himself was an atypical Party member, a Tatar nationalist 
who had argued that class categories should not be applied to formerly colonial 
peoples. He wrote extensively on anti-religious propaganda, another question of 
culture and byt to be discussed again shortly.62 
Sometimes described as the ‘Sovietisation of the aul’, the spread of the Party and 
its campaigns was explicitly intended to undermine traditional structures of power in 
Kazakh society.63 As explained in Chapter Six, the expropriation of goods and livestock 
from the richest Kazakhs was perhaps the Party’s primary method before 
sedentarisation, but more subtle policies were also advocated, such as ‘rallying the 
bedniak and seredniak mass against the bai in the aul’.64 This might involve the 
replacement of patrilineal principles of inheritance and land ownership with collective 
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ones devised by the administration, but the regular propagandising of aul Party cells 
was surely the Communist Party’s primary strategy.65 
Leaving aside the antagonism and disruption engendered by such an approach, 
this assault on traditional social structures could have a retroactive impact on the 
Party’s other agendas.66 The risk of forbidding the children of bai families from 
attending schools, for example, was that moderately-affluent and impoverished 
Kazakhs would also accidentally be denied an education.67 The Bolsheviks’ earliest 
assault on faith and religious authority in the Kazakh Republic was largely unsuccessful 
and deeply alienating.68 The state’s interference was also highly provocative in less 
intimate but no less important areas like agricultural activity.69  
As with the state, it was believed that the Communist Party should be made more 
representative of Kazakh society, principally through the recruitment of more Kazakh 
members.70 This would mitigate the provocative impact of Communist propaganda by 
undermining the sense that the Party was a Russian institution acting in a colonial 
manner towards Kazakhs. The more Kazakhs in the Party, the more the Party looked 
like a collaborative multinational effort.71 
Rural Kazakhstan’s earliest Communist Party cells were small in number, and the 
quality of their membership was a source of serious anxiety for those in Orenburg. 
Qualified Kazakhs were hard to find, and suitable Russians rarely possessed the 
necessary familiarity with Kazakh life and culture.72 One delegate sent to the Kazakh 
capital from the Adai region related local concerns thus: ‘The organisation of the 
Communist Party in the Kazakh Republic has 25 thousand members and the oblast 
bureau could not find from that number an appropriate secretary!’73 There followed a 
rush to recruit new Kazakhs, generally from among young adults, through the 
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organisation of associations or unions.74 This was most commonly done at particular 
points in the nomads’ seasonal migrations, when their location was more certain and 
their lifestyle made fewer demands on their time.75 Joining the Party thus necessitated 
at least a brief behavioural shift from ordinary nomadic duties. But nationality was not 
the only criterion by which potential members were assessed, and unease quickly 
followed regarding the class character of new Kazakh members. For some Party 
leaders, the recruitment of Kazakhs at the expense of Russians became conflated with a 
kind of bourgeois nationalist entryism.76 Early, small-scale Party purges were enacted 
in response, particularly between 1922 and 1924, alongside further engagement with 
the poorest of the steppe population.77  
Ideally, new Party members had not just to be Kazakhs, but poor Kazakhs, and as 
well as nationality and class, the Communist Party kept registers of its members’ 
professions, whether farmers, livestock-herders (presumably this category included 
nomads), craftsmen and so on.78 A high proportion of recruits from affluent professions 
was inevitable because of literacy requirements, which the wealthy were more likely to 
meet.79 This would continue to cause alarm late into the decade.80 Leaders claimed that 
bourgeois elements in the membership stopped the Party building a relationship with 
the aul and holding influence there, though it is unclear when the Party would ever 
realistically have been satisfied with its power among nomads; by 1929 it was 
indisputably but still jealously the supreme institution on the steppe.81 The Party also 
continued to use methods of social categorisation without readily-apparent resonance 
in nomadic regions. The Semipalatinsk Governate does not explain, in a register of new 
recruits printed in September 1929, how pastoral nomads were inserted into a 
typology including batrak, ‘peasant’, and ‘worker’ but not kochevnik.82 For a Party 
anxious about its sway in nomadic regions, it remained stubbornly attached to national 
and class differences, but not agricultural ones. 
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As Party organisations spread across the countryside, from 1925 Kazakh 
membership began a steady five-year rise.83 Already in 1926, regional committees felt 
able to express growing confidence in their network of rural cells, which were 
apparently increasing Party engagement and becoming more involved in the 
management of economic and societal life in the aul.84 Yet leaders remained mindful of 
nomadism’s unique challenges:  
The remoteness of the aul from the governing centres; the 
disconnectedness of the aul; the low cultural level of its clannic existence; 
the nomadic economy [all] hold back the growth of the technical and 
political literacy of the aul communist and lead to the subordination of the 
interests of the Party to the interests of the clan, of the group and of the bai 
elements.85 
Cherot confirms that, in comparison with settled Uzbeks or Tajiks, ‘the unsettled 
character of the Kazakh population made it difficult to establish political contact with 
them, to make them Party, and politically, conscious.’86 Propagandising against 
nomadism would be difficult while nomads could not hear the propaganda.87 Cherot, 
however, also notes the relatively high proportion of Russians in the Kazakh Republic, 
and the Kazakhs’ comparably low level of education and urbanization, as reasons for 
the continuing dominance of Europeans in the Kazakh Party branch for the entirety of 
the decade 1920-1930.88 
As the scales nevertheless tipped haltingly towards a Kazakh majority, new Party 
members of all nationalities were being hurriedly educated in the ideology of the 
organisation.  Lectures, discussion groups and publications of varying length and 
sophistication were the Party’s primary means. 89  For those who attained it, 
membership of the Kazakh Communist Party was thus intended as a transformational 
process. The more nomads who joined, the less backward the population would 
become. Perhaps, if younger people were perceived as less obstinate and more 
compliant, this explains the Party’s eagerness to engage with the native youth. By 1929, 
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Kazakhs outnumbered non-Kazakhs by two to one in the Kazakh Komsomol.90 Still the 
processes of recruitment and education took time, creating what Martin describes as a 
‘hole in the middle’; a lack of Kazakhs employed in middle-ranking professions 
requiring literacy and numeracy.91 
The Soviet state and Communist Party were both parts of the larger Kazakh 
administration which would be used in the 1920s to change nomadic society and 
nomadic social norms. Both began the decade as deeply inadequate institutional 
conglomerations, and the policy of making them more representative and thus more 
effective was imperfectly realised. For nomads, this was largely because representation 
was conceived in terms of class and nationality, social categories which correlated to 
some extent with nomadism (nomads were usually poor and never Russian) but which 
did not perfectly reflect the nomadic-sedentary divide in the Kazakh Republic. The 
difficulty of communicating with nomads, and the low rates of literacy and numeracy 
among them, also hindered their recruitment, and because participation in the 
administration was at least as transformational as being governed by said 
administration, nomads often missed a further opportunity to experience the processes 
of social change favoured by the Party. Yet all this did nothing to dissuade the 
administration from seeking social change. Though the early Party and state lacked 
effectiveness and representativeness, they both set about accumulating information on 
nomadic life and devising ways to transform it. 
Section Two: Information, Agricultural Reform and Economic Policy 
In February 1922, a delegate to the second All-Kazakh Conference complained: 
‘On the steppe now, as earlier, any information is completely lacking.’92 A scarcity of 
knowledge, or a rich abundance of ignorance, was both a symptom and cause of the 
minimal infrastructure inherited by Bolshevik revolutionaries. The Red Caravan was 
one of the Party’s first means of redress, and provided the administration with some of 
its earliest and most immediate insights into nomadic life and culture. 
Not to be conflated with the Red Yurts, the Red Caravan was a quite distinct 
enterprise albeit with notable similarities. Like the yurts, to be discussed later, the Red 
Caravan was a roving institution, which approached nomads instead of waiting for 
nomads to approach it. It is one of the first instances of the Soviet administration going 
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mobile in Central Asia; meeting its nomadic citizens in situ on the road. Its objectives 
were also similarly manifold. Soon after complaints were aired at the second All-
Kazakh Conference, a kind of manifesto of aims for the Caravan was published by the 
Kazakh Oblast and Central Executive Committees (the Kazakh Obkom and KTsIK).93 Its 
three stated aims were: 
1) The investigation, inspection and instruction of local Party Soviets and 
professional organs and the study of local working conditions. 
2) Political-educational work and economic ‘agro-propaganda.’ 
3) Practical medical and veterinary aid to the population.94 
The Caravan was to be led by three representatives of KTsIK and the Kazakh 
Obkom. A complaints bureau would be managed by a member of the Kazakh 
Committee of Justice, a political department would liaise with regional bodies, and 
veterinary information points would be held alongside medical clinics.95 The Red 
Caravan thus acted as an inspecting, instructing and galvanising arm of the central 
Kazakh Party executive. In the full variety of its functions, it may be presented as an 
early microcosm for all the social policies the Party pursued on the steppe, but as a 
means of gathering information it excelled because so many of its services doubled as 
methods for learning about the nomadic population. They were also provided to 
nomads on the move, in their typical state of seasonal mobility, rather than in the 
artificial conditions of a conference or court hearing. This is presumably why a 
photographer and a scholar also joined the troupe.96 
The Red Caravan travelled extensively within the Kazakh Republic, setting off 
from Orenburg on 20th May 1922 and alighting at the towns of Orsk, Turgai, Atbasar, 
Akmolinsk, Petropavlovsk, Pavlodar and Semipalatinsk, visiting various villages and 
aul communities en route.97 On arrival at the Orsk region of what was then a north-
western area of the Kazakh Republic, the Red Caravan gave orders to local bureaucrats 
for the alleviation of famine and the improvement of sanitary conditions, among other 
objectives.98 It also began the flurry of reports which Party leaders in Orenburg used 
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when devising legislation in keeping with the New Economic Policy.99 Unsurprisingly 
given the time of its activity, the Caravan’s favoured themes in its reporting of nomadic 
life were shortage, destitution and need. 
The Red Caravan worked on similar issues both independently and together with 
the Red Army. A representative of the Red Army’s Kazakh recruitment office travelled 
with and answered to the leader of the Red Caravan. During expeditions, this figure 
was expected to arrange meetings with civilians to explain the nature and aims of the 
Red Army and to discuss local military affairs. When the Red Caravan came across 
military companies, the Red Army’s representative was obligated to inspect and 
correct political-educational activities within the group, thereby fulfilling an extra 
supervisory function on behalf of central authorities.100 It seems that the Red Army was 
sometimes conceived of as an institutional conduit for the establishment of a network 
of Party cells, which would eventually supersede the army across the republic, 
moderate the activities of serving soldiers, and augment the state’s governing 
apparatus. 101  In preparation for this handover the army published internal 
propaganda.102 
Long after the Red Caravan had finished its expedition, the Soviet administration 
was still investing considerable effort and resources in studying the Kazakh population. 
Most obvious is the All-Union census of 1926, but regional bodies also sponsored their 
own research.103 On 15th February 1927, for example, the Syr-Darya Governate 
Committee launched an inquiry into ‘one of the volosts typical for Kazakhstan.’104 The 
Gubkom seems to have preferred a representative volost because its data might have 
provided generalizable lessons for the management of the whole governate. It 
described the population of its typical volost as semi-nomadic, located in one area 
during the winter and migrating in the summer months.105 Under a heading helpfully 
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entitled ‘Questions that need answering,’ the Gubkom revealed the extent of its 
ignorance seven years after the close of the Civil War.106 Questions were a mixture of 
economic, political, and social or cultural issues: the whereabouts of aul Soviets; the 
number of communities in an ‘administrative aul’ (adm-aul); the size of the population 
in an adm-aul; the number of clans in an adm-aul; the main leaders of these clans; the 
time of the summer migration; migratory routes; the distances between summer and 
winter campsites; the size of aul Party cells; the age, education, social origins and 
occupation of cell members; how cells operated during migrations and how frequently 
they convened.107 Assuming that the Syr-Darya Gubkom asked questions for which it 
had no ready answer, it appears no better informed about its network of Party cells 
than it was about the population they supervised. Comparably on 7th April 1930, prior 
to a reorganisation of collective farms in the area, the Alma-Ata Okrug Committee felt it 
necessary to create a commission for the identification of nomadic and semi-nomadic 
regions.108 
As it gradually increased its understanding of the Kazakh nomadic population, 
the Soviet administration took steps to change the cultural norms or byt of the nomads. 
The most obvious manner in which it could do this was by changing prevailing 
agricultural practices, migration and pastoral animal husbandry, since these practices 
defined the distinctive, unique everyday behaviour of nomadic communities in the area. 
Agricultural reform has of course been discussed in every chapter of this thesis, but 
here it will be considered specifically with regard to its cultural or domestic 
implications. 
First, the poor state of Kazakh livestock was deemed a key cause of the nomad’s 
cultural deficiencies, and it was repeatedly argued that lack of technology, outdated 
habits and poor veterinary standards all undermined what little profitability could be 
found in nomadic animal husbandry.109 Fundamentally, nomadism was ‘backward’ and 
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unproductive, and poverty suffocated social progress.110 A resolution of the sixth All-
Kazakh Regional Party Conference in 1928 summarised the problem as follows: 
The characteristic trait of cattle-breeding in Kazakhstan is its 
extreme backwardness (archaic, uncultured forms of activity in the 
community, a haphazard approach to developing the herd, nomadic routes 
across a vast distance, inferior types of livestock, pasturage all year, 
periodic decline as a result of dzhut and epidemics and so on)…111 
 Nomadic techniques for keeping animals were thus a prime target for the Party’s 
intervention, initially to protect herds from epizootic episodes, raiding packs of wolves 
and dzhut. According to estimates made at the time, the population of the Akmola 
Governate lost considerable numbers of livestock as a result of epidemic in 1926, and a 
good portion was taken by wolves in the same year.112 The Party believed it could 
rectify these problems with new scientific methods of farming and animal 
husbandry.113 Veterinary assistance would take the form of trained specialists offering 
advice to nomadic communities, and governate bodies also planned to breed Kazakh 
sheep with varieties which produced more wool. More cattle hide would go to the 
tanning industries, communities would be encouraged to create and trade more dairy 
products, and prices would be fixed to strengthen animal husbandry.114 Livestock 
herding among both sedentary and nomadic communities would undergo 
‘rationalisation.’115 
The improvement of livestock breeds was an agenda for the whole Kazakh 
Republic as well, as revealed in a declaration from Sovnarkom RSFSR, dated 2nd August 
1928. 116 Party members also spoke about improving access to fodder for livestock, to 
bring more stability to the republic’s nomadic herds.117 Rather than increasing the land 
available to nomads, the Party encouraged the use of feed in place of fresh fodder.118 
This effort intensified in 1930 as another bout of instability and hardship struck the 
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republic.119 Rationalisation on a republic-wide level involved the formalisation of 
nomadic migratory routes and the locations of summer and winter pasturages.120 
 As and when nomads did settle, and possibly at the points in the nomads’ 
migrations when they stopped to sow or reap grains and fodder, attempts were also 
made to improve agronomic technique. Kazakh agronomic practice was typically 
compared unfavourably with that of Russian peasants; whereas some Russians had 
long ago begun adopting the medieval three-field system of crop rotation in the 
republic, Kazakhs were barely familiar with it.121 The disparity between the two was 
seen not only as a logistical problem but a source of profound inequality and 
instability.122 This was particularly the case in the context of widespread food 
shortages after the first famine.123 
Party-led efforts to change this state of affairs began in the earliest days of the 
republic, as on 22nd February 1921 when the first session of KTsIK proposed increasing 
and improving land cultivation, explicitly with the cooperation of the republic’s 
livestock-herding communities124 Such a behavioural shift necessitated education and 
guidance from localised state actors, at that point conceived as ‘agricultural soviets’, 
who would actively include nomadic and semi-nomadic society into the improvement 
of agriculture through instruction and propaganda whilst also offering veterinary aid 
and protection from wolves, perhaps as incentives for the nomads’ complicity.125 An 
army of agronomists was required for such a task, but the administration struggled to 
find sufficient numbers, and all the Party’s extravagant pledges must be read alongside 
the aforementioned complaint from 1928 about ‘administrative helplessness’.126 
Anxieties about the bourgeois background of some specialists seems to have been less 
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pronounced in the Kazakh Republic than in Moscow, possibly because numbers were 
even lower and Kazakh officials felt less able to be particular.127 
The Soviet state also convened ‘sowing campaigns’ to furrow and sow lands and 
overcome food shortages at harvest time. 128  Given the presumed cultural 
backwardness of nomadism and the transformational effects of settlement, these 
endorsements of sedentary arable farming were conceived as acts of social as well as 
economic intervention.129 Some of the Red Caravan’s most important decrees related to 
agronomic efforts, such as the coordination of community-wide efforts to plough the 
land and sow seeds.130 The distribution of grains for sowing remained an important 
aim for the administration.131 
The regulation of trading relations between livestock-herders and farmers was 
also a recurrent policy.132 Commodity exchange was seen as a way of making animal 
husbandry more profitable at the height of NEP and undermining the strangle-hold of 
the bais, as well as efficiently distributing produce.133 The mobility of nomadic 
communities and their traditional use of trade fairs seemed a simple way of 
overcoming the lack of roads and rail.134 The largest annual Kazakh trade fairs could 
last for weeks and attract tens of thousands of nomads, creating fields of yurts across 
many kilometres of land.135 The Party involved itself in the organisation of such 
commodity markets on the steppe late into the NEP era, thereby again co-opting the 
mobility of nomadic institutions and practices for its own ends just as the Red Caravan 
had done.136 As concerns about exploitation and private capital gained currency, the 
administration organised ‘mobile state exchange’ and began closing down some non-
state markets.137 Of course, the exchange of private goods was justified as a way of 
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allowing nomads to accumulate the resources needed to successfully settle, and 
therefore successfully advance, so the state’s adoption of nomadic practices was 
conceived as another temporary solution to the governance of a highly mobile 
population.138 All this coincided with the perceived economic interests of the Union and 
the state more generally. 
For the construction of a stable economy, nomadic agricultural behaviour had 
also to be standardised and harmonised with the expansive range of agricultural 
practices to be found elsewhere on the steppe.139 The lack of established, republic-wide 
norms for governing land-use and agricultural activities was held responsible for 
increasing ethnic tension in late 1928, as was the unregulated use of water and the 
long-neglected irrigation system which exacerbated shortages.140 Moscow encouraged 
the Kazakh Party branch to popularise crop growing, improve livestock herding and 
develop cottage industries and handicraft techniques in rural Kazakhstan.141 Even the 
further development of timber and carpentry was connected to the nomads. Amze 
Nakhimzhan, a delegate to the second All-Kazakh Conference in 1922 and then only 23 
years of age, pointed out: ‘The significance [the timber industry] has for the settled 
population is clear to everyone, but regarding nomads, the wooden parts of yurts are 
essential for them.’142 
In comparison to later years, the NEP era was characterised by less intervention 
than the ambitious publications of Party organs might suggest. Irrigation projects and 
land reclamation was however a site of considerable activity from the beginning of the 
1920s.143 Irrigation created the possibility of cotton-growing in the south, a means of 
stabilising and improving the Kazakh Republic’s economic productivity as a whole.144 
This was considered so important that the KASSR’s borders were drawn carefully 
around irrigation systems, so that canals which serviced Kazakh land would not have 
their water sources managed by Uzbeks.145 General attempts were made to regulate 
water-use across the republic.146 The state aimed to create or reconstruct a more 
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comprehensive network of wells, for the use of passing nomads and others.147 Aside 
from cotton, the administration entertained proposals for melon fields and goat 
farms.148 
Larger infrastructural projects such as oil extraction and the Turksib (Turkestan-
Siberian) and Semirech′e railways acted as loci for economic development and 
nomadic engagement.149 The Party prioritised the security and control of areas of 
major economic significance, creating spaces in which Soviet power functioned fully 
and properly within the larger malaise. A resolution from the Central Asian Bureau on 
the treatment of nomads suggested that it was here, at these points of state orderliness 
and control, that medical and educational institutions should be established for the 
cultural improvement of nomads who passed by.150 These areas were also conceived as 
most appropriate for large-scale sedentary agricultural efforts.151 The image created by 
the documentation is of a general lawless nomadism tempered only where 
communities brush against areas of concentrated state interests, where facilities 
functioned as they should. Beyond these areas ‘the tribal principle and patriarchal 
relations’ reign.152 
The Koshchi Union was established in Central Asia in 1920, and may initially 
have been a response to the instability and banditry which predominated there at the 
time. Like other forms of collective endeavour, it did not begin meaningful operations 
in the Kazakh Republic until later in the decade, but by the late 1920s its Kazakh 
branch had become a major lever of power, dominated by ethnic Kazakhs.153 In May 
1928 it had 231,650 registered members.154 Koshchi Union cells primarily operated in 
settled and semi-nomadic regions, but also engaged with and recruited nomads, 
building bases within particular auls and then connecting with other local cells to 
create unified regional branches.155 Though it was intended as another means of 
undermining tribal loyalties in favour of class ones, its membership towards the end of 
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the decade was still drawn disproportionately from affluent families, prompting 
intermittent purges.156 As in the Party, purges were considered an effective means of 
shaping the lives of nomads and others who wanted to retain their institutional 
foothold. Like the other economic and agricultural policies of the early Soviet state, the 
Koshchi Union was intended to promulgate new, superior forms of behaviour and then 
enforce those behaviours through cooperation, support, but also patronage and 
financial coercion.157 
Like the establishment of an effective and representative administration, in the 
ideological atmosphere of early Soviet Central Asia, agronomic and economic reforms 
were believed to have important cultural consequences which are vitally important for 
understanding the Soviet state’s relationship with Kazakh nomads. These reforms were 
pursued alongside ongoing efforts to learn more about nomads, in lieu of a successful 
attempt to bring nomads into the republic’s administrative structures.  At times, such 
was the distance between nomad and state, institutions took to migrating themselves, 
whether in the form of trade fairs or roving investigatory teams. This trend is also 
observable in the sphere of educational policy, an area with a more readily apparent 
cultural dimension which again had to adapt to the nomadic context. 
Section Three: Education 
Agronomic training, ideological instruction, general education and literacy 
formed a tight association of mutually relevant agendas in many Kazakh Party 
documents. A report from the ‘agitprop department’ (agit prop otdel) of the Kustanai 
Governate, dated March 1922, exemplifies the trend.158  According to the piece, the 
agitprop department was then recruiting the best agronomists of the region to work 
with the local newspaper ‘Steppe’, to help the publication answer the questions of its 
readers relating to the proper cultivation and division of land and adaptation to 
drought conditions. The department also produced a series of pamphlets on related 
matters, including ‘Questions of a drought-struck economy’, and ran monthly 
agricultural courses. At the same time, the department was cooperating with the Red 
Army on matters of internal Party propaganda, and advising educational organs on the 
liquidation of illiteracy.159 The agitprop department apparently combined all this with 
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work more befitting of its title, such as the coordination of Party activities among the 
scattered communities of the governate.160 
Education was something any Kazakh Party or state organ could do. Even the 
Red Army’s recruitment official who travelled with the Red Caravan, mentioned earlier 
in the chapter, had a distinctively educational function. In between explaining the Red 
Army’s policies and activities to civilians, this figure was tasked with the establishment 
of schools and libraries in any military units he or she came across during his journey. 
Once organised, the official would leave the unit with instructions for the further 
development of these educational endeavours.161 The Red Caravan itself, in its capacity 
as a fact-finding expedition, confirmed the pressing need to improve literacy among 
Kazakhs, and insisted that Russian Party members educate themselves about local 
Kazakh custom and practice.162 If the Party was to function as an educational 
institution, it had best be educated. A Party census from January 1927 revealed that 
only 35% of Kazakh Party members had received a formal education, and 25% of all 
members were wholly illiterate. Other ethnic Party branches in Central Asia admitted 
worse results, but the need for basic education was clearly not imaginary.163 In 1923 
Kazakh Party cells received a 90-hour course in political economy produced in 
Moscow.164 
Such was the conflation of educational and agricultural policies, that the Kazakh 
People’s Commissariats of Education (Narodnyi komissariat prosveshcheniia Kirgizskoi 
ASSR, or Narkompros) and Agriculture (Narodnyi komissariat zemledeliia, or 
Narkomzem) spent the summer of 1924 arguing over which organisation was best 
placed to manage education in rural areas. 165  Originally controlled largely by 
Narkomzem, sovkhoz and aul schools were transferred to the jurisdiction of 
Narkompros by central organs, something Narkomzem briefly protested. After all, 
some of the Party’s greatest agricultural challenges, including the prevention of 
livestock epidemics and anticipation of climactic disasters, were contingent on state-
directed education.166 Nakompros defended the decision on two levels; first, that 
Narkomzem’s conception of education was too narrow, and second, that Narkompros 
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would better manage all aspects of rural education, including its agricultural aspects.167 
Certainly this was a major matter, since aul schools were said to play the most ‘decisive 
role’ in the countryside.168 The building of a network of educational institutions, 
offering their services to nomads, was one of the administration’s foremost aims.169 
Education was seen as the state’s way of accessing the minds of nomads, precipitating 
voluntary behavioural changes in agriculture, health and social order, while also 
effecting a larger political transformation. But all could potentially prove beneficial for 
the aul, the governate, the republic and the Union. 
Even later in the decade, as fewer and fewer Party members anticipated a long-
term accommodation of nomadism, Governate committees were planning to create 
cadres of nomadic tutors and mobile schools alongside the more conventional 
textbooks and educational grants.170  Sovnarkom RSFSR insisted on the further 
construction of stationary schools in regions dominated by Kazakh nomads in August 
1928, but the principle of nomadic educational institutions which moved to meet their 
pupils seasonally had by then been long-standing.171 
To elaborate a little more on this trend for fact-finding expeditions, trade fairs 
and, here, educational projects to migrate around the steppe, what is so striking about 
these policies is that they differ so dramatically from more widespread representations 
of the Soviet state. Historians might more commonly present the Soviet state as an 
immovable, unyielding framework of institutions or an unresponsive, stagnant 
bureaucracy, highly formalised and very much of physical bricks and mortar, which is 
what has made the high walls of the Kremlin or the reticent facade of the Lubyanka 
such apposite visual metaphors for Soviet power. Could there be any greater contrast 
between these Muscovite landmarks and the carts of the Red Caravan or, to be 
discussed in section four, the Red Yurts? In place of the Byzantine paperwork for which 
Soviet Commissariats became notorious, small-scale Party cells travelling the steppe 
were necessarily cut adrift from centralized authority, albeit with clear instructions in 
hand. In the Kazakh Republic, at least, Soviet power for a period roved the landscape in 
search of a hearing, rather than hiding its inner machinery away behind solid, imposing 
and impregnable architecture. 
                                                          
167 TsGARK 30/1/362: 195-195 ob.. 
168 RGASPI 17/25/208: 52. 
169 RGASPI 62/2/911: 165. 
170 RGASPI 17/25/208: 52. RGASPI 17/25/87: 217. 
171 GARF 1235/73/21: 65 ob.. 
188 
 
The physical mobility of educational institutions was intended not only for the 
benefit of isolated or disinterested rural Kazakhs, but also for rural Kazakhs with an 
interest in joining the Party. In an assault on the ‘political illiteracy’ of Party members 
and membership candidates, authorities in the Akmola region arranged educational 
expeditions, assemblies of peasant delegates and ideological courses which would 
deliver Communism to the countryside.172 In instructions published in November 1926, 
course convenors were advised to begin their tutelage based on an assessment of their 
pupils’ knowledge. It was deemed essential to hold an introductory group discussion, 
in which the ‘leader should speak as little as possible’ in order to discover the issues 
which most interested his or her pupils.173 Literacy for membership hopefuls was a 
priority, as some arrived at the assembly point completely illiterate, but on matters of 
political theory the pedagogue’s role was to encourage Kazakhs to discover 
Communism for themselves: ‘The old question ‘lecture or discussion’ should be 
decisively resolved in favour of the latter.’174 Perhaps it was thought that the open 
steppe made escape from a soporific lecture too easy. 
Beyond political literacy, tutors were faced with a more profound problem. As 
noted by VTsIK in November 1928, the Kazakh Steppe greeted the October revolution 
in a state of almost total illiteracy.175 According to one estimate, over 90% of the aul 
population was illiterate in 1920.176 Kazakh nomadic culture was traditionally oral, 
including in its transmission of Islam.177 Literacy became a prevailing Party ambition 
and also a cornerstone of social mobility; attendees of literacy classes could be made 
Party members and encouraged to act as role models for their fellow nomads. 178  As 
argued in section one, illiteracy was a major obstacle in the recruitment of and 
communication with nomads. The early literacy campaigns were less effective in rural 
areas and riven with contradictions but it is notable that, leading into the 1930s, these 
campaigns have been presented as one of the Soviet administration’s most 
unambiguous successes.179 Here the Party’s youth movement, the Komsomol, played a 
particular role, as did the republic’s larger infrastructural projects, which educated 
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their Kazakh employees. By 1939 the literacy rate in the republic for those over 50 
years of age was recorded at a striking 83.6 percent.180 
The decade closed with some of the Party’s educational ambitions unfulfilled. On 
17th October 1929 a representative of the KASSR informed VTsIK that there was no 
principle of compulsory education in the republic, nor could or would there be without 
further funding from Moscow.181 Education remained a priority for some time, 
therefore, and Party members continued to conflate it with all other kinds of 
development into the 1930s. Sedentarisation was, for some in the administration, a 
quintessentially progressive policy, and so it should come as no surprise that the 
Committee for Sedentarisation counted children’s nurseries and literacy among some 
of its most important measures.182 The committee also discussed the building of roads 
and hospitals and the management of Party cadres.183 The connection between the 
Committee for Sedentarisation, the First Five Year Plan, and the changing direction of 
cultural policy in the USSR and in the KASSR may indicate how activities were going to 
change in the early 1930s.184 Most state organs, though not all, would stop migrating 
just as nomads were forced to. 
In broader terms of cultural development, the living and working practices 
among urbanized nomads also came under the Party’s gaze. As Matthew J. Payne 
suggests, many Kazakhs (and all nomads) were ‘production outsiders’, unaccustomed 
to the conventions of the industrial workplace.185 They would need protection as well 
as additional guidance. Reports of Kazakhs, potentially recently-settled, damaging 
buildings and allowing their livestock to do the same would also have prompted the 
Party to adapt a rural lifestyle to an urban environment.186 In May 1930 the Aktiubinsk 
Okrug Committee recommended that the administration of newly-settled aul 
communities should be organised with reference to the ‘cultural-domestic specificities’ 
of the population in question.187 This might have involved emphasising the importance 
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of hygienic domestic conditions, for example, something which would also be of 
repeated significance in the Party’s dealings with nomadic women.188 
Section Four: Nomadic Women, Health and the Red Yurts 
Inheriting certain elements of their approach from late Tsarist intellectual 
currents, the Bolsheviks brought to post-revolutionary Russia a commitment to 
transforming women’s role in both domestic and professional contexts.189 In Central 
Asia this same agenda interacted with local cultural and religious practices, but was no 
less radical, indeed it may have seemed more so.190 The proper position of women, 
hotly contested within the Party in the 1920s, was deeply intermeshed with questions 
of culture and everyday life.191 
Like other policies, campaigning for the inclusion and betterment of women was 
an interdepartmental effort, and was understood as such by the Kazakh Party 
branch.192 At times this appears to have undermined the case for a strong central 
zhenotdel (Women’s Department), which was denied an official role, centrally and 
regionally, in famine relief efforts in 1922 because its brief was considered 
insufficiently relevant.193 Sarah Cameron rightly asserts that female emancipation 
among Kazakhs (who were less likely to wear a veil, for example) did not become the 
heightened political controversy it did among Uzbeks.194 Shortage of manpower also 
affected the women’s agenda: Goloshchekin, by then first secretary of the Kazakh 
Communist Party, admitted in 1927 that the republic suffered from a critical lack of 
relevant trained professionals, including doctors and midwives.195 
On the other hand, gender politics were not relegated to the prerogative of a 
lonely sub-committee in Alma-Ata, formed to fulfil the demands of one of Moscow’s 
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ideological preoccupations. The Koshchi Union was expected to be sensitive to issues of 
gender.196 Regional committees regularly discussed ‘work among women’ alongside 
finances, communications and governance, and published local newspapers for 
working female Kazakhs.197 Though the Union-wide zhenotdel was formally dissolved 
in 1930, it continued to function in Kazakhstan and in similar republics into the 
1930s.198 Prior to this moment, it too reflected the tight interconnection between 
health, education and gender in the Bolsheviks’ approach. Each governate’s zhenotdel 
was expected to enlist women specifically in the battle with typhoid in 1922, for 
example.199 Women were seen as the primary conduit for the improvement of domestic 
hygiene and public health in the aul, and were targeted with leaflets advising on these 
matters.200 
By various Soviet criteria of development women lagged behind men, and as 
nomads similarly lagged behind sedentary communities, so nomadic women formed 
one of the neediest groups in the Union. From the beginning, the administration of the 
Kazakh Republic had been keen to recognise gender difference in the nomadic aul. All 
nomadic women were exempt from the Work and Cartage tax in early 1922, for 
example.201 If literacy was rare among Kazakhs in the early 1920s, it was almost 
unheard of among Kazakh women, and as such they were particularly targeted by 
literacy campaigns, with a phalanx of female Kazakh literacy instructors envisioned by 
the Party in November 1922.202 The recruitment of poor Kazakh women into the 
Communist Party was also a daunting aim.203 In some ways nomadic culture may have 
mitigated the challenge, however. Yaacov Ro’i asserts that to some degree Kazakh 
women were less secluded than in other Central Asian communities, and that this was 
due to the informality of nomadic custom, which made gender segregation 
impractical.204 Yet it is notable that Ro’i cites Soviet-era scholarship in defence of this 
description, which may originate from later Soviet attempts to present nomads as 
culturally amenable to Communism. In this respect, the argument bears indicative 
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similarities with Tsarist efforts to present Kazakh nomads as lacking in Islamic fervour 
and therefore responsive to Orthodox Christianity and Russification.205  
As indicated by Narkompros KASSR, until 1923 most propagandizing among 
female Kazakhs was restricted to urban and settled regions. It was at this point that the 
administration turned its attention on the nomadic aul and its attendant challenges; 
the scattered distribution of the population, changing seasonal circumstances and the 
‘hostile attitude from the male part of the population to the involvement of women in 
the work of the Soviets.’206 
The Soviet conception of female empowerment encompassed many changes in 
behaviour and belief, including their participation in collective labour, Party 
membership, voting, improved literacy and economic independence. The Communist 
Party also sought to undermine and ultimately eradicate certain customs, such as 
polygamy and kalym.207 Kalym was the Kazakh dowry or bride price, which predated 
Islam but was later adapted to that religion.208 A ‘day for the cancellation of kalym’ was 
celebrated by Party cells in 1923, and the following year in October it and similar 
practices were formally banned through Soviet reforms to the criminal code.209 Here 
the Soviet Union was continuing a subjugation of Kazakh legal and social practices 
which had begun long before 1917, but such measures were also part of the 
Communist Party’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with religious norms and 
activities.210 Sultan-Galiev drew these issues together most concisely in 1921: ‘cultural 
backwardness and religious fanaticism go hand in hand, completing and mutually 
reinforcing each other.’211 
                                                          
205 Allen J. Frank argues that non-Soviet historians like Martha Brill Olcott and Alexandre 
Bennigsen have perpetuated this misrepresentation of the Kazakhs by uncritically referencing 
Tsarist-era sources: Frank, Muslim Institutions, pp. 275-276. See also: Robert D. Crews, For 
Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), pp. 198-199. 
206 TsGARK 81/1/665: 5, 9. 
207 TsGARK 81/1/665: 5-13. 
208 Kassymova, Kundakbaeva, and Markus, eds., Historical Dictionary,  pp. 135-136. 
209 TsGARK 81/1/665: 6. Hélène Carrère D’Encausse, The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the 
Bolshevik State 1917-1930 (London: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 165. For further discussion of the 
Soviet state’s reform of religious practice, see: Shoshana Keller, 'Conversion to the New Faith: 
Marxism-Leninism and Muslims in the Soviet Empire,' in Of Religion and Empire: Missions, 
Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia, ed. Robert P. Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 311-334. 
210 For further discussion on the Soviet Union’s treatment of women and religious custom in 
Central Asia, see: Northrop, Veiled Empire. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, pp. 204-240. Michael 
Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 214. 
211 Bennigsen and Wimbush, eds., Muslim National Communism, p. 148. 
193 
 
Chapter Seven: Soviet Cultural Policies in the Aul 
 
By the mid-1920s, overall, the ‘involvement of women in Soviet-construction’ 
was a revealing motif.212  As with the Party’s efforts in recruitment and democratic 
engagement, to which women were said to have a ‘passive attitude,’ work among 
women did change women’s lives but it also served to enlarge the state and reinforce 
its power.213 Economic independence, for example, meant putting women to work in 
the rural economy, which had the useful additional benefit of increasing 
productivity.214 
The Party’s engagement with women in the aul was closely associated with its 
work ‘among the aul youth.’215  As with women, young people were seen as 
instrumental for the ‘sovietisation of the aul’ and as vitally important for the future 
industrialisation of Central Asia. 216 The Party prioritised the improvement of literacy 
among children and encouraged them to read Communist newspapers as well as 
focusing on their participation in agricultural work and so on. The Kazakh Komsomol 
was expected to cooperate when possible with the Red Yurts, shortly to be 
discussed.217 Within the sub-group of youth, the Party again distinguished by gender. 
Young girls were to be taught to read, but the Party also revealed the limits of its 
radicalism by encouraging them to study the domestic arts of embroidery and 
handicrafts.218 
As in agriculture, class-consciousness and democracy, the emancipation of 
women required educational programmes and Party-led instruction at conferences, 
though these were more common in settled regions.219 Specifying a schedule for each 
seminar and conference was a preoccupation of Narkompros, which was perhaps 
concerned that such novel forms of political engagement could easily be derailed by 
unpractised participants.220 At conferences, a high premium was placed on the 
discussion of practical, everyday issues which would appeal to a Kazakh ‘as a mother, 
as a builder of the economic life of the aul.’221 At the third Kazakh regional congress of 
Governate Women’s Departments, held on 4th June 1922, delegates enjoyed lectures 
on the economy of the Kazakh Republic and society under NEP. An excursion into the 
                                                          
212 TsGARK 81/1/665: 9. 
213 TsGARK 81/1/665: 9. 
214 TsGARK 81/1/665: 6. 
215 TsGARK 81/1/665: 24. 
216 Aldazhumanov et al., eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, p. 402. 
217 TsGARK 81/1/665: 24, 25, 27, 30. 
218 TsGARK 81/1/665: 29. 
219 TsGARK 81/1/665: 8. 
220 TsGARK 81/1/665: 5, 6. 
221 TsGARK 81/1/665: 6. 
194 
 
countryside was also organised, where attendees could familiarize themselves with 
new methods of collective childcare and upbringing under Communism.222 
State or Party-led education clearly took many forms, including mobile or 
seasonally-run schools, conferences, excursions and more conventional stationary 
institutions, but also the Red Yurts. These were bands of medical and legal experts, 
veterinary specialists, tutors and Party propagandists, offering the benefits of their 
expertise and distributing educational publications.223 Normally Russian by ethnicity, 
with men predominating further up the chain of command, some of these professionals 
came from as far away as Moscow. They were often accompanied by one or more 
Kazakh guides who also functioned as translators.224 The groups would roam the 
steppe in yurts decorated with a red flag to signal their purpose and their affiliation 
with the state. Expeditions could last months, but groups would seldom offer their 
services to a particular nomadic aul for more than 5-10 days before moving on. One 
group saw 3,000 individuals during a three-month summer period in 1927.225 Like 
almost any of the republic’s endeavours, the Red Yurts were understaffed and 
underfunded, but they clearly had their admirers in the administration.226 
The Syr-Darya Governate committee stated in March 1927 that ‘The Red Yurt is 
the proven form of work among women of the nomadic population.’227 Of all the 
institutions or policies which worked to bring women into the political space of the 
Kazakh Republic, the Red Yurt was the most intimate. Michael Rouland associates the 
campaign almost entirely with women and gender, though in reality the Red Yurt’s 
objectives varied just as many other institutions’ did.228 Its mobility and flexibility 
made it seem an indispensable method for engaging with nomads on various domestic, 
social and everyday matters, with the Semipalatinsk, Syr-Darya and Zhetysu 
Governates all recognising the utility of the Red Yurts and committing more resources 
to their expansion in the later 1920s.229 All this may explain the campaign’s surprising 
longevity. In 1928, as the imposition of the first Five Year Plan coincided with the 
Kazakh Republic’s first incidents of forced sedentarisation, VTsIK noted the success of 
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the Red Yurts campaign and recommended its continued use.230 The following year 
approximately 134 yurts were active on the steppe, of which around 100 focused 
specifically on women. By 1939 this number had declined to less than 12.231 Yet there 
seems to have been some recognition in the USSR after World War II that the 
persistently transhumant behaviour of some Kazakhs still required a state willing to 
come to them. By 1952, in the era of late Stalinism, 273 Red Yurts were back in 
operation.232 
The seminal piece on the Red Yurts campaign, cited indispensably elsewhere in 
the secondary literature, is Paula A. Michaels’ Curative Powers: Medicine and Empire in 
Stalin’s Central Asia.233 Michaels is articulate and admirably clear about her own 
analytical perspective, placing the Yurts alongside sedentarisation and collectivisation 
as a series of imperial policies used to colonise and control the steppe.234 She makes a 
distinction between two types of medicine in her discussion, ‘biomedicine’, which was 
advocated by the Yurts and the Soviet state more generally, and ‘ethnomedicine’, native 
to Kazakh nomadic culture.235 This choice of words reveals a position close to that of 
Virginia Martin, who seeks to avoid a crude dichotomy between ‘traditional’ (Kazakh) 
and ‘modern’ (Russian) culture in her own work.236  Medicine is a final, vital aspect of 
the state’s social policy in the 1920s, associated with culteredness but also with 
productivity and the control of typhoid and other dangerous diseases. As with other 
educational endeavours, sanitation in the aul made nomads more useful (or less of a 
nuisance) to the state. 
It is true that the ‘curative practices’ advocated by state-employed doctors would 
have been quite alien to many nomads, and the opportunity for cultural 
misunderstanding was clearly considerable. In the early twentieth century, Kazakhs 
were still paying for the ministrations of religious healers.237 The new doctors on the 
steppe, including those employed by the Communist Party to work on the Red Yurts, 
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were generally secular, educated in European Russia, and politically conscious.238 They 
sought to create patient histories for the nomads they saw by asking women about 
their first menstruation, the age at which they lost their virginity (Kazakhs were 
apparently asked simply when they got married) and how many children they had.239 
These were intrusive questions for a member of the old imperial nationality to ask, and 
rumours subsequently spread that the Red Yurts kidnapped Kazakh girls to put them to 
work in the city.240 Doctors of the Red Yurt also administered smallpox vaccinations 
and offered advice on food hygiene.241 Whether or not all these policies constitute an 
imperial project must be placed within this thesis’ wider discussion of Soviet power in 
Central Asia, to be addressed in Chapter Nine. There is at least space here to point out 
that the bulk of Bolshevik ideology’s intellectual origins, which justified the actions of 
the Red Yurts, was avowedly anti-imperialist. Although the kind of cultural work 
practised by the Red Yurts was associated with settlement, settlement was not only 
pursued for the economic benefit of the metropole. Nomadism was considered 
profoundly disempowering as well as culturally and economically inferior. 
As with the Party’s agenda for women more generally, the Red Yurts were not 
controlled directly from one central authority. Regional bodies employed Yurts with 
enthusiasm. In 1927, the Syr-Darya Governate resolved to deploy its Red Yurts for 
three to four months at a time, to increase their number and provide them with more 
trained staff. In conjunction with other bodies, it insisted that its Yurts receive more 
funds for ‘circles’ (kruzhki) of nomads working on hygiene, sanitation, home economics, 
needle-work, singing and drama.242 The Red Yurts in the region were also expected to 
arrange more consultations with pregnant women, debtors and other potentially 
vulnerable people in need of legal aid.243 In the Zhetysu area in November 1928, local 
organs noted approvingly the success of the Yurts, which had only been operating 
nearby for a short time. Since they were deployed, significant progress had been made 
in the Party’s campaigns against kalym and for the payment of alimony, kruzhki for 
young girls were being organised around the Red Yurts’ encampments and female 
literacy had increased. There was however room for improvement, and the Governate 
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242 RGASPI 17/25/256: 79. On use of theatrical kruzhki, see also: Aldazhumanov et al., eds., 
Istoriia Kazakhstana: s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, p. 399. The specific ideological 
purposes of some kruzhki remain unclear, but it is tempting to speculate that one reason for 
their existence may have been to create what may now be called women-only spaces, in which a 
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authorities planned to expand almost every aspect of the Yurts’ work, most particularly 
hygienic instruction, which was said to play a hugely important role in the betterment 
of nomadic life. Again with specific regard to women, the Red Yurts in the Zhetysu area 
apparently lacked a permanent legal advisor, weakening the quality of advice offered to 
nomadic women.244 
The Red Yurts were not the Party’s only conduit for disseminating medical 
expertise. Stationary ‘Medical points’ or centres employed doctors and other specialists 
to offer services to visiting nomads.245 Medical staff of this kind in the Gur′ev Okrug in 
1926 apparently became despondent about the isolation of the nomadic population 
and the impossibility of properly engaging with it, submitting complaints which local 
Party leaders were keen to rebuff.246 Scattered over a wide area, nomads made difficult 
patients, which worried one attendee of the Alma-Ata Okrug conference who spoke of 
the common illnesses which afflicted nomadic communities.247  In August 1928 
Sovnarkom RSFSR instructed its Kazakh equivalent and Gosplan RSFSR to work 
together on a five-year plan for the growth of a public health system ‘in rural and 
particularly in nomadic regions.’248 For veterinary assistance beyond the Red Yurts, the 
Kazakh Sovnarkom in 1928 was also in talks with Muscovite authorities about ‘the 
strengthening of the zootechnical veterinary network.’249 
Perhaps more vividly than in any other policy area, the state’s treatment of 
Kazakh women demonstrates the depth and intimacy of the social and cultural changes 
for which the Party hoped. Health, sanitation, marital relations, handicrafts and leisure 
time all came under the jurisdiction of authorities outside of the traditional structures 
of nomadic society. It is unsurprising that, in these most personal and private aspects 
of life, the state was at its most proactive and dynamic, using the conventional 
transportation means of the nomads themselves to proselytise and transform. Unlike 
illiteracy, for example, which correlated quite clearly with nomadism, it is also notable 
that undesirable gender politics were not assumed to be contingent upon agricultural 
practice. Perhaps looking south to the deeply conservative religious communities of 
Uzbekistan, the Party does not seem to have assumed that settling Central Asian 
women were emancipated Central Asian women. Gender was one major policy area 
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which was not conflated reductively with settlement. This is one further explanation 
for the enthusiasm with which the Red Yurts migrated about the steppe; they could not 
complacently assume that the settlement of nomads would render work among women 
temporary and ultimately obsolete. 
Conclusion 
When in April 1928 members of the Zhetysu Governate Executive Committee 
complained about the lack of ‘cultural-economic points’ in their region, they could have 
envisioned a diverse assortment of institutions and services.250 The Communist Party 
found distinctions between culture, economics and politics distasteful; rising 
prosperity meant improving cultural standards, and improving cultural standards 
meant rising prosperity. Both meant settlement, but in these early years they also 
entailed less existential transformations in nomadic life. Thus projects ranging from 
agronomic training sessions, vaccinations, conferences on childcare, dramatic troupes, 
Party recruitment and digging wells were all held to have a cultural influence on 
Kazakh nomads. 
Just as culture and economics were effectively the same, state-building and Party 
recruitment were not just mutually contingent objectives; they were the same 
objective.251 Comparable arguments have been made before. Regarding Turkmenistan, 
Adrienne Lynn Edgar argues: ‘The crucial contribution of local elites in shaping Soviet 
nations has not received enough attention.’ 252 This acknowledges the importance for 
the Bolsheviks of bringing Turkmen into the state. Similarly on Uzbekistan, Marianne 
Kamp elegantly states: ‘… if Uzbeks needed a state, then the state also needed 
Uzbeks.’253 What of nomads? The severe difficulty experienced in recruiting Kazakh 
nomads for the Communist Party and employing them for the state hints at a degree of 
incompatibility between nomadism and effective statecraft as it was conceived by the 
administration. Where successes were made – and some were, in education for 
example – these were often attained by state institutions which were in practice 
nomadic. The most obvious example was the Red Yurts and Caravan, but newspapers 
and aul schools and Party cells are also relevant here. Further development of these 
policies was curtailed by sedentarisation, though it is tempting to speculate on whether 
                                                          
250 As cited in the introduction: RGASPI 17/25/156: 122. 
251 Heinzen, '"Alien" Personnel in the Soviet State,' p. 98. 
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state-nomadic cooperation could have expanded in a USSR where sedentarisation was 
not perpetrated.  
Some historians have noted the Communist Party’s belief in the economic 
benefits of kul′turnost′ and concluded that Soviet social policies, from stationary 
schools to mobile Red Yurts, were colonial policies designed to exploit the economic 
potential of the Kazakhs for the enrichment of the state Union-wide. This makes the 
USSR an Empire whose metropole, Moscow, aggrandised itself to the detriment of its 
realms.254 Party cells unleashed a cultural war against nomadic custom to ‘shatter 
Kazakh traditional identity by destroying their nomadic lifestyle.’255 Nomads could then 
be put to work in the fields. There were certainly aspects of Kazakh nomadic custom 
which the Soviet state sought to alter or destroy altogether. Paula A. Michaels is right in 
this context to draw parallels between Soviet actions and those of Western European 
Empires, whose sense of cultural superiority encouraged them to supress the alien 
customs of colonised peoples.256 The Red Yurts’ campaign against kalym, for example, 
was an uncompromising external assault on a deeply-ingrained native practice.  
Most contemporary Kazakh historians, no matter how harsh their criticism of the 
Soviet state, are reserved about this kind of colonial paradigm.257 Perhaps this is 
because the insights of scholars such as James C. Scott or Edward Said take no major 
place in their common intellectual heritage, which ultimately is Soviet, in spite of the 
fact that Said drew some of his own intellectual inspiration from Imperial Russian 
scholarship.258 Those educated in the late Soviet era are unlikely to have been told that 
                                                          
254 Ronald Grigor Suny, 'The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, "National" Identity, and 
Theories of Empire,' in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and 
Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 25. 
255 Matthew J. Payne, 'The Forge of the Kazakh Proletariat? The Turksib, Nativization, and 
Industrialization during Stalin's first Five-Year Plan,' in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-
Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 224. Payne, "Seeing Like a Soviet State," p. 60. 
256 Michaels, Curative Powers, pp. 9-10.  
257 Most offer highly critical assessments of early Soviet policy without accusing the USSR of 
being an empire: N. E. Masanov et al., eds., Istoriia Kazakhstana: narody i kul'tury (Almaty: Daik-
Press, 2001). Zere Maindanali, Zemledel'cheskie raiony Kazakhstana v gody nasil'stvennoi 
kollektivizatsii (Almaty: KazNU im. al'-Farabi, 2003). Kokish Ryspaev, Istoriia Respubliki 
Kazakhstan (Almaty: TOO Kursiv, 2008). M. K. Kozybaev, Zh. B. Abylkhozhin, and K. S. 
Aldazhumanov, Kollektivizatsiia v Kazakhstane: tragediia krest'ianstva (Alma-Ata: Ministerstvo 
narodnogo obrazovaniia Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1992). 
258 Matthew J. Payne references James C. Scott is his title here: Payne, "Seeing Like a Soviet 
State," pp. 59-87. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (London: Yale University Press, 1998). Paula A. Michaels draws 
inspiration for her argument from Edward Said’s Orientalism here:  Michaels, Curative Powers, 
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the early Soviet state was colonial in nature. Talas Omarbekov prefers to relate Soviet 
actions in Kazakhstan to Bolshevik debates about the scope and role of the state.259  
This is a more instructive approach to understanding the state’s social policy 
among nomads in the 1920s. Notwithstanding the Bolsheviks’ intellectual heritage, 
which was not altogether hostile to the cultures of colonial peoples, the Party would 
have been quite ahead of itself it were to have educated, cultured, trained and tutored 
Kazakh nomads in order to exploit their labour, since these things were all required for 
a far more primary goal; the establishment of a functioning state apparatus which 
could affect nomadic life in anything other than the most crude and rudimentary 
fashion.260 For the Communist Party of 1920s Central Asia, establishing consistent, 
pervasive, reliable state power, structured, of course, around a collection of non-
Russian national cultures, was an overwhelming priority. For the Kazakhs’ relationship 
with the state, nomadism had a distancing effect, both literal and figurative. Campaigns 
on literacy, gender and hygiene worked to reduce this distance and create common 
reference points for administrators and nomads in the decade before sedentarisation. 
At this time the Party was so eager to create points of commonality and make its power 
and influence meaningful, it compromised with the population and migrated too. 
Historian Adeeb Khalid has considered the Soviet Union’s imperial status extensively. 
His attitude is nuanced, but in rejecting characterisations of the USSR as an empire, 
Khalid proffers the alternative term ‘mobilizational state’. 261  The early Soviet 
administration on the Kazakh Steppe was not only mobilizational, but mobile.  
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Sedentarisation – it is collectivisation. 
Sedentarisation – it is the liquidation of the bai-semi-feudalist. 
Sedentarisation – it is the annihilation of tribal relations. 
Sedentarisation – it is the meaningful ascent of the economic and cultural prosperity of 
the aul working masses and it is thereby their liberation from the bai cabal.1 
 
Chapter Eight: 
Sedentarisation 
 
Sedentarisation (osedanie) has haunted each chapter of this thesis.2 Just as the 
Committee for Sedentarisation claimed limited responsibility over schooling, so 
confiscatory authorities were credited with a role in inducing settlement. The 
Communist Party used the language of internal border-making as a euphemism for the 
forcible settlement of nomads in the early 1930s. Sedentarisation provoked a mass 
exodus to China, leading to panicked debate about the USSR’s border-security, and its 
transformational character placed it at the heart of many of the Party’s disagreements 
over the nomads under its jurisdiction. Unquestionably, sedentarisation matters. Yet as 
explained in Chapter One, it is the primary objective of this thesis to describe and 
analyse the position of Kazakh nomads in the earlier years of Soviet power, 1919-1928, 
before the sedentarisation campaign reached its fiercest intensity. This campaign has, 
after all, already received considerable scholarly attention, while the nine or ten years 
which preceded it often suffer generalization or neglect. Nevertheless, before the thesis 
is concluded, this penultimate chapter must offer some assessment of the 
sedentarisation campaign and extend the scope of the project to 1934. 
An analysis of sedentarisation is indispensable for a number of reasons. First, it 
would be difficult to draw compelling conclusions about the preceding years without 
some reference to it. In its assessment of the 1920s, this thesis has argued that the 
period was not characterized by steadily increasing levels of repression reaching an 
inevitable climax in the following decade. It has also emphasized that the ideological 
continuities in the Communist Party’s treatment of nomads were hugely important but 
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relatively minimal and intellectually scant, restricted largely to a sense of what 
progress looked like and that nomadism wasn’t it.  A description of sedentarisation 
completes these arguments by offering a point of contrast or comparison with prior 
events. Second, sedentarisation was a provocative assertion of state power which has 
garnered much comment from historians. It thus provides an opportunity to return to 
the historiography and to the conclusions of other studies before this thesis draws its 
own. Third, the sedentarisation campaign was a period in which the duplicity of state 
and Party documentation deepened; when the difference between what the Party said 
it wanted and what happened looks, in hindsight, very considerable.3 The subsequent 
assessment is thus a timely reminder of the imperfections of the present source 
material. 
Discussion of sedentarisation, based largely on a historiographical survey but 
also employing primary references, will seek to establish what exactly sedentarisation 
was, when it happened, its scale and the factors which account for its existence.  Some 
comments on how these matters relate to the thesis as a whole will then follow. Overall 
the chapter will assert that sedentarisation might be defined broadly, as one part of a 
much larger process, or very narrowly as a particular act of state agents. This act, 
violent forced settlement, separates the specifically nomadic experience of the post-
NEP period from the Kazakh Republic’s more general experience of that same time. 
Violent forced settlement was systematically implemented from 1929 and began to 
abate in 1932, coming to a halt in 1934. Due to this and other coterminous processes, 
the Kazakh population declined by 1.5 million individuals in these years, though the 
chapter rejects claims that this should be thought of as an example of genocide. It will 
be further argued that sedentarisation was the result of larger, Union-wide processes, 
but that this is not quite the same as it being a direct order from Moscow. 
Sedentarisation’s Auxiliaries 
Though it is often referred to as a discrete phenomenon, sedentarisation was 
intermeshed with a host of other state initiatives. These were interdependent and 
helped to constitute each other, and together they amounted to a vast and radical 
policy programme. Other contributing factors to sedentarisation were beyond the 
Party’s control or were the unintended consequences of state actions, but similarly had 
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the effect of perpetuating settlement. In this sense sedentarisation had many different 
auxiliaries, policies or trends which existed independently of sedentarisation but also 
formed it, and it them. It is wise to identify and isolate these auxiliary factors before 
defining sedentarisation itself; four will be discussed below. 
The first of these auxiliaries was collectivisation, itself a much larger project and 
a broader term.4 As explained in ‘Collectivisation in Kazakhstan: Tragedy of the 
Peasantry’, ‘Strictly speaking, the mass sedentarisation of the nomadic and semi-
nomadic economies was something thought up in close coordination with 
collectivisation.’5 Certainly they coincided. As the procurement of grain reached crisis 
levels in European Russia in late 1927, confiscation of domestic goods in the KASSR 
was already well under way and was applied particularly harshly on nomads.6 The first 
incidents of sedentarisation swiftly followed, first in the predominantly sedentary 
arable regions of Kazakhstan where grain-requisitioning was most widespread.7 
Collectivisation, if defined as a violent attempt to improve grain yields and subdue the 
peasantry, had major implications for Kazakh nomads. As elsewhere, increasing grain 
yields in Central Asia meant increasing the amount of land sown for harvest, a project 
nomads had consistently confounded. Thus the logic connecting collectivisation with 
sedentarisation was: the fewer nomadic migrations, the more land available for newly-
collectivised farming communities. 8  Kazakh historians argue further that 
sedentarisation was itself a means of liquidating private property and socializing the 
means of production, goals closely associated with collectivisation, suggesting perhaps 
that Kazakhs could not be collectivised while they remained nomadic.9 Sedentarisation 
therefore facilitated collectivisation, and collectivisation justified and accelerated 
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sedentarisation.10 A declaration of the Kazakh Regional Committee in December 1929 
stated that sedentarisation should be accompanied by ‘100 percent’ collectivisation of 
the population, an echo of the first Five Year Plan.11 
The second auxiliary was an escalation in generalized political repression, 
another phenomenon witnessed across the USSR at the same time. Political arrests and 
executions were practiced both in Kazakh society at large and at the top of the Kazakh 
Communist Party.12 Kazakhs and others who refused to join collective, sedentary 
agricultural endeavours were threatened with exile or arrest.13 Legislation passed on 
7th August 1932 sharpened punitive measures against dissidents, which then included 
death by firing squad or ten years in prison and the confiscation of property.14 
Sedentarisation was presented as a matter of class politics, and those who resisted as 
class enemies, to be treated accordingly.15 Between 1930 and 1931 the OGPU 
condemned 6,765 citizens of the Kazakh Republic to ‘kulak exile’.16 Meanwhile Party 
members who publicly disagreed with sedentarisation and other policies were 
condemned, often as nationalists, and ostracized or deported.17 
Even as the OGPU was exiling Kazakhs from their republic, many more citizens 
were arriving into the KASSR under the supervision of that same organ of state, and 
placed in one of the republic’s notorious Gulag camps.18 The Karlag camp was 
established in 1931 and covered 281,000 acres of land alone.19 This was one form of 
another auxiliary to sedentarisation: mass population movement and migration.20 
Though the Gulag system was clearly designed to keep people in one place, it was also 
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one of various ways in which sparsely populated land came to host high concentrations 
of people. Sedentarisation took place at a time when a large number of citizens, 
culturally sedentary, were arriving onto the steppe.21 Aside from the Gulag, some of 
these citizens were Russian kulaks sent to join collective farms (kolkhoz), around 
51,000 of whom arrived in 1930 alone.22 Others, the so-called twenty-five-thousanders 
(dvadtsatipiatitysiachniki), were often former urban-dwellers, mostly Party members, 
who arrived to expedite work on the kolkhozes.23  
In the late 1920s the Kazakh administration was making hurried preparations 
for the arrival of these new settlers. This involved the delimitation of new arable 
farmland, putting renewed pressure on migrating nomads who were expelled from the 
best land and perpetuating a process which began with the first major influx of Russian 
settlers in the mid-nineteenth century.24 This influx of migrants and prisoners was an 
additional part of the Party’s programme for transforming the Kazakh Republic into a 
productive arable economy. Representing another form of mass itinerancy, it 
accelerated the state’s attempts to regionalize and control movement, aims shared by 
the Committee for Sedentarisation which argued that nomads looked increasingly 
incongruous in a land of Russian-led collective farms.25 As Russians and others came 
from the north, many Kazakhs hoping to evade the state travelled east, escaping over 
the border into China and thereby increasing the sedentary proportion of those 
Kazakhs who remained.26 
Sedentarisation’s final auxiliary phenomenon was famine, a feature of Kazakh 
nomadic life for much of the early Soviet period. If, as is commonly claimed, the state 
turned to collectivisation and sedentarisation because it lacked the goods needed to 
feed the cities, it was not nomads who were hoarding grain, though they were of course 
unlikely to grow a surplus.27 While by 1927 there was some evidence that the Kazakh 
economy was stabilizing and the far greatest proportion of that economy was still in 
private ownership, food reserves among Kazakhs had only recovered from the meagre 
levels which followed the Civil War, and nomadic communities were not equipped to 
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resist the state’s new directives.28 As will be discussed, famine went on to be a defining 
feature of the sedentarisation campaign, additionally provoking epidemics which were 
exacerbated by malnutrition.29 Kazakh pastorialists were perhaps the people most 
vulnerable to famine across the whole USSR.30 Various historians report a staggering 
decline in numbers of livestock, who struggled to find sufficient sustenance on the 
single plots of steppe land herds were apportioned.31 State agents then exacerbated the 
shortage through further confiscation.32 Famine also heralded the end of the campaign, 
as authorities acknowledged the crisis in 1934.33 Sedentarisation unquestionably 
intensified the famine, but it was also perpetuated by administrators who spoke of it as 
a solution to shortages, and by starving nomads who were forced to discontinue their 
seasonal migrations and approach towns and farmsteads to beg for food.34 Starvation 
may have been a more effective inducement to settlement than the violence which 
helped to cause it. 
As stated above, each of these auxiliaries to sedentarisation (collectivisation, 
political repression, migration and famine) existed independently but facilitated each 
other. Soviet organs often discussed them interchangeably, perhaps in recognition of 
their interdependence, but also in keeping with the Party’s predilection for viewing all 
policies whether political, economic or social as part of one holistic transformation of 
society. Goloshchekin and his allies subsumed a large variety of initiatives under the 
‘Little October’ agenda, to be addressed shortly.35 In so doing, the Bolsheviks laid the 
foundations for contemporary historical narratives which generally also associate all 
these phenomena together into a single period of unprecedented state interference and 
repression. Whether Russian or English-language scholarly analyses propose primarily 
to describe collectivisation, political repression, migration, famine or the treatment of 
nomads, all studies inevitably include commentary on all five issues.36 This is an astute 
                                                          
28 Abylkhozhin, Traditsionnaia struktura Kazakhstana, p. 41. Smith, Red Nations, p. 105. Rouland, 
'Music and the Making of the Kazak Nation,' PhD thesis, p. 294. 
29 Niccolò Pianciola and Susan Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe. The Collectivization of Agriculture 
and the Kazak Herdsmen, 1928-1934,' Cahiers du Monde Russe 45, no. 1/2 (2004), p. 167. 
30 Michael Ellman suggests that if the harvests of 1931 and 1932 had been better there may not 
have been a Soviet famine ‘except possibly a localised one among the pastoral population of 
Kazakhstan’: Ellman, 'Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 Revisited,' p. 677. 
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approach given the impossibility of understanding any one without the others, and has 
enabled Kazakh historians to develop a new, broad appraisal of state actions in the 
KASSR.37 Rather than being divided into discrete processes which are observable 
across the Soviet Union, they are brought together into the singular national history of 
Kazakhstan, a project which has grown in importance since 1991.38 
The treatment of all aforementioned phenomena as one episode in Kazakhstan’s 
national history, though instructive, does however have a flaw. It reveals how the 
period was different for Kazakhs, how the state acted in the Kazakh Republic and how 
this might compare with other titular republics of the USSR. But it partly neglects the 
issue which this thesis has repeatedly attempted to answer in various contexts: how 
the period was different not for Kazakhs or citizens of the Kazakh Republic, but for 
nomads. Here again a focus on nationhood and national history serves to distract from 
queries related particularly to nomadism.39 Famine, migration, collectivisation and 
repression may have been experienced by nomadic and sedentary communities in 
different ways, but these differences are seldom emphasised in the historiography. The 
phenomena are essentially presented as republic-wide. More specifically in this case, 
then, what made sedentarisation, the only action experienced by nomads alone, a 
policy in its own right, distinct from the other phenomena with which it interacted? 
It is possible to cut away the significant but ancillary features of the era following 
NEP in the KASSR, through to the definitive essence of sedentarisation.40 This is 
sedentarisation which was not an incidental result of collectivisation, migration, 
authoritarianism, or famine, but a deliberate attempt to permenantly settle nomads by 
force.41 Some of the methods used in this period were more intense, more coercive 
variations on the kind of techniques discussed in preceding chapters; some Red Yurts, 
                                                          
37 In a piece published in 2010, Kazakh historians explain their desire to counter old Soviet 
misrepresentations of the nomadic lifestyle in the 1920s: Aldazhumanov et al., eds., Istoriia 
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(Almaty: Kazakhskii Natsional'nyi Universitet im. Al'-Farabi, 2009), pp. 1-12. For further 
discussion of contemporary post-Soviet, Russian-language scholarship, see Chapter Two. 
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and Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' pp. 137-191. 
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Kazakh ethnocentricity of the repression in the republic, rather than on the lifestyle of some of 
those Kazakhs who suffered: Payne, "Seeing Like a Soviet State," p. 60. 
41 Pianciola uses a broader definition here, though in a more specific chronological context: 
Pianciola and Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' p. 188. 
208 
 
for example, began withholding their services from nomads who refused to settle.42 Tax, 
more specifically arbitrary confiscation, was used to penalise nomads and exhaust their 
reserves. But the sedentarisation campaign was novel and distinct in its systematic and 
widespread use of violence to force nomads to settle. It is further distinguished by the 
profundity of its intended consequences. Though many other communities were forced 
to settle new land at this time, uniquely Sedentarisation systematically and widely used 
violence to settle nomads and terminate their habitual migratory customs, an 
enormous cultural as well as spatial change.  
During the sedentarisation campaign, the Soviet state employed large numbers of 
armed militia to approach each migrating Kazakh aul and force the nomads present to 
a prearranged ‘point of settlement’ (punkt osedaniia).43 Some points of settlement 
would boast crude purpose-built domestic constructions but in many cases nomadic 
yurts would simply be arranged into rows, like an orderly new village. New villages 
could be given names as incongruous as ‘Rosa Luxemburg’, a trend which began in 
Russian regions.44 Though cases continued to emerge of nomads pledging to remain in 
place and then moving on, often the community’s livestock were rounded up, some 
confiscated, and the rest moved into new pens. Their owners were told that releasing 
the animals was a criminal offence, earning immediate and severe punishment.45 In a 
sense then the state did not so much settle nomads but settle nomadic livestock, 
leaving Kazakhs no other option but to pitch their tents within walking distance of 
their most important resource. This whole process was more uncompromising and 
coercive even than that described by Sheila Fitzpatrick with regard to collectivisation 
in European Russia.46 Most former nomads lacked the technology and expertise to 
pursue sedentary agriculture, but more crucially, they would likely have known that 
their punkt osedaniia, hurriedly and carelessly chosen as they often had been by state 
employees, was usually insufficiently fertile to support animals all year every year.47 
Animals starved as their fodder depleted, and nomads starved as their herds depleted. 
Accounts differ over the precise timing of the campaign, and this is where the 
tendency to conflate sedentarisation with other phenomena again becomes 
                                                          
42 Michaels, Curative Powers, p. 166. 
43 RGASPI 17/25/339: 92. Payne, "Seeing Like a Soviet State," pp. 65-66. Kozybaev, Abylkhozhin, 
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45 Davé, Kazakhstan, p. 59. Olcott, 'The Collectivization Drive,' pp. 133-134. 
46 Sheila Fitzpatrick, 'The Question of Social Support for Collectivization,' Russian History 37, no. 
2 (2010), pp. 156-158. 
47 Payne, "Seeing Like a Soviet State," p. 70. 
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problematic. Documentation and analysis reveal that large-scale collectivisation and 
confiscation began in the Kazakh Republic considerably earlier than in the bulk of the 
USSR, with early efforts occurring in 1927-1928 before beginning again in 1929, 
prompting a large increase in collective farm workers in the KASSR between October 
1928 and October 1929.48 Early experiments in sedentarisation may have been held in 
1928, but systematic attempts were certainly being made by late 1929, albeit in a 
limited and regional form. At the first regional congress of workers for sedentarisation 
in 1930, attendees complained about the disorganization of sedentarisation projects 
implemented in the previous year, and in so doing they confirm that the campaign had 
started by then.49 It appears to have begun principally in the okrug administered by 
Alma-Ata (now Almaty), then also the capital of the KASSR. 50 This was followed in 
December 1929 by a decree from the Kazakh Central Executive Committee (KTsIK) 
which called for the sedentarisation of all nomads in the republic.51 
From late 1929 onwards sedentarisation intensified in explicit response to the 
first Five Year Plan, which had been published in 1928.52 In this the campaign again 
bares comparison with the other phenomena described above, which were all 
exacerbated around the time in the late 1920s typically associated with the Stalin 
administration’s ‘Great Turn’ or break from the NEP and other Party positions.53 The 
Plan demanded that the Kazakh Party branch increase the pace of collectivisation, 
thereby necessitating an acceerated rate of sedentarisation given the link between the 
two agendas.54 The Committee for Sedentarisation, which was formally recognized by 
Presidium KTsIK in April 1930, worked with the various charts and tables of economic 
aims produced by Moscow in conjunction with the Plan.55 The Plan also had the 
characteristic effect of bureaucratizing and systematizing the process of forced 
settlement, meaning that all nomads across the republic would suffer comparable 
                                                          
48  TsGARK 1179/6/3: 2-3. RGASPI 17/25/159: 26. RGASPI 17/25/201: 31. Kozybaev, 
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51 Smith, Red Nations, p. 105. 
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treatment and that again progress would be measured in terms of data categorised by 
region.56 
Beginning in limited, experimental form in 1927-1928, then, the process of 
violent, forced sedentarisation became a systematic republic-wide campaign in 1930. 
According to Niccolò Pianciola, however, it remained ‘a low priority’ in 1930 and 
1931.57 After an increase in activity, instructions to slow the pace of change in the 
KASSR came from central organs in autumn of 1932, but the campaign appears to have 
continued into 1934.58 Thus the bulk of the process occurred between the years 1929 
and 1933 within a timeframe not dissimilar to the period of collectivisation and anti-
kulak campaigning elsewhere in the USSR.59 In 1934 concerns over the size of the 
ensuing famine forced the Party to discontinue the campaign, though by then 
nomadism had largely ceased to be a current, notable social reality on the steppe, and 
by the end of the 1930s nomadism had been almost entirely eradicated; a small 
number of communities retained some transhumant practices far beyond this point.60 
The Scale of Sedentarisation 
With a rudimentary timeframe established, it is possible to assess the scale of 
settlement, of sedentarisation, and of its effects. It is important to emphasise here that 
these are different measurements. To serve the intent of this thesis in maintaining a 
focus on nomads and nomadism, it is sensible to distinguish violent sedentarisation 
from collectivisation and other agendas. But it would be extremely difficult to divide 
former nomads into those who settled in direct response to sedentarisation, and those 
who settled in response to the changing political environment of the KASSR, 
generalized hardship, confiscation and so on. Indeed, as this section has argued thus far, 
these factors worked in chorus and numbers of any kind are difficult to trust. Soviet 
scholarship, upon which English-language scholars were highly reliant until the 1990s, 
was of course under pressure to justify the earliest actions of the state and thus 
includes questionable data.61 Previous chapters described the problems encountered 
by an underdeveloped state apparatus wanting to differentiate permanent settlement 
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from temporary settlement and habitual migration from reactionary migration. These 
problems did not disappear in 1929, in fact they were compounded by the Party’s 
common conflation of collectivisation and sedentarisation. Thus what should we make 
of Martha Brill Olcott’s assertion that by the 10th March 1930 56.6 percent of the 
republic’s population had been collectivised?62  Was this proportion also henceforth 
sedentary? 
It is perhaps unsurprising in this context that many historians prefer to cite the 
drop in livestock during the period, which certainly communicates the depth of the 
famine.63 The statistics are unsettling in their scale. In 1928, according to one group of 
Kazakh scholars, there were 6,509,000 cattle in the republic. By 1932, as 
sedentarisation began to ease, the republic contained only 965,000 cattle. The same 
source tells us that numbers of camels also dropped from 1,024,000 in 1928 to 63,000 
in 1935.64 These figures can be found repeated in a number of texts, however, and as 
with the statistics utilized by Olcott they may have their roots in Soviet scholarship and 
reflect its agenda.65 
In terms purely of sedentarisation, estimates are few and they can be obscured 
by the Party’s tendency to talk of the khoziaistvo, here comparable to a community or 
group of nomads, instead of individuals. Zere Maidanali cites the Committee for 
Sedentarisation’s claim that 443,700 khoziaistva were settled by the end of 1932, but 
the number of nomads within each community would likely have varied considerably.66 
Other historians give a sense of fluctuation in the campaign, wherein 87,136 nomadic 
and semi-nomadic khoziaistva were forcibly settled in 1930; 77,508 in 1931; 77,674 in 
1932; and 242,208 in 1933. 67  Though these numbers do not correlate with 
Maindanali’s, they bear some resemblance to further figures from the Committee for 
Sedentarisation, which for example repeatedly claimed that 84,340 nomadic and semi-
nomadic khoziaistva were forced to settle between January and November 1930.68 
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Matthew J. Payne gives a similar figure, preferring to translate khoziaistvo as 
‘household’. 69  Interestingly in its own documentation the Committee for 
Sedentarisation goes on to report that, of the 84,340 khoziaistva settled, 45,500 had 
also been ‘covered by collectivisation’ (kollektivizatsiei okhvacheny), so a settled nomad 
was not always a collectivised nomad.70 Aside from the problems of the khoziaistvo as a 
unit of measurement, the Committee for Sedentarisation would have been under 
political pressure to present solid statistical data despite the likelihood that it, like 
much of the Kazakh administration, was under-staffed and under-resourced. The most 
obvious retort to this complaint, however, is that if any organ of the Soviet state was 
going to yield instructive information on the sedentarisation campaign, it was probably 
going to be the Committee for Sedentarisation. For the later years of the process, 
avoiding the restrictions of the khoziaistvo measurement, Paula A. Michaels claims that 
159,000 nomads and semi-nomads were settled from 1932 to 1933.71 Maindanali 
offers data on sedentarisation divided by region of the republic.72 
Measuring overall fatality rates for the period is also complicated.73 More than 
one historian points out that the massive drop in the number of Kazakhs registered in 
the KASSR after the first Five Year Plan is partially explained by a mass exodus to China 
and elsewhere during 1930s, so paying sensible attention to likely demographic trends 
whilst comparing the 1926 and 1939 All-Union censuses does not guarantee an 
accurate estimate (the Kazakh Republic of 1926 also included regions which it had lost 
by 1939).74 Furthermore it is not easy to separate Kazakhs from non-Kazakhs among 
the deceased.75 A kind of consensus has emerged, however, that around one and a half 
million Kazakhs died in the early 1930s as a result of famine, violence and epidemics, 
all created or exacerbated by the actions of the Soviet state. Estimates closer to one 
million are generally found in older works written during the Cold War such as Robert 
Conquest’s The Harvest of Sorrow, though Olcott’s quote of one and a half million also 
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comes from a 1941 piece by Naum Jasny, and Eugene M. Kulischer suggested the same 
number in 1948.76 More recent analyses from Kazakh historiography can draw nearer 
to two million, though the timescales over which fatality is measured can vary.77 
Estimates have increased over time but there is little evidence that contemporary 
differences run between English and Russian-language scholarship.  For Niccolò 
Pianciola the ‘most … convincing contribution to the problem’ is S. Maksudov’s 
assertion that 1,450,000 Kazakh individuals died as a direct result of starvation 
between 1931 and 1933.78  In summary, the range of policies imposed on the Kazakh 
Republic in the early 1930s by the Soviet state, including sedentarisation, precipitated 
a mass famine and a demographic catastrophe.79 With all factors considered, the gap 
between the 1926 and 1939 censuses reveals a drop in the Kazakh population of over 
one third.80 
Sedentarisation was a campaign whose principal aim was the settlement of all 
nomads in the KASSR. In the pursuit of this aim it was aided by a number of other 
concurrent phenomena; collectivisation, political repression, migration and famine, all 
of which began to escalate in the late 1920s and reached their peak in the early 1930s. 
Sedentarisation distinguishes itself from the other factors which contributed to greater 
levels of settlement, and from the state’s previous efforts to encourage settlement, by 
its systematic and widespread utilization of violent force. This force, in combination 
with other phenomena, largely eliminated nomadism in the Kazakh Republic and 
caused well over one million Kazakhs to starve to death. 
‘In today’s terms, it would unquestionably justify the accusation of genocide.’81 So 
says journalist Tom Stacey of the events described above in his introduction to 
Mukhamet Shayakhmetov’s poignant memoir of the Kazakh famine. Kazakh historians 
have used the terms ‘Goloshchekin’s Genocide’ ‘ethnocide’ or ‘Kazakhcide’ (Kazakhtsid) 
in making such an accusation as, though other nationalities suffered from the state’s 
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policies, Kazakhs suffered disproportionately within their own republic.82   Payne 
indicates that deaths were ‘highly ethnicized’ there.83 However, he also acknowledges 
that ‘the state expended enormous resources to avoid “mass extermination”, 
unfortunately it was rather indifferent in monitoring the use of these resources.’84 Few 
analysts describe sedentarisation as a deliberate attempt to exterminate Kazakhs.85 If it 
had been intentional, attempts at mitigation would never have been made, and this 
logic applies even if attempts were unsuccessful or lacklustre. What the post-NEP state 
wanted to exterminate was nomadism, not Kazakhs.    
Furthermore Kazakhstan’s experience of the collectivisation era must be 
properly contextualized alongside other parts of the USSR at this time, as Sarah 
Cameron does most eloquently: ‘Other parts of the Soviet Union, most notably Ukraine 
and parts of Russia (the Volga, Don and Kuban regions), would also experience 
terrifying collectivisation famines, peaking in the period from 1932-1933. But hunger 
in the Kazakh Steppe assumed a different pattern, arriving earlier, enduring longer and 
becoming proportionately more deadly than elsewhere in the Soviet Union.’86 The 
famine became more severe at a faster rate in the Kazakh Republic, then, but the 
genocide model does not fit if famine was neither intentional nor unique to one 
nationality across the USSR, otherwise we may also accuse the Soviet state of seeking 
to exterminate Russians in the Volga region but not elsewhere. The fact that targeting 
nomadism was in effect targeting Kazakhs is clear from the particularly egregious 
impact of the collectivisation drive in the KASSR, but official Party policy refused to 
recognise nomadism as an aspect of Kazakh national culture, so the resulting impact on 
Kazakhs as a group was ideologically incidental.87 Prejudice against Central Asian 
culture certainly played a part, but was not tied to any one genus or race. This would 
further complicate any accusation of ethnic cleansing on the steppe at this time. It has 
been argued previously in this chapter that the Kazakh national paradigm is useful for 
studying the collectivisation era because it amounted to a republic-wide 
transformation, worse than in the Soviet Union’s other national territories. But for the 
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purposes of studying sedentarisation specifically, accusations of genocide are yet 
another imposition of the national paradigm onto a story principally about nomadism. 
This lifestyle was the intended victim. This is confirmed by some explanations for the 
origins of sedentarisation, the final topic for this section. 
Explaining Sedentarisation 
One of the concluding aims of this thesis will be to offer some explanation for the 
brutal treatment of nomads in the early 1930s, including but not limited to 
sedentarisation. But there is opportunity here to ask the narrower question of why the 
state began perpetrating specifically violent, forced sedentarisation when it did. This 
section will consider and assess some of the explanations which have been offered for 
the emergence of violent sedentarisation in the late 1920s. 
First, some historical summaries prefer to cite the Communist Party’s ideological 
antipathy to nomadism to explain the events of 1929 onwards. It is true that, ‘The 
ideology of sedentarisation was closely linked to the full transformation of the 
economic form.’88 It was explicitly designed to undermine the power structures of rural 
Kazakh society, characterised by the Party as patriarchal, chauvinistic or in some other 
sense unequal.89 But as argued in Chapter Three, the association of nomadism with 
economic backwardness was a constant throughout the 1920s, and anxiety about class 
structures in the nomadic aul had been debated since the very earliest days of Soviet 
power. In other words, when the Party began experimenting with sedentarisation, 
there was nothing new its view that nomadism was economically useless, and 
compelling evidence of emotional hostility towards nomads among Party leaders 
remains elusive. The Party had acted on its concerns and ideas already, seeking to 
incentivise settlement through a host of policy areas, but it did not implement 
systematic, violent sedentarisation until 1929. There must have been novel factors at 
work at this later time. 
Alternatively, the confluence of unprecedented events in the late 1920s, 
including mass collectivisation, Stalin’s increasing centralisation of power, and the first 
Five Year Plan, have led many historians to a more convincing macroeconomic 
explanation. First, it is argued that the nomadic economy was prone to cyclical crises, 
particularly in the form of dzhut, and was characterised by ‘long-term 
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unsustainability’.90 Even if this depiction was unfair, and the crises experienced by 
Kazakh nomads before and during the 1920s were the result of Russian imperial 
encroachment, Civil War and Soviet mismanagement, it is clear that the majority of 
those in the Communist Party held the Kazakhs’ lifestyle to blame by 1929. 
Second, it is asserted that this perceived or real unsustainability contrasted 
unfavourably with the onerous demands of the first Five Year Plan. The argument 
follows a traditional pattern. The rapid industrialisation and urbanisation demanded 
by the Plan required a massive increase in available foodstuffs and a subsequent grain 
shortage. The Kazakh Republic was imagined as a major grain-producing region of the 
USSR, and vast arable projects were envisaged across the territory.91 In the context of 
these new economic exigencies, nomads were worse than useless.92 They wasted land 
with their unproductive agricultural practices while their republic was being placed 
under ever greater demands.93 If their lifestyle were terminated, large tracts of 
migratory land could be put to the tractor and plough without conflict. Meanwhile, 
settled nomads could be set to work on the new collective farms.94 From a problem to 
be managed, nomadism became an obstacle to be surmounted, and as quickly as 
possible.95 
There are problems with this argument. As is clear from any Party communique 
produced in the 1920s, Soviet authorities had always justified almost anything they did 
in terms of the imposing macroeconomic necessities of the day. Further, there is 
possibly some evidence that, in 1927 when the majority of the republic’s population 
still practiced some form of seasonal migration, the Kazakh economy was stabilizing 
after a decade of turmoil.96 This evidently did nothing to improve the Party’s overall 
assessment of nomadism, but organs of state cannot have failed to notice, especially as 
sedentarisation took this improving economy and obliterated it. The productivity of 
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livestock-herders plummeted when they were forcibly settled, and attempts to remake 
the KASSR as a breadbasket republic resulted in environmental catastrophe.97  
These are largely cavils, however. The abject failure of a policy, even when that 
failure seems so predictable in retrospect, is no reason to expect the policy not to have 
been implemented in the first place. Administrators and officials always spoke of their 
economic obligations but the Five Year Plan added meaningful bureaucratic pressure 
to the rhetoric. It heralded a transformation in the management of state priorities and 
nothing but a complete transformation in the productive capacities of the Kazakh 
countryside, improving or otherwise, would likely have seemed sufficient. 
With the first Five Year Plan and its attendant administrative restructurings 
taking a leading role in the march to sedentarisation, then, it may intuitively seem 
correct that the central Party apparatus in Moscow be held to blame for the violence 
that followed. As Jeremy Smith concludes: ‘While the famine appears to have been the 
result of incompetence and ill-thought-out implementation of drastic policies, the 
decision to sedentarise and the callousness of implementation underlined the new 
priorities of the regime. Not only did the economy come first, but also national 
development was no longer to be organic and was taken out of the hands of national 
communists.’98 But does this mean that the order came from Moscow? A consensus 
emerges from the historiography that the process Smith describes was more subtle and 
indirect than might be assumed. The political atmosphere in Alma-Ata changed as a 
result of Stalin’s actions, but the policy of sedentarisation itself did not originate in 
Moscow. Stalin was complicit in sedentarisation, but according to contemporary 
research his involvement does not go much further than this.99 It should be added that 
this is in contrast with the broader policy of collectivisation. Historians have argued 
over the level of Stalin’s personal culpability regarding collectivisation, but certainly he 
was far more directly responsible for collectivisation than he was for sedentarisation 
specifically.100 
                                                          
97 Maindanali, Zemledel'cheskie raiony Kazakhstana, p. 273. 
98 Smith, Red Nations, p. 106. 
99 Ryspaev, Istoriia Respubliki Kazakhstan, pp. 250-251. Cameron, 'The Hungry Steppe,' PhD 
thesis, p. 126. See also Pianciola’s use of Terry Martin’s ‘hard line’ and ‘soft line’ formula to 
explain the connection between centre and periphery somewhat differently: Pianciola and 
Finnel, 'Famine in the Steppe,' p. 187. 
100 Davies and Wheatcroft, 'Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33: A Reply to Ellman,' p. 628. 
Ellman, 'Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 Revisited,' pp. 676-677. 
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Stalin aside, another figure afforded utmost importance by historians is Filipp 
Goloshchekin, Stalin’s man but not without his own autonomy.101 ‘Goloshchekin 
wanted to show himself as a far-seeing strategist and a good organiser’ and led 
Muscovite authorities to believe that the KASSR was so far behind other parts of the 
USSR that a most radical step was needed, a second revolution or Little October.102 
Goloshchekin moved against dissenters within the Kazakh Party branch soon after his 
appointment, and is presented as a fierce and unforgiving Party manager who pushed 
cells and government organs on to ever greater excesses of intervention, alienating and 
intimidating other Party members as he did so.103 His uncompromising statements and 
the attitudes revealed therein have already been explored in this thesis, and justify the 
significance attributed to him in other accounts of sedentarisation.  
However, it would again be misleading to lay the blame for sedentarisation 
squarely on the shoulders of Goloshchekin and his closest associates. Goloshchekin was 
only the figurehead of the larger Kazakh Party branch, and the statements of other 
historians suggest that sedentarisation ultimately came not just from Goloshchekin but 
from this entire local cadre. It was neither the larger Moscow-based administration nor 
the solitary figure of Goloshchekin which made the ultimate decree in December 1929 
or supervised the ‘Committee on Settlement’, but the Kazakh Central Executive 
Committee and the Kazakh Council of People’s Commissars respectively.104 Further, 
Sedentarisation was not imposed by a select militia under the control of a central 
committee. As legislation produced by the Ural Regional Committee (raikom) in May 
1932 makes clear, all its regional organisations were responsible for the swift and 
unconditional implementation of directives connected with sedentarisaton.105 Thus 
Party members and state employees on the lowest rungs of the hierarchy were 
expected to collaborate in the policy, and they appear to have done so with alacrity and 
without regard to the desperate conditions of the people they governed.106  
Arguments made elsewhere in this thesis, regarding the increasingly optimistic 
and self-confident temperament of the Communist Party in its relationship with 
nomads, reinforce the case made above. With regard to the first Five Year Plan and the 
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exigencies of industrialisation, we see the same confidence in technological 
advancement which led administrators to assume newly sedentary nomads could be 
effective farmers. The idea of an arable Kazakh Republic was not one without 
precedent in 1928, but it seemed eminently achievable to an ever larger number of 
Party members by that time. To take one example; the Soviet administration had 
insufficient agricultural machinery to realise the grand vision of its first Five Year Plan, 
but broadly speaking it seems to have convinced itself that it would produce the 
requisite amount of tractors and so on in time for collectivisation to be successful. 
Failure to realise this expectation exacerbated the consequent famine as state quotas 
could not be met sustainably by poorly-equipped collective farms.107 This can only have 
a greater problem for former nomads, who were less familiar with even the most 
rudimentary arable farming equipment.108 The idea of an encroaching faith in progress 
and man’s dominance over nature also embellishes and refines our understanding of 
the centre-periphery dynamic in the sedentarisation drive as in other, earlier policy 
areas. Triumphalism filtered from Moscow to Alma-Ata to the Kazakh regions. 
Conclusion 
Alongside a massive shift in macroeconomic policy, then, we see a coterminous 
change in the political atmosphere of the whole Soviet Union. Both these factors 
precipitated, exacerbated, and reacted to a series of interdependent phenomena: 
political repression, collectivisation, migration and famine, and in the meeting rooms of 
Kazakh Party committees across the KASSR a new consensus was forged. Nomads, 
politically regressive and economically useless, were a problem needing a new solution. 
From a de facto process of managed decline for nomadism as a lifestyle, the Party 
moved in 1929 to sedentarisation, the systematic settlement of nomads by violent 
force. Though some disquiet was expressed in and outside the Party, this policy was 
effectively implemented by many in the administration, with tragic results. By 1934 
most traces of nomadism had been eviscerated and the policy was discontinued, 
though not before the deaths of over one million Kazakhs. 
This simplified story can be retold a hundred different ways. Matthew J. Payne, 
one historian who reminds us of the culpability of opportunistic local Party cadres, also 
distances himself from the analytical presumptions of revisionists like J. A. Getty who, 
in Payne’s view, understate the power of the Soviet centre to coordinate its 
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periphery.109 Others describe and debate sedentarisation in far more depth, and in 
various shades of nuance, than is possible here.  But from this summary it is possible to 
draw out a few pertinent observations which will inform the larger conclusion.  
First, in contrast to the years prior to 1928, the personal autonomy of nomads to 
resist or conform was diminished to almost nil by the violent actions of the state. 
Sedentarisation ostensibly presented nomads with a choice to perish or settle, but in 
fact the options were more circumscribed even than that, as the conditions of forced 
settlement presented Kazakhs with a simple need to do anything to survive. 
Conventional migration was made not only illegal but impossible. The autonomy of the 
state to settle the nomads violently was absolute, but its subsequent ability to stabilise 
the newly-settled economy was limited by the unforeseen consequences of the policy, 
by bad weather, poor harvests and further massive movements in population. 
Therefore both in its conception and implementation, sedentarisation was a crude, 
poorly-conceived and brutal policy which turned into a disaster.  
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Nomadic peoples had long ago formulated a simple response to 
persecution and injustice, and even family quarrels: they would simply up 
sticks and move away. Within the great expanse of the steppe, it was easy 
to find new places in which to lead free and independent lives…1 
Nomadism was once the foremost social and economic form on the Kazakh 
Steppe, though it can be hard to keep this in mind reading Mukhamet Shayakhmetov’s 
memoir. By 1931 nomads had already ‘long ago’ become accustomed to moving around 
the Central Asian landscape to evade the abuses of more powerful sedentary cultures. 
Organised resistance was not unheard of but displacement or acquiescence was the 
general trend. 
For Kazakh nomadism, this long-established power dynamic between sedentary 
and nomadic cultures is the most important contextualising detail for any discussion of 
the 1917 Revolution and its aftermath. For nomadic communities living far from 
Petrograd, the most important outcome of the Revolution was what it meant for the 
behaviour of the sedentary culture, unassailable in its dominance, which governed 
nomadic lands. 
Soviet power would go on to form a singular kind of sedentary culture, with 
features relevant to the management of nomadism in its ideological foundations, its 
intellectual influences, its rhetoric, its approach to governance, its manner of 
administration, its fixations and its indifferences. What were the most salient of these 
features, and how did they manifest themselves? What were their results? 
On 26th October 1924, Yanis Ruduztak made an interesting comment at a meeting 
of the All-Union Central Committee. The meeting concerned the national territorial 
division of Central Asia and, having previously worked with Filipp Goloschekin and 
Mikhail Frunze on the earlier delimitation of Turkestan, Ruduztak was an authority on 
the region among his colleagues in Moscow.2 Speaking of the various subgroups of 
Kirgiz who populated the borderlands between modern day Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, he complained that these groups’ cultural differences caused conflict in 
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spite of the fact that they were all nomadic cattle herders, and therefore led very 
similar lives.3 The national, cultural distinctions between these Central Asians were 
politicising simple budgetary deliberations over whether or not to subsidise settled 
communities, he added.4 
 Ruduztak may have had a point, but it is ironic that he should make it at a 
meeting convened to discuss the ongoing national delimitation of Central Asia. He held 
nomads themselves to blame for the political conflict which distracted administrators 
from the more fundamental economic questions of who was nomadic, who was 
sedentary, and who was in need of assistance. But the new Soviet state had been guilty 
of this misdirection, as Ruduztak would have it, from its very recent inception.  
Though the Soviet state itself was undoubtedly new in the 1920s, many of the 
attitudes which informed its treatment of Kazakh nomads predated 1917 by some 
margin. Some of the youngest came from late-Tsarist scholars, others from Marx and 
Marxist writers; the rest emerged from older ideas about the superiority of European 
civilisation, the backwardness of nomadic peoples, and the linearity of human progress. 
The prevalence of these older assumptions reveals the relative ideological 
indifference of the new Soviet state towards its Kazakh nomads. Tsarist Orientalist 
scholarship was still establishing itself as a discipline when the revolution occurred; 
Marx did not write at great length about nomadic cultures, and what he did write was 
not broadly accessible to the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks themselves were led by urban 
European intellectuals interested primarily in the revolutionary potential of urban 
European workers. This bias was corrected to some extent by the variety of peoples 
who eventually joined the Communist Party in Central Asia and elsewhere, peoples of 
different languages and cultures but, for the most part, of sedentary if not urban 
backgrounds. This is the political organisation which came to govern the nomads of the 
Kazakh Steppe.  
The Party’s homogeneity in this regard did not create as much internal 
consensus as might be expected. As has been shown, nomads and their treatment were 
debated intensely. But the effect of the Party’s demographic and intellectual 
foundations was not a single blueprint for nomadic communities, nor a vivid and wide-
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ranging argument about the correct course of action, but a weak and incoherent agenda 
which was easily overwhelmed by more concerted and refined priorities. 
The Paradox of National Reductivism 
Though Ruduztak’s comments do not suggest it, the Communist Party saw 
Central Asians primarily as a group of nations. This is why so much mental energy was 
expended delimiting the republics of the region and their borders.  Referred to as the 
National Question, the desire to respect and represent the national minorities in the 
former Russian Empire, and to prevent a resurgence of what was called Great Russian 
chauvinism, affected much of the new Soviet state’s treatment of Kazakh nomads. 
In its earliest manifestation, sensitivity for the National Question worked to the 
nomads’ advantage. It was plain to low-level administrators that nomadism correlated 
to some extent with a non-Russian nationhood, and efforts to renounce Great Russian 
chauvinism therefore led to less onerous tax rates and more generous land-use rights 
for nomads. Nomads themselves learned how to benefit from these circumstances. The 
disadvantageous side of associating nomads with Kazakh identity was the readiness of 
some organs to make accusations of bourgeois nationalism against policies favourable 
to nomads. But more damaging than this was the gradual dissociation of nomadism 
from Kazakh identity as national categories formalised and certain social realities were 
disconnected from national culture. Conflicts between nomadism and sedentary 
agriculture were no longer tainted by fears of bourgeois nationalism, but they were 
also deprived of the importance which the National Question continued to afford to 
other social realities, especially language.  It became a legal requirement for Kazakh 
organs of state to operate in the Kazakh language, but not for those same organs of 
state to contain token nomadic representatives or to consult with nomadic community 
leaders. 
Though it precipitated a series of vivid scholarly debates, the National Question 
was therefore profoundly reductive in the nomadic context, and became more so. The 
Communist Party assessed its impact in accordance with its treatment of Kazakhs, not 
nomads. It taxed Kazakhs instead of nomads, counted Kazakhs instead of nomads, and 
defended national jurisdiction instead of migratory paths. Nomadic interests for much 
of the decade were less attacked than overlooked. The paradox is that a political force 
guided by materialist philosophy was led to ignore the material realities of steppe life.  
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The effect of this was maladministration and mismanagement. In localised 
incidences, Russian administrators were aggrieved by the implications of the National 
Question and penalised the nomadic representatives of the Kazakh nation in response. 
On a broader level, nomads consistently found themselves competing with the interests 
of their titular republic, and losing out. Settling Kazakhs were preferred to nomadic 
Kazakhs, and sedentary non-Kazakh communities were allowed to impose on local 
nomads if their productive capacity was judged beneficial for the republic overall.  
Where Kazakh interests and nomadic interests coincided, which was not infrequent, 
nomads gained, but nomads found that an administrator of the Kazakh Republic was 
often as blind to nomadic needs as any other. 
This was not the only cause of poor governance, however, and it is here relevant 
that the Soviet state was new. Much is connected to what James W. Heinzen calls ‘the 
paradoxes of revolutionary institution building.’5 The new Soviet state was badly 
constructed, disparate and poorly informed in Central Asia, largely due to the Tsarist 
Empire’s minimal legacy and the Civil War which ravaged it. The problems which may 
be associated with governing any itinerant population, including assessing their wealth, 
calling them to face justice, and educating their children, were compounded by this 
weakness. Soviet administrators were further limited in their ability to control external 
and internal borders, to prevent corruption and bribery and to dictate the terms of use 
of natural resources. From an already low standard, the state sought to learn more 
about nomads, but every item of knowledge was won through serious exertion. The 
consequent ignorance of nomadic life and what constituted a nomad was another 
contributory factor for the Party’s preference for nationhood and class, social 
categories many members felt they understood with more confidence. 
Development and Nomadism in Opposition 
Nevertheless, the Communist Party was utterly committed to economic 
development or ‘modernization’.6 Like the National Question, this commitment to 
development crowded into any considerations of nomadism and dictated terms. Of all 
demographic groups across the USSR, nomadic Kazakhs were among the very least 
empowered by the tumult of revolution and its aftermath. Their power and wealth in 
Central Asia had already been in long decline when they were annexed by the Tsar, and 
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the Russian Empire did much to accelerate this trend. After violence and property 
confiscation by military forces from 1917-1920, when Communist Party members 
sought out role models for their new vision of an economically prosperous east, they 
found the opposite among nomads. The future was not nomadic. This feeling was 
augmented by ideology and scholarship, and was a point of commonality for all 
Communists. The simple consensus, less Marxist than simply modern, was as follows: 
nomadism was a wretched and unproductive existence, and nomads could be changed.  
Yet, importantly, sedentarisation was not the immediate answer. As mentioned, 
there were disputes. A very small number of early participants in the administration 
argued that Kazakhs were nomadic by nature, and that settlement was unlikely, 
unnecessary or even undesirable for them. This view was short-lived. A more 
commonly held view in the administration maintained that the unforgiving conditions 
of the steppe meant sedentary farming would never be feasible in large patches of the 
republic, and that leaving this land for nomadic use was no inconvenience for the 
regime. Furthermore, any inconveniences that did arise would be ephemeral. Nomads 
would soon settle voluntarily if shown the benefits of socialism; some believed that 
nomads desperately wished to settle and only needed the opportunity.  
Apologists for nomadism in the Party were most successful in the earliest years 
of the decade when the emancipatory rhetoric of the Bolsheviks was interpreted in 
Central Asia as justification for decolonisation and post-colonial reparations made to 
non-Russian peoples. The wretchedness of nomadic life was more often blamed on 
Tsarism than on nomadism, and the vexations of governing nomads was contextualised 
by the colonial history of the region and the injustice of the Tsar’s rule. 
In line with these attitudes, the 1920s witnessed various attempts to induce 
settlement without resorting to violent sedentarisation, beginning in the first days of 
Communist rule. Some techniques were realised repeatedly throughout the decade. 
These included: border-making which would make migration harder and settlement 
easier; exhortation and propaganda; penalising bai families economically and agitating 
against them in an effort to undermine their power and liberate paupers hoping to 
settle; confiscation of livestock; preferential tax rates for those who settled. Other 
methods were notional, in that they were explicitly endorsed by higher organs of state 
but were never likely to be widely or systematically implemented because of the 
poverty and disorganisation of the Soviet administration. These methods included: 
subsidies of fodder, building materials, equipment and currency for newly-settled 
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families; offering agronomic expertise; recruiting large numbers of nomads into the 
Communist Party. 
Other measures were taken to manage nomads on a pragmatic day-to-day basis 
and did not take settlement as the ultimate goal. Again these are detectable late in the 
1920s. They included: changing patterns of animal husbandry; veterinary assistance; 
education; the emancipation of women; the tax-in-kind early in the NEP period; some 
acts of border making (designed to redirect, not stop, migrations); adaptations to water 
access. Although these policies were a kind of compromise, in that they brought 
nomads closer to a Communist ideal without explicitly undermining their lifestyle, they 
were likely conceived as a stop-gap. The inevitability of mass voluntary settlement was 
a presumption which never quite left most administrators. 
Difficulties of Governance 
The single greatest compromise made by the Soviet state in this vein was its 
decision to go mobile.  Various institutions and state undertakings made the effort of 
traversing the steppe in a remarkably concerted effort to engage with these most 
marginal of citizens. This was most often seen in areas of social policy (the Red Yurts), 
but there was an element of this in economic policy (use of nomadic markets) and in 
infrastructural development (the Red Caravan; nomadic volosts). Nomads were less 
participants than targets of these and all other state projects of the time, and in this 
sense the case study confirms the old dichotomy between state and society so often 
seen in historiography of the USSR. Yet the state was proactive in its engagement with 
Kazakh nomads. There appears to have been a genuine desire to recruit them into the 
Party and otherwise increase awareness of the revolution and their place in the post-
revolutionary world, in a manner which may even compare favourably with the 
relationship between similar modern states and their minority groups. It may have lent 
nomads more control over their lives and enabled them to better negotiate with the 
bureaucratic system which was quickly emerging around them, but it is also an 
example of the Soviet state exerting and consolidating power. The failure to recruit 
many nomads into Party and state processes was therefore also an ongoing failure of 
the state to make itself powerful for nomads in the 1920s, at least by its own ambitious 
standards. 
To summarise, such were the demographic and intellectual qualities of the Soviet 
administration, it could agree on little more this most basic assertion about Kazakh 
nomads: nomadism was inherently backward, nomads need not be. Beyond this the 
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Party lacked ideological direction, and this is why a stronger ideological agenda, the 
national delimitation of Central Asia, was allowed to complicate the proper 
management of nomadic groups, a task which would have been difficult enough given 
the infrastructural weakness of the early Soviet state. A variety of programmes were 
implemented in nomadic regions, some designed to incentivise settlement, some 
intended to mitigate nomadism’s backwardness in the short term. The perceived 
failure of many schemes demonstrates a kind of impotence of Soviet power among 
nomads; though Soviet administrators had immense power to affect the lives of Kazakh 
nomads, it proved difficult to make these nomads complicit or cooperative with Soviet 
power. With a few notable exceptions they remained subjects but not participants. 
The limitations of the state’s administrative structures and processes were a 
source of unending anxiety for Party figures. The option of limited governmental 
autonomy for conglomerations of nomadic families was never considered; various 
governing frameworks all prescribed an element of state supervision or direct 
interference. Measures were taken, particularly in 1924-1925, to clarify and strengthen 
these frameworks. This was motivated principally by the economic ambition of the 
Kazakh Communist Party branch and their leaders in Moscow. Areas of the Kazakh 
Republic were selected for special treatment. Oil fields, fishing enterprises and railway 
lines were prioritised and developed, and their nearby towns became important 
administrative centres. Land in these areas was more jealously guarded from migrating 
nomads, and these areas were getting bigger. Overall the state’s treatment of its 
nomadic citizens was becoming increasingly systematic; by 1928 the nomads’ 
experience of Soviet power was less arbitrary and personal and more consistent and 
regulated, more bureaucratic. 
Problems remained. First, the nature of Soviet power in nomadic areas was still 
blunter and more reactionary than in sedentary areas. Nomadic lives could be 
profoundly changed by decisions made in Kyzyl-Orda, but not with the precision and 
nuance that was desired. Large numbers of nomads could be encouraged back and 
forth across the Sino-Soviet border, but what of kul′turnost′, law and order or, most 
importantly, productivity? Nomads, on account of their lifestyle, were as much unable 
as unwilling to engage in a dialogue with the state about techniques of animal 
husbandry and efficient use of pasture, and when they did hear about state schemes 
through rumour and hearsay they reacted with understandable suspicion if not 
hostility. Mobile herds were harder to count and tax; nomadic pasturage was harder to 
delimit. 
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Second, administrative structures charged with managing the nomadic 
population were largely the same structures available to the sedentary population. The 
Party created few nomad-specific institutions, partly because nomadism was thought 
to be a temporary problem and partly due to the lack of ideological clarity over what 
nomadism was and how it should be treated. This created concerns no matter how well 
the infrastructure functioned. The land commissions, for example, also resolved 
disputes between sedentary communities. Nomads were simply an extra burden on 
bureaucrats’ time. Organisations were modelled on those elsewhere in the USSR where 
communities did not migrate habitually, and bodies such as the public prosecutor’s 
office in Gur′ev came to see nomads as a nuisance, and presented them as such to 
central authorities. 
It may seem counterintuitive to emphasise the impotence of the Soviet state 
given that, from 1928 onwards, it would implement one of the most profound 
transformational campaigns ever witnessed in Central Asia, albeit in tandem with 
auxiliary phenomena for which the state was not wholly responsible. How did the state 
come to choose and enforce sedentarisation?  
The Importance of the Steppe 
To the extent that trends are observable, the earliest years of the decade were 
characterised by a more permissive attitude towards nomads. As argued, this was 
partly the result of the febrile post-colonial atmosphere and the Bolsheviks’ official 
suppression of Great Russian chauvinism. The Kazakh Party branch had also acquired 
many former members of the Alash Party and other recruits with a diversity of opinion 
which did not lend itself to firm action in regard to nomads. Furthermore, it was more 
common at this time to conceive of the steppe as a forbidding wasteland. In claiming 
that the October Revolution had not yet reached the Kazakh Republic, and that Kazakhs 
needed a ‘Little October’, Goloshchekin was largely talking of social and economic 
change. It is vitally important to remember that Russia, for so long considered the 
backward cousin of its fellow European empires, was on the whole considerably less 
agrarian and more industrialised than Central Asia when the Winter Palace was raided. 
But perhaps early members of the Kazakh Party branch also did not feel the revolution 
had penetrated the steppe in a more geographical sense.  The region was little known, 
vast and inscrutable. 
Steppe lands were therefore an early exception to the otherwise remarkable self-
assurance of the Party in Central Asia. Post-revolutionary ardour led state organs to 
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promise tranches of material aid which were vastly beyond their capabilities to provide. 
Party members seem to have assumed that the advent of socialism would allow long-
standing tribal conflicts to conclude themselves after a day of convivial negotiation. But 
it took time for this optimism to stretch itself fully into nomadic territory. Sceptical 
Party figures like Mendeshev and Sadvokasov reacted emphatically to Vainshtein’s 
confident claims about the social structures of the aul. Land commissioners, 
commissars and governate officials recognised the impossibility of growing crops in 
saline soil or raising cattle without proper pasture. This changed when Goloshchekin 
arrived and took measures to eject naysayers, but on a subtler level a culture change 
was already underway. Optimism and confidence was invested in technology, 
bureaucracy and organisation, and in the possibility that these three working in 
tandem could tame steppe lands; nomadic lands. Scholars such as A. N. Donich claimed 
to see possibilities where the steppe’s inhabitants had not. 
At this point, the nomads’ uncertain status was thrown into relief. Though 
animosity and ambivalence are wholly different, the result might be similar. Religion, 
to a large extent in the Soviet 1920s and 1930s, was conceived as a direct obstacle to 
progress. It had to be destroyed.  For much of the 1920s, nomadism was less an 
obstacle than a forgotten laggard, frustratingly slow-paced and distanced from the 
main struggle. Unlike Islam, which could evangelise and propagate counter-revolution, 
few Party members thought nomadism would spread like a transgressive faith and 
unmake the gains of October. Nomadic bais defended migration as a means of retaining 
power but their reach barely exceeded beyond the outskirts of the camp. It was not 
until ever larger portions of the steppe, not just the odd Russian farmstead, were 
credited with productive potential that these straggling nomads became a concern for 
more than themselves. In the late 1920s nomadic land became a meaningful resource, 
and its occupants’ lifestyle became an obstacle in the exploitation of that resource. 
The Question of Imperialism 
The bais then played a similar but not identical role to the kulak. The bais were 
blamed for nomadism’s longevity up until 1928, were identified as figureheads of 
resistance to the campaign, and were said to be the targets of the most extreme 
confiscatory policies. In European Russia and Siberia, however, the hoarding of 
foodstuffs by reactionary kulaks was a primary justification for heavy-handed 
confiscation. In Central Asia the practices of all nomads justified sedentarisation.  
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Class, like nationality, became a system of social categorisation which was used 
by the Party in preference to one based on the nomadic-sedentary divide. Earlier in the 
decade the nomadic aul was sometimes presented as more insulated from the old 
capitalist economy and therefore less stratified, making the bais less malevolent figures. 
Debates over the proper use of batrak in nomadic regions show that the familiar 
conceptions of proletarian and bourgeois identity used on the streets of Moscow had 
been deployed less on the steppe. But as the decolonisation process lost its vigour and 
the Party again began supervising the resurgence of Russian settlers back into Central 
Asia, class-based discourse achieved the same pervasiveness it had achieved in 
European Russia. After initial attempts at treating nomads as an economic category of 
their own for the purposes of taxation, nomads were divided up into bedniak, seredniak 
and bai categories in exactly the same manner as sedentary communities could be. 
These categories were used not just to assess wealth, but applicability for membership 
of the Communist Party. The frameworks with which the Party made itself conscious of 
society’s marginalised groups thus had a blinkering effect. The Party recruited 
economically and nationally marginalised groups with enthusiasm but failed to do the 
same for those marginalised by their agricultural practices. 
Arguably the imposition of Russian class and national terms onto nomadic 
communities was one small example of a much broader way of characterising the 
Soviet state’s actions, that of economic and cultural imperialism. The extraction of 
resources from Central Asia for use in European Russia, coordinated from Moscow 
with little to no system of exchange, might be characterised as economic imperialism. 
The denigration of Kazakh habits and the forceful imposition of Russian culture might 
be characterised as cultural imperialism. In this interpretation of the decade, the 
Bolsheviks arrived in Central Asia with comparable aims to those of the Tsar: the 
economic exploitation of the region and its people and the endorsement of Russian 
cultural norms and domestic practices at the expense of local variants, all to the benefit 
of a leading cadre of Party officials based principally in Moscow. 
To address the final point first, as the Soviet Empire’s hypothetical metropole, 
Moscow’s involvement in the management of nomads is not straightforward. Much has 
been made in the historiography of Goloshchekin’s loyalty to Stalin, and the parallels 
between the political repression overseen in the Kazakh Party branch with those 
taking place across the Union. Though it preceded collectivisation in Siberia and 
European Russia, sedentarisation was roughly coterminous with the state’s assault on 
the Russian peasantry and should therefore be associated with the changing nature of 
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Moscow’s rule and efforts to extract economic resources from the countryside. Less 
measurable but equally important was the ongoing cultural transmission, in which an 
absolute faith in man’s dominance over nature made its way from the old imperial 
nation to its former colony. Thus the cultural and economic connection between the 
Kazakh Steppe and European Russia, and the latter’s unquestionable dominance within 
this relationship, survived the revolution, and allowed Moscow to influence the 
direction of Kazakh Party policy in a similar way that Saint Petersburg had dictated the 
direction of reform in its Central Asian colonies.  
On the other hand neither settlement nor sedentarisation were driven by 
Moscow. These policies appear to have originated in the Kazakh Party branch, and 
though they were sanctioned by the political and cultural direction of the whole Union, 
they were partly the product of a deeply condescending attitude towards nomadism 
shared by many Russian and many Kazakh Communists from the early days of Soviet 
power. Furthermore the period preceding 1928 is characterised by departmental 
disputes arising between bureaucratic jurisdictions, not between centre and periphery.  
Agronomic experts argued with educationalists and agricultural commissioners 
quarrelled with accountants, but Kyzyl-Orda and Moscow acted as much in concert as 
in contradiction of one another. Localised resistance to the actions of the state came 
mostly from outside the Party, and though the Party was majority European, 
considerable efforts were made to recruit Kazakhs. 
Korenizatsiia, then, might also be cited to defend the USSR from accusations of 
imperialism, in that it sought not to subdue national minorities but to empower them, 
admittedly within the context of its own governing structures. It is true that, as with so 
much else, the Bolsheviks understood their anti-imperial efforts in national terms. As 
stated, Kazakhs were given preferential rights in a bid to undermine Russian 
dominance in Kazakh lands. What of sedentary dominance in nomadic lands? Sergei 
Solov′ev, the nineteenth century historian who worked so hard to justify Russia’s 
imperial ambitions, may have seen something the Bolsheviks did not when he 
conceived of Central Asia as a battleground between European sedentary civilisation 
and Asiatic nomadic barbarism.7 Again, the Communist Party’s limited respect for non-
Russian cultural customs extended only to those deemed a constituent part of 
nationhood and compatible with socialism. Nomadism was neither. Preferential rights 
were ascribed to Kazakhs, not nomads; indeed, Kazakhs were encouraged to settle land 
                                                          
7 Seymour Becker, 'Russia between East and West: The intelligentsia, Russian national identity 
and the Asian borderlands,' Central Asian Survey 10, no. 4 (1991), p. 50. 
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if they had not already done so. Nevertheless, korenizatsiia complicates the imperial 
paradigm. It did not benefit nomads, in fact it may have contributed to their hardship. 
But it does not therefore follow that the treatment of nomads was imperialistic in 
nature, simply that aspects of the Bolsheviks’ counter-imperial programme overlooked 
nomadic issues. 
Also in defiance of the imperial paradigm, nomads may have been excluded from 
many of the Soviet state’s efforts to accommodate and represent formerly colonised 
peoples, but they found ways to benefit all the same. The most obvious example is their 
retrieval of recently colonised land after the Civil War, but shrewd nomads were also 
able to harness Communist priorities for their own ends. They learned quickly to 
deploy the language of national and class grievance to achieve their aims. Petitions 
from nomads made accusations of national chauvinism or bourgeois sympathising, and 
could associate their needs with those of their titular republic if it was expedient. As 
marginal as they were, then, nomads could appropriate identities the state recognised 
for their own gain.8 This reveals a small degree of participation or complicity with the 
new Soviet status quo among some nomads, which an explicitly racist Western 
European empire, for example, may have precluded on the basis of their ethnic 
deficiencies.  
Whether nomads participated or not, furthermore, economic resources were at 
least notionally granted to them rather than taken from them. In some cases this was 
arguably with the larger intention of making them more productive, as when loans 
were made to nomads who settled. Yet, settling or not, nomads were at times offered 
material relief from hardship and access to resources which might otherwise have been 
exploited by the larger state infrastructure. 
The picture then is mixed. Communist thought on nomads did bear resemblance 
to the musings of Tsarist officials. As nomads were thought less Islamised and 
therefore more susceptible to Orthodox Christianity, so nomadic women were thought 
less submissive and therefore more amenable to socialism.9  Yet the Party explicitly, if 
only for a time, permitted the spontaneous decolonisation of the steppe. Over a longer 
                                                          
8 Jochen Hellbeck’s argument is not quite that Soviet citizens interacted in this manner with 
state ideology in pursuit of their own self-interest, but his insights remain relevant at this 
juncture: Jochen Hellbeck, 'Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: the Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi, 1931-9,' 
in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 78-79. 
Hellbeck draws considerably from Stephen Kotkin for his analytical framework: Stephen Kotkin, 
Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
9 Becker, 'Russia between East and West,' pp. 59-61. 
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period various regional organs maintained the principle that native Kazakhs should be 
given first preference to land over Russians and others. Substantial efforts were taken 
to improve the health of nomads. Campaigns against customs such as kalym, if 
imperialistic, were tempered by an ostentatious respect for non-Russian languages and 
a refutation of Great Russian chauvinism. If the Soviet centre entered the late 1930s 
with a structural, imperialistic relationship with its Central Asian periphery, evidence 
from the treatment of nomads in the 1920s at least shows that this was not the 
inevitable direction of travel. 
The research questions of this thesis ultimately allow only a limited appraisal of 
the imperial paradigm. There were other nomads in Soviet Central Asia, principally 
Kyrgyz, who have been excluded from investigation in the interests of making the 
thesis manageable. Their experience of Soviet power may have been substantially 
different, more or less directed from Moscow and more or less imperialistic. 
Furthermore, the ambitions of the project leave little room to discuss the Russian 
Empire. As an explicitly imperial enterprise, Tsarist Russia is the most obvious point of 
comparison when assessing the Soviet Union’s imperial status, particularly as both 
states ruled Central Asia. An expansion of the project in time and space would also 
allow for a comparative element to emerge between the Russian Empire and the USSR 
and between different manifestations of Soviet power in different regions of the Union.  
Indeed, comparisons with any other modern state containing nomadic citizens 
would be highly instructive when further assessing the 1920s in Soviet Kazakhstan. 
Again, the project’s prevailing aim to learn more specifically about nomadic history in 
Central Asia and about the nature of Soviet power prevented comprehensive 
comparison with similar states, regions and epochs. Such an addition would help to 
answer the question of whether or not states of the Soviet kind always have trouble 
managing itinerant groups, habitual or not, and the extent to which there is anything 
uniquely challenging about governing nomads. 
Wider Implications 
The objective of this doctoral project was to investigate a little-researched period 
in the history of a little-researched region of the world. Kazakh archives have been a 
largely untapped resource, despite their accessibility and substantive holdings. 
Western scholarship has only recently turned to Kazakhstan as a topic of study, as for 
so long the country was subsumed within the larger and more conspicuous categories 
of ‘Russian’ and ‘Soviet’. On its emergence as a new and independent country, there has 
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been an understandable desire to focus on Kazakhstan’s history in national terms. This 
has been a productive tendency, but it has its limits, and the present thesis has 
reversed the trend by focusing on the nomadic element of early Soviet history in the 
area. The thesis has also eschewed an exclusive focus on sedentarisation as the key 
point of emphasis, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the campaign’s importance. 
The product of this approach has been a series of insights into the relationship 
between the Soviet state and nomads. Nomads were marginalised by their lifestyle, by 
forbidding environmental conditions, by recent Tsarist history, and by the Party’s 
interest in alternative systems of social categorisation which did not reflect the 
nomadic-sedentary divide. In this manner an explicitly materialist political philosophy 
counterintuitively overlooked and mismanaged one of the most profound material 
realities of the Central Asian population; the difference between nomads and non-
nomads. Comparably counter-intuitive is the state’s subsequent decision to migrate 
alongside its nomadic citizens, and engage with them in spite of its own economic 
priorities. Nevertheless, the case study largely reinforces the dichotomy between state 
and society, while simultaneously complicating the centre-periphery dynamic. The 
Soviet state acted upon nomads, while granting them limited meaningful opportunity 
to engage with, influence or veto policy. The manner in which it did so was the product 
of mixed priorities within the administration, priorities which cannot be easily divided 
up between those of Moscow and those of its provinces. Overall, in the case of Kazakh 
nomads, the Soviet state was more distanced from the population; less centralised; 
more proactive; less static and inflexible; and more driven by the needs of economic 
development than may previously have been anticipated. 
Early in the 1920s, in a short circular letter to all the Uezd Committees of the 
Ural′sk Governate, a prominent figure in the Governate’s administration claimed that 
nomadism was a primitive form of economic activity which had ‘long ago been 
separated from civilization’.10 Without a transition to settlement, he added, it would be 
impossible to equalise class relations, improve the nomads’ economic condition, battle 
various epidemics, or raise the nomads’ cultural and sanitary standards. He further 
added that ‘All communist workers must ensure that national inequalities are dealt 
with.’11 In content, no document better communicates the ambitions of the nascent 
administration even in the early years following the Civil War. But in its lack of clear 
instructions, reticence on methodology and timescale, and disregard for the material 
                                                          
10 The figure in question was a certain Comrade Dolgushev. APRK 139/1/40: 12. 
11 APRK 139/1/40: 12. 
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realities of the state’s capabilities, no document better communicates the incoherent, 
lethal optimism with which Kazakh nomads were confronted after the establishment of 
the new Soviet sedentary culture in Central Asia.  
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Aul     A Kazakh village or nomadic community. 
Bai     A wealthy Kazakh. 
Batrak A farm labourer or, in a nomadic community, a 
hired hand. 
Bedniak    A poor peasant. 
Byt ’Everyday life’, particularly regarding domestic 
or menial matters. 
Dzhut A hard frost on steppe lands, causing 
widespread starvation amongst nomadic 
livestock. 
Governate The largest administrative sub-division of the 
Russian Empire, also used by the Soviet state 
until the mid-1920s. 
Gubispolkom    A Governate-level Executive Committee 
Gubkom A Governate-level Committee 
Kalym The Kazakh dowry or bride price. 
KASSR The Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic, geographically very similar to 
contemporary Kazakhstan, created in 1925. 
Kirgiz The ethnonym used to describe the Kazakhs 
until 1925. The Kyrgyz at this time were called 
Kara-Kirgiz. 
KSSR The Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic, the 
precursor to the KASSR but without its 
southernmost provinces and including land 
around Orenburg and elsewhere. 
KTsIK The Kirgiz/Kazakh Central Executive Committee 
Kulak A wealthy peasant and member of a rural 
bourgeois class. 
Kul′turnost′ ‘Culturedness’, various personal virtues 
associated with refinement and civilisation. 
Narkomfin KASSR/KSSR  The Kazakh People’s Commissariat of Finances. 
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Narkomfin RSFSR The People’s Commissariat of Finances for the 
whole federative republic, including the Kazakh 
Republic but also Russian and Kyrgyz lands. 
Narkominodel    The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. 
Narkomiust KSSR   The Kazakh People’s Commissariat for Justice. 
Narkomnats KSSR The Kazakh People’s Commissariat for the 
Nationalities. 
Narkomprod KSSR The Kazakh People’s Commissariat for Food 
Supplies. 
Narkomprod RSFSR  The People’s Commissariat for Food Supplies. 
Narkomrabkri KSSR The Kazakh Inspectorate of Workers and 
Peasants.   
Narkomvnutdel  The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs. 
Narkomzem KASSR/KSSR The Kazakh People’s Commissariat for 
Agriculture. 
Oblast An administrative region between an uezd and 
governate in size. 
Okrug A new Soviet administrative region based on an 
area’s economic characteristics, introduced in 
the mid-1920s. 
Okruzhkom    An okrug-level committee. 
Pood A unit of measurement roughly equivalent to 
sixteen kilograms. 
RSFSR The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 
the largest republic within Soviet territory. 
Saun The Kazakh tradition of renting livestock to the 
poor. 
Seredniak    A peasant of moderate wealth. 
Sovnarkom KASSR/KSSR  The Kazakh Soviet of People’s Commissars 
Uezd A small administrative region predating 1917, 
typically constituting several volosts. 
Volost      A small administrative region predating 1917. 
VTsIK     The All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 
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